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This dissertation is a collection of three essays that address the economic and 
environmental effects of land use spillovers.  The first essay explores mechanisms for 
controlling nonpoint source water pollution, given that water quality in a watershed is 
a function of spillovers from agricultural production.  The second essay considers the 
selection of an optimal wildlife corridor, on the basis that parcel values are a function 
of nearby land use.  The third essay estimates the effect of spillovers from open space 
land on residential property prices.  Taken together, the essays address enduring 
environmental economics issues through the application of contemporary economic 
tools.  
The first essay proposes a mechanism for addressing ambient pollution through 
a background threat of regulation which induces nonpoint source polluters to 
voluntarily reduce emissions.  Specifically, the severity of the threatened tax policy is 
endogenous to voluntary stage outcomes.  Beyond showing the mechanism’s 
theoretical properties, the essay highlights a set of economics experiments in which 
participants are faced with a voluntary-threat policy. 
The second essay introduces a model for determining an optimal wildlife 
corridor that, in a departure from previous corridor research, accounts for both the 
costs and benefits of individual parcels.  By combining parcel-level costs and benefits 
for land areas connecting three ecosystems in the Northern Rockies, the economic 
tradeoffs inherent in corridor design are empirically examined.  By varying the 
granularity of the available parcels, the study explores issues related to model 
  
 
specificity and computational complexity.  A heuristic is also proposed that offers 
considerable computational advantages and approximates the optimal corridor.   
The third essay applies hedonic pricing methods to estimate marginal implicit 
prices for open space land and other landscape amenities across distinct urban, 
suburban and rural submarkets in Rochester, NY, rather than the standard approach 
which assumes spatial uniformity.  Results, controlling for spatial autocorrelation and 
the endogeneity of nearby open space, suggest that public open space is most highly 
valued in urbanized areas and that private open space is relatively valuable in rural 
areas.  Additionally, proximity to concentrated animal feeding operations and other 
locational disamenitites have a significantly negative impact on home prices.   
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CHAPTER ONE: 
Voluntary-Threat Mechanisms to Reduce Ambient Water Pollution 
 
 
Abstract 
This essay focuses on voluntary-threat policies that provide incentives to producers to 
reduce agricultural nonpoint source water pollution. The policies allow a group of 
polluters to meet a pollution target voluntarily, under the threat of a mandatory tax 
policy that is implemented only in the case of voluntary noncompliance. In a departure 
from the voluntary-threat mechanism proposed by Segerson and Wu (Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 2006), in which the threatened tax 
mechanism is determined exogenously, a threatened tax mechanism is introduced 
where tax liabilities are conditional on the level of noncompliance in the voluntary 
setting. This “endogenous” voluntary-threat mechanism generates voluntary, least-cost 
compliance as part of a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, without the need 
for retroactive taxation. Laboratory economics experiments are used to investigate 
both the Segerson and Wu mechanism and the voluntary-threat mechanism introduced 
in this essay. Results indicate that the voluntary-threat policies do not generally result 
in ambient standards being achieved voluntarily unless communication occurs among 
participants or the threatened tax policy is made severe. 
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1.1  Introduction 
Improvements in surface water quality since the passage of the Federal Clean 
Water Act Amendments of 1972 have come primarily as a result of emissions 
reductions from point sources, such as wastewater treatment plants and factories. 
While opportunities for further point source reductions remain, nonpoint source 
pollution presently represents the greatest share of surface water impairment in the 
United States (Ribaudo 2003). Agricultural production, which occurs on 
approximately 60% of nonfederal land in the US (NRI 2002), is the largest contributor 
to nonpoint source water pollution and the leading source of water quality 
impairments among the rivers and lakes surveyed in the 2000 National Water Quality 
Inventory (US EPA 2002).   
  Given the influential role of nonpoint sources, economic theorists have devised 
a number of mandatory approaches designed to reduce surface water pollution 
stemming from agricultural production. These approaches can be roughly broken into 
performance-based policies, which base regulation on measurable outcomes, and 
design-based policies, which are predicated on input decisions (Ribaudo 1999). Since 
nonpoint source emissions are characterized as prohibitively costly to monitor on a 
firm-by-firm basis, performance-based policies have been directed toward ambient 
environmental conditions. Beginning with the seminal work of Segerson (1988), 
numerous mandatory approaches have been proposed that provide incentives to 
nonpoint sources based on measured ambient pollution levels (e.g., Xepapadeas 1991; 
Cabe and Herriges 1992; Hansen 1998; Horan et al. 1998; Karp 2004).   
One main criticism of mandatory approaches, in particular policies that involve 
taxing nonpoint polluters based on ambient pollution, is political feasibility. Policy 
makers have historically addressed nonpoint source pollution almost exclusively 
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through voluntary measures.
1 While purely voluntary programs have been widely 
accepted by agricultural producers, there is little evidence that they have delivered 
outcomes, in terms of improved water quality, that would warrant declaring them a 
success (Shortle, Abler and Ribaudo 2001).   
In an effort to wed the political attractiveness of a voluntary policy with the 
theoretical effectiveness of an appropriately designed mandatory policy, Segerson and 
Wu (2006) develop a policy that uses voluntary and mandatory programs as 
complementary instruments. The proposed policy allows firms in a watershed to meet 
an ambient pollution standard voluntarily. As long as the ambient standard is 
achieved, no regulatory action takes place. If, however, the standard is not met 
voluntarily, then a mandatory instrument is put in place, under which all firms face an 
ambient-based pollution tax. The threatened tax policy is structured in such a way that 
profit maximizing firms are induced to meet the ambient pollution standard 
voluntarily. 
This voluntary-threat policy has some clear advantages over a strictly 
mandatory or strictly voluntary approach. From a producer’s standpoint the policy is 
attractive because it allows for flexibility in meeting pollution standards without 
explicit regulation or taxation. From the regulator’s standpoint the policy’s 
attractiveness comes from avoiding the potentially large costs associated with 
administering the tax and incurring the information costs necessary to appropriately 
set the tax rate. Finally, the instrument is desirable from a social planner’s perspective, 
as it offers the potential to address the nonpoint source pollution problem cost 
effectively.   
                                                 
1 Common voluntary policies include land retirement programs, such as the Conservation Reserve 
Program, as well as working land programs, that provide incentives to agricultural landowners for 
developing best management practices (BMPs) and implementing pollution prevention and control 
measures.  Annual federal expenditures for voluntary conservation programs are projected to be nearly 
$5 billion by 2011 (ERS 2002). 
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A shortcoming of the Segerson and Wu mechanism is that there is a theoretical 
coordination problem in the voluntary policy stage, resulting from the existence of 
multiple Nash equilibria, including an equilibrium where none of the firms engage in 
pollution control. To address the theoretical issues related to the existence of multiple 
Nash equilibria, an endogenous tax mechanism is introduced where expected tax 
payments are an increasing function of the degree of noncompliance in the voluntary 
stage. This mechanism can be designed to induce optimal abatement in the voluntary 
stage as a unique equilibrium. 
Due to the novelty of a voluntary-threat policy, empirical program evaluation 
using naturally occurring data is not possible since no such policy is presently being 
implemented.
2 The social gains from a pollution standard being achieved voluntarily 
at least cost, together with the theoretic potential for costly suboptimal equilibria, 
imply that the experimental economics laboratory is an important intermediate testing 
ground for gaining a perspective on how the proposed policies might work in practice.   
In recent years a burgeoning experimental economics literature has 
complemented theoretical work on nonpoint source pollution, through laboratory tests 
of many of the proposed ambient-based mandatory policies (Spraggon 2002, 2004; 
Alpizar et al. 2004; Poe et al. 2004, Cochard et al. 2005; Vossler et al. 2006; Suter et 
al. forthcoming). The results from these experimental studies show that a subset of the 
proposed policies, including a tax policy similar to the threatened policy of Segerson 
and Wu, engender outcomes that are highly efficient. However, none of these studies 
have tested a voluntary-threat policy. 
                                                 
2 Compliance mechanisms require farmers to undertake conservation measures to be eligible for some 
federal aid programs.  For example, farmers who fail to reduce soil erosion on highly erodible land may 
be ineligible for some federal benefits (USDA 2004).  While this is similar to a voluntary-threat policy, 
the threat is based more on input decisions than on the meeting a collective performance standard.  
  4 
This essay introduces an endogenous voluntary-threat policy and compares 
experimental outcomes from the policy to outcomes under the voluntary-threat policy 
proposed by Segerson and Wu. The next section provides the theoretical background 
for the policy introduced by Segerson and Wu and derives the theoretical properties of 
the new endogenous policy. Section 1.3 details the experimental design and Section 
1.4 presents and analyzes experimental results. Section 1.5 concludes with a summary 
of the findings along with a discussion of their policy relevance. 
1.2  Theoretical Background  
The economic model follows that of Segerson and Wu closely. In particular, it 
is assumed that abatement and firm characteristics can each be represented by a scalar 
and that the policy goal is one of meeting an ambient water quality standard on 
average, such that stochastic factors (e.g., weather) can presumably be suppressed. 
 There are n firms, indexed by i, in a given watershed. Let ai denote the firm’s 
abatement decision and ( ) n a a a ,..., , 2 1 = a  the vector of abatement decisions. Ci = C(ai, 
θi) is the abatement cost function, where θi is an index that represents characteristics 
specific to the firm. The vector of characteristics of all firms in the watershed is 
( n) θ θ θ ,..., , 2 1 = θ . It is assumed that the cost function is strictly convex, with 
0 C   0,
2 2 > ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ i i a a C and ( ) 0 0, C i = θ . Ambient pollution at a monitoring point, 
denoted by x, is a function of the abatement decisions and firm characteristics of all 
firms, i.e., x = x(a1,…an; θ1,…, θn), with  0 < ∂ ∂ i a x and  0
2 2 ≥ ∂ ∂ i a x . Given that 
abatement is costly, in the absence of any policy intervention it is expected that in 
equilibrium ai=0.  
A social planner is interested in meeting an exogenously determined water 
quality standard, which is denoted by x
s. The standard could be based on a Total 
Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) requirement or simply be a product of political 
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bargaining. The social planner’s problem and corresponding Lagrangian, assuming an 
interior solution, can then be written as 
                                     (1)  () ( ) 0 , x ,...,θ ;θ ,...,a a x s.t.     ,θ a C
n
1 i
s
n 1 n 1 i i Min ≥ ≤ ∑
=
a
a
 
() ( ( n 1 n 1
s
n
1 i
i i ,...,θ ;θ ,...,a a x x λ , a C L − + − = ∑
=
θ ) ) .                                                        (2) 
  The first-order conditions from equation (2) are solved with each firm in the 
watershed making abatement decision , so that the vector of optimal abatement 
decisions can be denoted by . The strict monotonicity and convexity of the firm 
cost functions imply that                           for all i, where
*
i i a a =
* a a =
λ  can be interpreted as the 
marginal cost to the group of polluters of decreasing the ambient standard by one unit. 
Since , the constraint is binding and therefore, at the optimum, ambient 
pollution is exactly equal to the standard. 
0 λ
* >
*
*
i /
λ =
i a
a *
x
C
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
The following subsections detail the theoretical basis for three policies that 
seek to induce polluters in a watershed to achieve the ambient pollution standard at 
least cost. The first two policies, a pure ambient tax policy and a voluntary policy with 
a threat of an exogenously determined tax, are similar to those described by Segerson 
and Wu and the reader is directed to the proofs provided in that article. The primary 
difference between the theory presented here and that in Segerson and Wu is that here 
the threatened tax policy is put in place for K rounds rather than in perpetuity, as 
assumed in Segerson and Wu. A rigorous analysis of the third policy, a voluntary 
policy with a threat of an endogenously determined tax, is provided to establish the 
policy’s theoretical properties. 
Pure Ambient Tax Policy 
  The social planner is charged with meeting the ambient standard at least cost 
through the use of a policy that charges all firms in the watershed a marginal tax, τ, on 
units of ambient pollution above a specific tax threshold, x . Setting and
* λ τ =
s x x = , 
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the cost minimization problem for firm i, where the superscript t indicates abatement 
under the tax, is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
s
1
a
x ,... ; ,...  τ 0, max , C     Min
t
i
− ⋅ + n i n i
t
i a a x a θ θ θ .                                       (3)  
Under the tax policy  is a Nash equilibrium, where is the optimal abatement 
level for firm i as defined previously. The intuition for this result is as follows. 
Suppose the vector of abatement decisions by the other n – 1 firms is denoted by 
* t a a =
*
i a
( )
* *
1
*
1
* ,..., n i -i
t
-i a a − = = a a
t
i
*
i
t
i a a <
*
1,..., , i a a + . Ambient pollution will be equal to or less than the 
standard if abatement by firm i is  . Since there is no marginal benefit to 
reducing ambient pollution below the standard,  can never be a best response. 
Firm i will therefore choose a and achieve the standard with equality or 
and pay the ambient tax. 
*
i
t
i a a ≥
*
i a
*
i
t
i a a >
=
When , the marginal benefit of abatement by firm i, in terms of tax 
payments avoided, is
*
i
t
i a a <
t
i a x ∂ ∂ ⋅ −τ , where 0 < ∂ ∂
t
i a x . Substituting,                        the 
marginal benefit from abatement becomes                            . For   the strict 
convexity of the abatement cost function implies the marginal cost of abatement by 
firm i is
*
i
t
i a a <
* / i
t
i C a ∂ < ∂
* a
*
*
i /
= τ
i a
a C
∂
∂ ∂
−
x ∂
t
i *
*
i x
/ ∂
i
a
a x
a C
∂ ∂ ⋅
∂ ∂
∂
a C ∂ ∂ . The concavity of the pollution function implies                      
and therefore                                        for . Since the marginal cost of 
abatement is greater than the marginal benefit to the firm,  cannot be a best 
response. Thus, firm i will choose , at the point where the marginal cost of 
abatement is equal to the marginal benefit. Assuming similar rational behavior across 
all firms, is a NE.    
*
i
t
i a a <
*
i
t
i a a <
*
i
t
i a a =
t a =
1
a x
a /
*
i ∂x
i
t
≥
∂ ∂
∂
t
i *
i
*
i t
i a x
/
∂ ∂
a x
a C
a C ∂ ∂ ⋅
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
<
Additionally,  is a unique NE, since abating more than incurs 
marginal abatement costs in excess of the marginal benefit to an individual firm, 
independent of the abatement decisions of other firms in the watershed, i.e.,                                             
* t a a =
*
i a
                              . This implies that can never be optimal and given 
that none of the n firms choose , no firm will rationally choose , since 
                        
* t
i a a i >
* t
i a a i >
* t
i a a i <
t
i *
i t
i a x
x
/
∂ ∂
i
*
a
a C
a C ∂ ∂ ⋅
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
>
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this would result in pollution in excess of the ambient standard. It is illustrated above 
that firms are strictly worse off by choosing and incurring the tax.    
* t
i a a i <
An important feature of the tax policy is that the tax threshold can be replaced 
with any
s x x ≤ , such that the unique NE a is maintained. Therefore
* t a = x is a choice 
variable and settingx  below has the effect of increasing tax payments, while 
remains a unique equilibrium. The cost to each firm of one period of the tax 
policy can therefore be defined as 
s x
* t a a =
( ) ( ) x x τ , a C
s *
i − + i θ .                                                                               (4) 
  The incentives for firms under the pure ambient tax policy are illustrated 
through the best response functions in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 for the simplest case 
involving a watershed comprised of two firms with linear pollution functions. In the 
example, the firms are heterogeneous with respect to their abatement costs and each 
has a maximal level of abatement indicated by the respective dotted lines. In both 
figures, firms face an ambient tax rate of                       . In Figure 1.1, where
s x x = , 
the best response for each firm is to abate just to the point where the ambient standard 
is achieved when abatement effort by the other firm is high. When abatement effort by 
the other firm is equal to or less than , however, firm i’s best response is constant 
at .  
*
j a
*
i a
*
*
i /
= τ
i a x
a C
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
−
s x x < When the tax threshold is reduced to , each firm’s best response is to 
abate so that ambient pollution is equal to the tax threshold as long as abatement effort 
by the other firm is high enough. However, as abatement effort by the other firm is 
reduced, the best response for each firm is again to choose . In each case, the best 
response functions for firms one and two intersect at only one point, indicated in the 
figures by the large dot, and illustrate the unique NE whereby costs are minimized and 
ambient pollution is equal to the standard. This latter result is essential to the design of 
the voluntary-threat mechanisms. 
*
i a
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a 1
a 2
x
s
a 1*
a 2*
b 2(a 1)
b 1(a 2)
 
a 1
a 2
x
s
a 1*
a 2*
b 1(a 2)
b 2(a 1)
 
     Figure 1.1 Pure Ambient Tax: 
s x x =          Figure 1.2 Pure Ambient Tax: 
s x x <   
Exogenous Voluntary-Threat Policy  
If the policy maker allows firms to meet the pollution standard voluntarily, and 
without incentives, it is expected that firms expend zero abatement effort, since 
abatement is expensive. However, consider a case where the policy maker allows 
firms to respond to the pollution standard voluntary, but includes a threat of a 
mandatory tax policy if the standard is not achieved. Specifically, if ambient pollution 
is above the standard in the voluntary setting, then the tax policy described above, 
with
s x x < , is put into place for K < ∞ periods. The finite K-period tax penalty is a 
variation on Segerson and Wu, who assume that the tax policy is imposed in 
perpetuity. The finite nature of the tax penalty eliminates the possibility for other NE 
that could occur in an infinitely repeated game. Moreover, considering the finite case 
is important for purposes of experimental testing as it allows for ending and re-starting 
the game in experimental sessions where a violation occurs, akin to a situation where 
the regulator gives firms a second chance to comply voluntarily.  
The incentive to meet the standard voluntarily is provided by employing a tax 
threshold that is less than the ambient standard, which makes the tax payments – even 
under optimal abatement in the tax stage game – strictly positive for each firm. This is 
labeled the “exogenous” voluntary-threat policy as the tax threshold,x , is exogenous 
in the sense that it does not depend on behavior in the voluntary stage. 
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Using the superscript v to indicate outcomes in the voluntary stage, the amount 
of voluntary abatement chosen by firm i is denoted . The amount of voluntary 
abatement necessary by firm i to ensure that the ambient standard is exactly met, given 
the abatement activities of the other firms in the watershed, is further defined as 
) 
(i.e.,
v
i a
(s v
i a
( )
s
i i
v
i
s v
i x a x = − − θ a , ; ,
) ( θ ). In every period of the tax stage, as described in the 
previous section, firms will choose  as part of a unique NE when                                              
*
i
t
i a a =
                       . If the costs imposed by the tax policy are sufficiently high, firms will 
choose  in the voluntary stage game as part of a subgame perfect NE (SPNE).                               
* v a a =
*
i /
− = τ
i
*
a x
a C
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
As shown in Segerson and Wu, it must be the case that firm i will optimally 
choose either  or  in the voluntary stage. It is never optimal for a firm 
to choose  since this causes ambient pollution to be strictly less than the 
standard and firm i would be better off choosing . It is also never optimal for 
firm i to choose . If 
)then the ambient standard will not be met 
and the tax policy will be imposed. Since abatement is costly, firm i would have been 
better off choosing zero abatement.  
) (s v
i
v
i a a =
) (s v
i a >
0
v
i a < <
0 =
v
i a
) ( s v
i a
v
i a
) (s v
i
v
i a a =
a
(s v
i
v
i a <
In the voluntary period the firm therefore has a choice between abating so that 
the ambient standard is achieved or not abating at all and paying the tax over the next 
K periods. Assuming a discount factor 0 < δ ≤ 1, the cost of voluntary abatement 
sufficient to meet the standard across K+1 periods is given by . 
The cost of abating zero in the voluntary period and facing K periods of the tax policy 
is given by
() i i
v
i
v(s)
i
K
0 k
k , ;θ , a C δ − −
= ∑ θ a
() ( ( ∑
=
− +
K
1 k
s
i
*
i
k x x τ , a C θ δ ) ) . Therefore the firm will abate voluntarily, and 
the standard will be achieved, if   
() ( ) ( ( ∑ ∑
=
− −
=
− + ≤
K
k
s
i
*
i
k
i i
v
i
v(s)
i
K
k
k x x τ ,θ a C δ , ;θ , a C δ
1 0
θ a ) ) .                                        (5) 
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When
s x x = , the expected liabilities are zero under the tax policy. In this case, 
no firm will ever choose , since
*
i
v
i a a ≥ ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 0 , ,
* = > ≥ C a C θ a C i i i
v
i θ
0 =
v
i a
. If it is not 
optimal for any firm to choose , then the standard will not be achieved 
voluntarily and each firm is strictly better off by choosing .  
*
i a ≥
v
i a
When x is sufficiently below , there is a SPNE in which firms optimally 
choose  in the voluntary stage and in the tax stage. The intuition for this 
result is as follows. Suppose   so that for firm i. Recall that firm i will 
either choose  or . Choosing  will result in the standard not 
being met and the imposition of the tax policy. Therefore, if                               
then firm i will optimally choose . Note that for  to be part of a 
SPNE, 
s x
*
i -
= a
* v a a =
i a
* t a a =
v(s)
i a
=
v
i a
*
i
) ( a =
s
v
i - a a =
0 =
v
v
i a
*
i a =
0
) (s v
i
v a = i a
                                      ,     
v
i
* v a a =
x must be chosen so that                                         for each firm in the 
watershed. In words, the discounted penalty for not achieving the standard must be at 
least as great as the cost of abating to . 
*
i a
()
Under the exogenous voluntary-threat policy there will also exist SPNE 
whereby the ambient standard is achieved but not at least cost, unless                                                     
                                 all firms. If not, firms with           
will strictly prefer the voluntary policy to the tax policy and thus have an incentive to 
abate more than . For the condition to hold with equality for all firms requires 
identical total abatement costs at the optimum across all firms (i.e., 
  for                                         
*
i a
( ) ( ) n j i a C a C j i i ∈ ∀ = , ,
* * θ j ,θ ) and that                                            .  
When  ≠  for at least one of firm in the watershed, the aggregate cost of 
meeting the ambient standard is not minimized. As
v(s)
i a
*
i a
x diverges from the range of 
firm-level profit maximizing voluntary abatement levels expand and the potential for 
free riding increases. This implies a tradeoff in the choice of the tax threshold. Setting 
s x
x low relative to generates a more severe penalty for the group, if the standard is not 
s x
() ∑
=
− ≤
K
1 k
s
i
*
i x x τ , a θ
k δ C
() ( −
s x ) x ∑
=
≤
K
1 k
kτ δ i
*
i , a θ C
() ( ∑
=
− =
K
1 )
s k
i
*
i x x δ , a C θ
k
τ () () ∑
=
− <
K
1 k
s k
i
*
i x x τ C δ ,θ a
() ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎛
=
k s τ δ x x
⎝
− ∑
=
K
1 k
i
*
i , a C θ
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achieved voluntarily. However, it opens the door to a greater range of disparity 
between cost-minimizing and realized abatement choices.   
In addition to multiple SPNE where the ambient standard is achieved 
voluntarily, there also is a SPNE whereby all firms choose zero abatement in the 
voluntary period. If  = 0, firm i will choose to abate zero units since abating to the 
point where the ambient standard is met is excessively costly or not feasible.
v
i - a
3 In past 
experimental analyses of ambient-based policies with a zero abatement NE, in 
addition to the Pareto optimal NE, groups achieved significantly lower levels of social 
efficiency than under the ambient policies that did not have a zero abatement NE 
(Spraggon 2002, Vossler et al. 2006).  Unfortunately, in the case of the exogenous 
voluntary-threat policy, the choice of  x alone cannot eliminate the zero abatement 
SPNE.  
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 illustrate that the best response functions for firms 1 and 2 
will always cross at multiple points. The overlapping best response functions reflect 
the multiple NE whereby the ambient standard is achieved, but not necessarily at least 
cost. This overlapping section increases as the exogenous threshold in the threatened 
tax policy is reduced, as in Figure 1.4, indicating a wider range of equilibria. In 
addition, the best response functions under the exogenous voluntary-threat policy 
always intersect at the origin, which implies that both firms choosing zero abatement 
cannot be eliminated as an equilibrium strategy. 
                                                 
3 There is a potential that the best response for firm i is to meet the standard voluntarily even if all other 
firms chose zero abatement (i.e.,  ( )
s
i i
v
i x a x = − θ 0 , ; , θ ). However, this would require that the standard 
be relatively close to the baseline level of ambient pollution and is therefore not of particular interest.  
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     Figure 1.3 Exogenous V-T: High x           Figure 1.4 Exogenous V-T: Low x             
Endogenous Voluntary-Threat Policy 
To eliminate suboptimal equilibria in the voluntary stage, Segerson and Wu 
suggest the threat of a retroactive tax policy. Under this policy, if the ambient standard 
is exceeded in the voluntarily stage, firms pay taxes for the violation in the voluntary 
stage, in addition to facing the tax policy in future periods. The tax paid on ambient 
pollution in excess of the standard in the voluntary stage is collected prior to the first 
round of the tax stage. While this eliminates the zero abatement equilibrium in the 
voluntary stage, it could negate much of the political attractiveness associated with the 
voluntary policy. The voluntary policy with a retroactive tax distinguishes itself from a 
pure tax policy only in the sense that rather than being collected at the end of the 
period, taxes in the voluntary stage are collected at the beginning of the next period. 
Nevertheless, it remains attractive from the standpoint that the expenditures necessary 
to optimally implement the tax mechanism could be avoided.   
The policy instrument introduced here relies on an endogenously determined 
tax threshold. That is, the threshold in the tax stage is determined by the level of 
noncompliance in the voluntary stage. Therefore under voluntary noncompliance, this 
instrument makes the amount of future tax bills conditional on voluntary period 
behavior. This implies, for example, that even if all other firms undertake zero 
abatement in the voluntary period firm i has an incentive to abate as it reduces its own 
  13 
future tax payments. Formally, if the ambient standard is exceeded in the voluntary 
stage, the tax payment due in each period of the tax stage is defined as 
Tax Payment =  ( ) ( ) 0 ~ ~ > − = − ϕ ϕ   and   -x x x x    where x x τ
s v s t .                      (6) 
In equation (6), x
v denotes realized ambient pollution in the voluntary stage and the 
scale factor, ϕ, is freely chosen by the regulator. Increasing ϕ lowers the tax threshold 
for all levels of  and therefore increases the severity of the threatened tax 
policy. The crux of the mechanism is that the tax threshold decreases as the level of 
pollution in excess of the standard in the voluntary stage increases, thus making the 
consequent tax policy more costly. The firm’s tax payment in each period of the tax 
stage can be written as
s v x x >
( ) ( )
s v s t x x x x − + − ϕ τ  for pollution levels greater thanx ~, zero 
otherwise. From this representation, it is apparent that in the tax stage of the 
endogenous mechanism, firms pay a tax based on the pollution level in that period 
(similar to the pure ambient tax) as well as a penalty for noncompliance in the 
voluntary stage. Note that the exogenous-threat policy is a special case of the 
endogenous-threat policy where ϕ =0 and
s x x = . 
It has been shown above that in the tax stage any threshold x ≤ will induce a 
unique NE  , which implies that the standard is met (i.e., x =  ) at least cost. 
Substituting this equality into equation (6), simplifying and multiplying it by the 
discount rate yields the tax penalty over K rounds from voluntary noncompliance 
under the endogenous threat mechanism 
s x
t x
* t a a =
s
                             .                                                                                            (7)  ϕ δ
In the voluntary stage, each firm compares the cost of abatement against the 
present value of future tax payments. However, the cost of the tax is now a function of 
firms’ voluntary abatement decisions. The consequence is the elimination of 
suboptimal equilibria. The equilibria generated by the endogenous tax threat are stated 
(
s v
K
1 k
k x x τ − ∑
= )
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in Propositions 1, 2 and 3 below along with a discussion of the intuition for each. 
Formal proofs of the propositions can be found in the appendix.  
Proposition 1: If  then 
* λ τ = { } { }
* * v , , a a a a =
t  is a SPNE if and only if                    . 
1
1 k
−
=
  The intuition for Proposition 1 is based on firm i comparing the marginal costs 
and benefits of abatement in the voluntary setting. Suppose the other n-1 firms in the 
watershed choose the abatement vector  such that pollution will be equal to or 
less than the standard if . As in the previous cases, there is no benefit to reducing 
ambient pollution below the standard, and thus is not a best response. In such a 
setting, firm i will therefore choose  so that the standard is achieved with 
equality or choose a and face the K-period tax policy.  
*
i -
v
i - a a =
a
*
i a =
*
i
v
i a a ≥
*
i a <
*
i
v
i a >
v
i a
v
i
K
k δ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
≥ ∑ ϕ
The optimal level of abatement for firm i, , is again determined by 
comparing its marginal cost of abatement, 
*
i
v
i a a ≤
v
i a C ∂ ∂ , to the marginal benefit of 
reducing its future tax burden,                         (the entire expression is positive 
given that 
       
v
i
k x − τ ϕ
0 < ∂ ∂ i a x ). Substituting                                and rearranging, firm i will 
optimally abate to                                                       , where the marginal cost of 
abatement equals the marginal benefit. The marginal incentives of the endogenous 
voluntary threat policy are identical to the pure ambient tax policy when   
K
k
a δ ∂ ⋅ ∑
=1
*
i
*
i /
= λ τ
*
a x
a C
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
− =
                  and firm i will optimally choose  . When                   , the marginal 
benefit of reducing future tax payments is strictly greater than the marginal cost of 
abatement at . However, since there is no benefit to reducing ambient pollution 
below the ambient standard, in terms of reduced future tax payments, firm i will 
optimally choose . Thus, as long as                   ,   is part of a SPNE in 
the voluntary stage.  
*
i
v
i a a =
*
i
v
i a a =
v
i a =
*
i a
* v a a =
If                    and , the marginal cost of abatement at  is strictly 
greater than the marginal benefit of abatement, i.e.,                                                     . 
*
i -
v
i - a a =
*
i
v
i a a =
v
i *
i
*
i k v
i a x
/
/ ∂ ∂
K
1 k a x
δ a C ∂ ⋅
∂ ∂
= ∑
=
ϕ
a C ∂ ∂
1 K
1 k
δ
−
= ⎠
⎜
⎝
⎛∑
k ⎟
⎞
= ϕ
k ⎟
⎞
⎜
⎛
> ϕ
k ⎟
⎠
⎞
1 K
1 k
δ
−
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1
1 k
−
=
K
δ ⎜
⎝
⎛
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1 K
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δ
−
= ⎠
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⎞
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/ ∂ ∂
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Thus, firm i will optimally choose  and  can therefore not be part of a 
SPNE.  
*
i
v
i a a <
* v a a =
Proposition 2: If  then 
* λ τ = { } { }
* , a a
v *, a a =
t  is a unique SPNE if and only if     
1 −
                 . 
K
1 k
k δ
=
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
= ∑ ϕ
It was shown above that when                   ,  is part of a SPNE. The 
intuition for why is part of a unique SPNE is identical to that of the pure 
ambient tax. The marginal cost of abatement is greater than the marginal benefit of 
abatement, in terms of reductions in the tax burden, for all levels of abatement above 
, i.e,                                              . Therefore none of the n firms will ever choose 
, regardless of the abatement decisions made by other firms in the watershed. 
Given that other firms will never rationally over abate, it is not in a firm’s best interest 
to abate less than , since, as explained in Proposition 1, the marginal benefit from 
reduced tax payments is greater than the marginal cost of abatement for  .  
* a
v a =
* v a a =
*
i a
*
i a
v
i a
*
i a >
*
i
v
i a a <
1 −
⎠
K
1 k
k δ ⎟
⎞
⎜
⎛
= ∑ ϕ
⎝ =
  When                   then it is in firm i’s best interest to abate more than  when 
.  In this case, the marginal cost of abatement at  is less than the 
marginal benefit, i.e.,                                                     , since                   . When one 
firm chooses to overabate to achieve the standard, other firms in the watershed will not 
deviate from their strategies and thus other SPNE are possible. It follows that is                                 
*
i a
*
i
s v
i a a >
) ( *
i
v
i a a =
                   necessary and sufficient to induce a unique SPNE. 
 
Proposition 3: If  then 
* λ τ = { } { }
* v,a a
t a 0, = is never a SPNE when 0 > ϕ . 
  The intuition for Proposition 3 follows from the fact that, as long as the scale 
factor, ϕ , is greater than zero, firm i can potentially reduce its future tax burden 
through abatement. Even if every other firm in the watershed chooses not to abate, 
firm i is better off by engaging in a positive level of abatement. Since the cost of 
v
i *
i
i v
i x
/
⋅ ∂
*
a x
a C
a / C ∂ ∂
∂
∂ ∂
> ∂ a
1 K
1 k
−
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abatement tends to zero as the level of abatement approaches zero, there will always 
be a point at which the marginal benefit of additional abatement exceeds the costs.   
  The firm-level best response functions under the endogenous voluntary-threat 
policy are illustrated graphically in Figures 1.5 and 1.6. When                    , as in           
Figure 1.5, the best response functions for the two firms’ are identical to those under 
the pure ambient tax policy with
s x x = . The unique NE in the voluntary stage is 
evidenced by the single intersection of the firms’ best response functions. Figure 1.6 
illustrates the effect of increasing the scale factor. The result is an overlap in the best 
response functions for firms one and two, which trace out the points under which the 
ambient standard is achieved. Importantly, the best response functions do not touch 
the origin, which implies that firms will never choose zero abatement in equilibrium. 
1 K
1 k
−
=
⎟
⎠
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⎝
⎛
= ∑
k δ ϕ
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Figure 1.5 Endogenous V-T:                          Figure 1.6 Endogenous V-T:       
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    The information requirements to appropriately parameterize the policies, such 
that voluntary least-cost abatement is a SPNE, are also an important consideration. In 
each of the policies considered above, the regulator needs to know  so as to 
optimally define the tax rate, 
* λ
τ , for the tax policy. In the exogenous voluntary-threat 
policy, the regulator needs to set the threshold to ensure that the costs imposed by the 
threatened tax policy are large enough so that every firm in the watershed is better off 
abating voluntarily. This requires that the regulator spend the resources necessary to 
determine the abatement costs for all firms in the watershed. In comparison, to 
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optimally design the endogenous voluntary-threat policy, the regulator need only have 
information regarding the discount rate, in addition to knowing . Further, even if the 
scale factor is set too low, firms will still voluntarily engage in a positive level of 
abatement effort. Under the exogenous voluntary-threat policy, setting the threshold 
too low results in firms choosing the zero abatement strategy as part of a unique 
equilibrium.     
* λ
1.3  Experimental Design 
To test the relative performance of the voluntary-threat policies, an economics 
experiment was conducted at the Cornell Lab for Experimental Economics and 
Decision Research. Participants were Cornell undergraduate students that had taken at 
least one class in economics and the majority had participated in at least one prior, but 
unrelated, economics experiment. The experimental sessions lasted approximately one 
hour and participants earned experimental tokens during each decision round, which 
were exchanged for dollars at the end of the session at the known rate of 70,000 tokens 
per $1US. Across all treatments, 264 participants took part in the experiment and 
individual earnings averaged $20.     
Overall, there are eleven separate experimental treatments, with four groups of 
six participants each in a given treatment. The experiment consists of 23 decision 
rounds
4 and the rounds are split up into Part A (rounds 1-5) and Part B (rounds 6-23). 
Preceding Parts A and B, participants read through a set of written instructions, 
provided in the Appendix, and view a Powerpoint presentation given by the 
experiment administrator. In Part A there is no ambient-based policy in place, in order 
to establish a regulation-free baseline. In Part B, the exogenous voluntary-threat, 
endogenous voluntary-threat or pure ambient tax policy is instituted. 
                                                 
4 The end round was determined randomly for each session, however each group completed at least 23 
rounds. Participants were told that the end round would be randomly determined and the decision 
making spreadsheet contained 30 decision rounds. 
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  In each treatment, all participants face the identical abatement cost function 
( )
α
i i a ,θ a C φ =
i a r
∑
=
=
6
1 i
x
. As the term abatement implies reducing emissions relative to some 
initial condition, the participants’ decision is instead framed as one of choosing a level 
of emissions. Specifically, participant emissions, ri, are related to abatement through 
the function , where γ represents the baseline level of emissions. 
Abatement is related to ambient pollution in a given round through the linear 
function .    
() i i a γ− =
() − i a γ
Each participant is provided an “Emissions Decision Sheet” that lists the “firm 
earnings” associated with all possible levels of emissions.  To give real-world 
relevance to the experimental parameters, experiment earnings under a zero abatement 
strategy are calibrated to the net income of a medium sized dairy farm in New York 
State, operating with a herd size of 200 cows (Dairy Farm Management Summary 
1999-2003). Table 1.1 lists the assumed functional forms and experiment parameters, 
which conform to the underlying assumptions of the theoretical model.   
 
Table 1.1  Experimental Parameters 
Description  Functional Form  Parameter Values 
Abatement Cost 
Function  ( )
α φ i a   φ = 13; α = 3 
Firm      
Earnings  ( )
α φ i a Y Y − =
0  
0 Y = 75,000 
Firm Level 
Emissions 
i i a r − =γ   γ = 20 
Ambient 
Pollution  () ∑
=
− =
n
i
i a x
1
γ   n = 6 
In Part A of all treatments, each participant makes their emissions decision in 
an environment where ambient pollution does not influence their earnings in any way. 
As such, the expectation is that each participant will choose an emissions level of 20, 
which maximizes their “firm earnings” in each of the five Part A rounds. Therefore in 
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Part A the expected ambient pollution level, given that each of the six participants 
chooses an emissions level of 20, is 120. 
In Part B, there is an ambient-based policy designed to induce a 40% reduction 
in ambient pollution levels from an unconstrained pollution level of 120 to an ambient 
standard,  , of 72. The reduction mirrors the 40% nutrient reduction goals called for 
in the original Chesapeake Bay Agreement (CBP 2005). Reaching the ambient 
standard of 72 at least cost requires each participant to reduce their emissions to 12 
units, from the unconstrained optimum of 20. Under each of the policy instruments, 
choosing an emissions level of 12 is a NE for all participants. A description of the 11 
treatments can be found in Table 1.2.  
s x
 
Table 1.2  Treatment Summary 
Treatment Policy Communication 
1  Pure Ambient Taxx = 72  No 
2  Pure Ambient Tax x = 66  No 
3  Pure Ambient Tax x = 50  No 
4  Exogenous Voluntary-Threat: x = 66   No 
5  Exogenous Voluntary-Threat: x = 50  No 
6  Exogenous Voluntary-Threat: x = 0  No 
7  Exogenous Voluntary-Threat: x = 50   Yes 
8  Endogenous Voluntary-Threat:ϕ =1/3  No 
9  Endogenous Voluntary-Threat:ϕ = 1  No 
10  Endogenous Voluntary-Threat:ϕ = 3  No 
11  Endogenous Voluntary-Threat:ϕ =1  Yes 
Treatments 1-3 test the pure ambient tax policy where, in each round, 
participants pay a marginal tax of 2,500 tokens on every unit of ambient pollution 
above the threshold, x . The tax payment in a given round is subtracted from the 
participant’s “Firm Earnings” for that round. To aid decision making, a “Tax 
Calculation Sheet” is provided to participants that includes the tax payment 
corresponding to levels of ambient pollution.
5 Given that the marginal cost of 
                                                 
5 Examples of the “Tax Calculation Sheet” and the “Emissions Decision Sheet” are included in the 
appendix. 
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reducing emissions to lower than 12 is greater than 2,500 tokens and the margina
of reducing an additional unit of emissions up to 12 is less than 2,500, optimal 
emissions for each firm is exactly 12 units such that the ambient standard of 72 is 
l cost 
exactly met. 
 In Treatment 1 the tax threshold equals the ambient standard of 72, which 
replicates the tax policy in the experimental studies of Spraggon (2002), Poe et al. 
(2004), Cochard et al. (2004) and Suter et al. (forthcoming). When τ =2,500, emitting
exactly 12 units is a unique NE for any tax threshold at or below 72. However, when 
the tax threshold is lower than 72 the group can maximize its payoff when participants 
emit fewer than 12 units. While collusive outcomes, in the absence of explicit group 
communication, are not seen in recent experimental results when total pollution was a 
stochastic function of total emissions (Suter et al. forthcoming), it is an open emp
question whether participants behave in a collusive manner in the non-stochastic 
environment presented in this study. A
 
irical 
ccordingly, treatments 2 and 3 reduce the tax 
thresho
d, 
n 
 
ld to 66 and 50, respectively. 
In Part B of Treatments 4-7 the exogenous voluntary-threat policy are teste
with the ambient standard equal to 72.  Each group begins Part B in the voluntary 
policy and as long as ambient pollution for the group remains at or below the ambient 
standard of 72, then the voluntary policy remains. If ambient pollution is greater tha
72 under the voluntary policy, then the threatened tax policy is implemented in the 
next round and persists for three rounds (K=3) before groups again have a chance to 
meet the standard voluntarily. Three tax policy rounds allow for multiple restarts of
the voluntary scenario while retaining the crux of a threat where participants pay a 
penalty over time for not meeting the standard, as suggested by Segerson and Wu. If 
the tax policy is implemented, each participant pays the marginal tax, τ, of 2,500 
tokens for every unit of ambient pollution above the tax threshold.  As in the pure 
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ambient tax policy, optimal firm-level emissions are 12 units. Given the short t
frame over
ime 
 which the decision rounds occur, a discount factor, δ, equal to 1 is 
assume
an 
e 
tax 
ch of 
t 
 
ing 
 
ct 
of the e  
d. 
In Treatment 4 the threatened tax policy has an exogenous tax threshold of 66, 
the minimum symmetric threshold that theoretically provides the necessary incentives 
for voluntarily abatement. In Treatment 5 the threshold is 50, providing stronger th
theoretically necessary incentives for voluntary abatement, but also increasing th
range of SPNE. Treatment 6 provides the most draconian threat by reducing the 
threshold to 0. Varying the exogenous tax threshold provides insight into the tradeoff 
between a tax threshold that is relatively close to the ambient standard and a lower 
threshold, which increases the incentive to abate voluntarily but also increases the 
potential for meeting the voluntary standard at higher than minimum cost. In ea
the exogenous voluntary-threat treatments there is also a SPNE whereby each 
participant chooses to emit 20 units (i.e., zero abatement) in the voluntary setting. 
  Meeting the ambient standard voluntarily at least cost requires a great deal of 
coordination by the participants, since everyone must emit exactly 12 units.  Withou
communication, this coordination is likely to be difficult. Thus, in Treatment 7, the
exogenous voluntary-threat policy is tested with a threshold of 50 while allow
groups to engage in costless, nonbinding communication, (referred to in the 
experimental economics literature as “cheap talk”). Groups are allowed up to five
minutes of cheap talk before rounds 6, 11, 16 and 21, enhancing the potential to 
coordinate abatement strategies. In the cheap talk sessions, they can discuss any aspe
xperiment, but are not allowed to make threats or arrange for side payments.
Treatments 8-11 test the endogenous voluntary-threat policy. Similar to the 
exogenous voluntary-threat treatments, as long as groups achieve the ambient standard 
of 72, the voluntary policy remains in place. If ambient pollution exceeds the standard 
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of 72 in a voluntary round then a tax policy is implemented for the following 3 roun
where groups again pay tax rate τ for every unit of ambient pollution above the tax
threshold. The tax threshold is determined by the degree of noncompliance in the 
voluntary setting. In Treatment 8, ϕ = 1/K = 1/3, so that for every unit of ambient 
pollution above the standard in the voluntary round, the tax threshold is reduced by 1/3
of a unit below 72 in the tax policy rounds. With ϕ = 1/3, under the assumption δ =
each firm chooses to emit 12 units as part of a unique SPNE and thus the ambient 
standard is achieved at least cost.  In Treatments 9 and 10 the endogenous threat is 
made more severe by increasing the scale parameter, ϕ, to 1 and 3 respectively
as the severity of the threat rises, through increases in the scale parameter, the 
incentives for voluntary abatement increase, but additional SPNE are introduced,
under which the ambient standard is achieved but not at least cost. Note that the 
severity of the threatened tax policy can also be increased by increasing the numbe
tax rounds, K, but this is not explored in the set of experiments presented her
Treatment 12 the endogenous voluntary-threat with ϕ = 1 is tested with the 
participants allowed the chance to engage in cheap-talk. In each of the endo
ds, 
 
 
 1, 
. Again, 
 
r of 
e. In 
genous 
volunta
ost 
 1/3. 
w 
st 
ts 
ry-threat treatments, the zero abatement equilibrium is eliminated. 
In comparing decision making under the exogenous and endogenous 
voluntary-threat policies, the focus is on outcomes from treatments that are the m
comparable. The exogenous voluntary-threat with threshold equal to 66 is most 
comparable to the endogenous voluntary-threat with the scale parameter set at
These treatments can be thought of as the minimum threat required to induce 
voluntary compliance and also the treatments that theoretically induce the most narro
range of SPNE. Similarly Treatment 6, with an exogenous threshold of zero is mo
comparable to Treatment 10, with scale parameter equal to 3, as these treatmen
represent the most severe threats. The zero threshold can be thought of as the 
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maximum exogenous threat that could be administered, although theoretically the 
threat could be increased by introducing a negative exogenous threshold. There is not
necessarily a corresponding upper bound on the endogenous scale parameter and the 
severity could be increased with higher scale parameters.
 
 
n the 
ey provide a mid-level point in the range of threats tested 
ed 
ult 
cy 
g 
y measures are used to evaluate the relative 
 
d in 
                                                
6 In the middle of the threat 
severity spectrum, the results under the exogenous voluntary-threat with threshold of
50 in Treatment 5 and the endogenous voluntary-threat with scale parameter of 1 in 
Treatment 9 are compared. Again, there is not a direct correspondence betwee
exogenous and endogenous threats in these treatments, but they are the most 
comparable given that th
here. 
1.4  Experimental Results 
  In this section, the outcomes from the 11 experimental treatments are analyz
to arrive at four primary results. For Result 1, an econometric model of participant 
emissions is used to evaluate decision making under the pure tax policy treatments. 
Drawing on outcomes from the voluntary stage of the voluntary-threat policies, Res
2 assesses the relationship between the severity of the tax threat and the frequen
with which groups achieve the ambient standard voluntarily. For Result 3, the 
econometric model of participant emissions is again used to evaluate decision makin
in both the voluntary and tax rounds of the voluntary-threat treatments. Finally, for 
Result 4 treatment-level social efficienc
economic performance of each policy. 
  Before proceeding to the primary results, it should be noted that in Part A of
the experiment, where no policy mechanism is in place, participants choose zero 
abatement. The econometric procedures are detailed below, but the results presente
 
6 One could argue that ϕ =1.5 is the upper bound, given that under zero voluntary abatement the 
threshold in the tax policy rounds is equal to zero. 
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Tables 1.3 and 1.5 clearly show that in each of the treatments, participants choose 
emissions decisions that are not significantly different from 20, which correspo
zero abatement. This can be taken as evidence that participants understand the 
decision-making framework and re o
nds to 
sp nd by choosing the level of emissions that 
maxim
 data 
isions across treatments 
a mixed-effects mode
8) 
rm of 
able fixed treatment-effect 
coeffic
ent 
y 
f at 
s are 
izes their private earnings.   
Since observations of participant-level decisions come from a hierarchical
generating structure, where groups are nested within treatments, participants are 
nested within groups and each participant makes decisions over a series of rounds, 
individual decisions cannot be treated as independent observations. It is reasonable to 
presume that participant decisions are correlated across rounds and with the decisions 
of other group members. To compare participant emissions dec
l is estimated, with the general structure  
igr igr ε Xβ r + =  ,                                                                                                (
where rigr is the emissions decision by participant i in group g and treatment r; X is 
known as the design matrix, which is a matrix of 1’s and 0’s that represent the fo
the fixed treatment effects; and β is a vector of estim
ients. The model error is represented by εigr . 
The mixed model uses participant-level emission decisions as the depend
variable and includes treatment-specific fixed effects. The treatment effects are 
allowed to vary across Part A of the experiment and two aggregate round groupings, 
rounds 6-14 and 15-23, of Part B. In addition, the treatment effects are allowed to var
or decisions made under the voluntary and tax policies of Part B. It is assumed th
εigr = αg + uigr, where a random effect αg is included to account for within group 
correlation and uigr is further assumed to be autocorrelated and heteroscedastic. In 
particular, the error variance is allowed to differ by treatment, and the model error
assumed to follow an AR(1) process, with the autocorrelation coefficient, ρ, also 
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allowed to vary across treatments. The mixed effects model essentially calculates 
mean participant emissions in each treatment scenario and then calculates standard 
errors analogous to an analysis of variance (ANOVA) framework that accounts for th
fact that observed participant decisions are not independent. The model is estimated 
using the SAS “proc mixed” command and the program is included in the appendix. 
The goodness of fit is measured with the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), which 
evaluates the degree to which the estimated model agrees with the observed structure, 
relative to the number of model parameters. Although one model is estimated, results 
are presented in two separate tables to facilitate the flow of the discussion. Coefficien
results from the first three treatments are includ
e 
t 
ed in Table 1.3, while the remaining 
ax 
ticipant Em rigr) AI :  22,402 
coefficient results are presented in Table 1.5.  
Table 1.3  Mean Participant Em
Dependent Variable: Individual Par
issions Model: Ambient T Re ults  s
issions ( C
Number of Ob s: 4
rt B
servation ,968     
 
 
  Pa  
Treatment Part   Scenario  Rounds  Rounds  2 A Policy 
6-14  15-23 
σ r 
 
ρ 
 
19.71 13.36*  13.73*   1  x = 72 
(0.48) (0.44)  (0.44)  8.22 0.64 
19.45 12.19  11.93  2  x = 66 
(0.49) (0.43)  (0.43)  9.27 0.53  Pure Tax 
19.91    10.18*  10.22* 3  x = 50 
(0.53)  (0.48)  (0.48) 
     Estimated Group-Level Variance  0.32   
10.62 0.69 
* Indicates parameter that is significantly different from the NE of 12 at the 5% level. 
Note: Results in this table are from the Pure Ambient Tax treatments only although the 
nd to underabate when the threshold is 72 and overabate when the 
thresho
model is estimated with data from all treatments. 
Result 1: Under the pure ambient tax policy, participant emissions are not 
significantly different from the cost-minimizing NE of 12 when the threshold is 66, 
but participants te
ld is 50.  
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Although the focus of this essay is on the performance of voluntary-th
policies, analyzing participant emissions in the pure tax policy treatments is important
as a way of gauging the incentives generated by the ambient tax. Each of the 
voluntary-threat policies require that the NE strategy is chosen in the tax stage of the
game in order for the threat to be salient. Emissions under the pure ambient tax, 
provided in Table 1.3, most closely approximate the cost-minimizing NE when the 
threshold is equal to 66. It is therefore reasonable to assume that for some thresholds 
lower than the ambient standard, as required by the voluntary-threat, the tax indu
the necessary incentives. As the threshold is reduced further, to a level of 50, av
participant emissions are lower than the NE in both early and late rounds. Thus, 
participants seem to be engaging in some tacit collusion by abating less than is 
privately optimal when the threshold is reduced or are simply not making optim
decisions at the margin. This may serve to “water down” the threat of the tax, si
group tax liabilities are lower when emissions are less than the NE. When the 
threshold is equal to the ambient standard of 72 in the pure ambient tax policy, 
participants exceed the NE of 12 in both early rounds (13.4) and late rounds (13.7). 
This result corroborates results in Spraggon (2002), who calculates mean emissions of 
31.8 when the NE is 25, and Poe et al. (2004) who calculate emissions of 5.9 when the 
NE is 5.  The level of emissions across the three ambient tax treatments are i
however, to the findings of Suter et al. (forthcoming), where the tax threshold is foun
not to have a significant influence on average decision making. The lack of 
correspondence between the two studies is likely a result of the fact that Suter e
consider the case where pollution is a stochastic function of group emissions, making 
group coordination mo
reat 
 
 
ces 
erage 
al 
nce 
n contrast, 
d 
t al. 
re difficult.  For example, participants may believe that 
individual deviations from group maximizing pollution levels in the stochastic setting 
are less transparent.   
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In Part B of the voluntary-threat treatments, groups had the opportunity to meet 
the ambient pollution standard volun b
Table 1.4  Summary of Voluntary Compliance 
Treatmen
Percent  ps that 
Achie dard 
Volunt Least 
Percen ntary 
Rounds  andard 
Achieved Groups 
That Ac ndard 
tary and avoid the am ient tax. 
t 
of Grou
ve Stan
arily at 
Once 
t of Volu
Where St
 Among 
hieve Sta
4  x = 66   25% 66.7% 
5  x = 50  50% 75.0% 
6  x = 0  100% 91.5% 
Exogenous 
Threat 
 
7  x = 50 [Com]  100% 98.3% 
8  ϕ =1/3  50% 33.3% 
9  ϕ = 1  25% 93.3% 
10  ϕ = 3  100% 75.6% 
Endogenous 
Threat 
11  ϕ = 1 [Com]  100% 100.0% 
Result  cted if the 
der 
at 
 the 
compliance be reasonably expected. Even with the severe threats 
studied
In the treatments where communication is allowed, voluntary compliance is 
assured in both the exogenous and endogenous voluntary-threat policies. Across these 
2: Voluntary compliance with the ambient standard can only be expe
threat of the tax policy is severe or if participants are able to communicate. 
Table 1.4 shows that in Treatments 4, 5, 8 and 9, where the threat is 
theoretically sufficient but not practically severe, no more than 50% of the groups are 
able to achieve the standard voluntarily over the course of the session. When the tax 
threat is made relatively severe in Treatments 6 and 10, however, all four groups un
both the exogenous and endogenous policy achieve the ambient standard voluntarily 
least once. In these treatments, groups achieve the ambient standard in 92% of the 
voluntary rounds under the exogenous threat and 76% of the time when the threat is 
endogenous. These results clearly show that groups are responsive to the level of
threat and that only when they are confronted with a relatively consequential threat 
can voluntary 
 here, however, some groups still fail to voluntarily achieve the standard in 
every round.  
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two treatments, groups achieve the ambient standard in all but one voluntary round.
7 
Communication allows participants the chance to coordinate their decisions and share 
information regarding payouts of various strategies. Under both the exogenous and 
endogenous policies, exactly achieving the standard voluntarily maximizes individual 
earnings (i.e., all individuals choose the SPNE of 12) and it also maximizes group 
earnings. Therefore communication provides a strong motive for groups to achieve the 
standard since each participant and the group as a whole are best off when the standard 
is achieved at least cost. This is in contrast to observed behavior in experiments that 
involve subsidy payments (e.g., Spraggon et al. 2002; Vossler et al. 2006), where 
communication results in overabatement, since the group profit maximizing level of 
emissions is lower than socially optimal levels. 
  Given that many groups in the voluntary-threat policy do not achieve the 
standard voluntarily, it is important to measure both the degree of noncompliance in 
the voluntary stage and emissions decisions in the consequent tax stage. Comparing 
participant emissions decisions across all of the policy settings allows for a more 
complete understanding of how specific policy parameters influence decision-making. 
                                                 
7 The one observed instance of voluntary noncompliance was a result of a participant that accidentally 
typed in the wrong emissions decision number, as revealed in the cheap talk period immediately 
following. 
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Table 1.5  Mean Participant Emissions Model: Voluntary-Threat Results  
Dependent Variable: Individual Participant Emissions (rigr) AIC:  22,402 
Number of Observations: 4,968       
Part B     
Treatment Part  A  Policy 
Scenario  Rounds 
6-14 
Rounds 
15-23 
σ
2
r 
 
ρ 
 
13.85* 17.34*  Voluntary 
(0.41) (0.44) 
10.74* 11.53 
4  x = 66  19.39 
(0.40)  Tax  (0.39) (0.36) 
5.56 0.34 
12.58 13.73*  Voluntary  (0.41) (0.42) 
9.19* 9.40*  5  x = 50  19.95 
(0.41)  Tax  (0.43) (0.39) 
6.29 0.37 
11.73 11.99  Voluntary  (0.36) (0.36) 
9.38* 7.25* 
Exogenous 
Threat 
6   x = 0  19.55 
(0.39)  Tax  (0.67) (0.48) 
4.63 0.42 
12.82 13.75*  Voluntary 
(0.48) (0.50) 
12.43 12.17 
8  ϕ =1/3  19.73 
(0.50)  Tax  (0.46) (0.45) 
8.73 0.66 
12.61 13.40*  Voluntary  (0.46) (0.47) 
11.95 11.29 
9   ϕ = 1  19.65 
(0.47)  Tax  (0.45) (0.44) 
7.93 0.59 
11.91 12.13  Voluntary  (0.40) (0.40) 
9.90* 10.06* 
Endogenous 
Threat 
10  ϕ = 3  20.02 
(0.42)  Tax  (0.50) (0.42) 
6.23 0.47 
     Estimated Group-Level Variance  0.32   
* Indicates parameter that is significantly different from the NE of 12 at the 5% level. 
Note: Results in this table are from the Voluntary-Threat treatments only, although the 
model is estimated with data from all treatments.  
Result 3: Voluntary-threat policies with a severe threat induce emissions decisions 
that are closer to the NE of 12 in the voluntary period, but further below the NE if the 
tax is implemented. Overall, the variability in mean emissions decisions is lower with 
the endogenous as opposed the exogenous voluntary-threat policy. 
Inspection of Table 1.5 reveals that in the early rounds of the voluntary setting, 
participant emissions decisions are only significantly different from the cost-
minimizing NE of 12 in the exogenous voluntary-threat treatment with the threshold 
equal to 66. In late rounds, however, emissions are significantly greater than 12 in the 
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voluntary stage of all but the severe voluntary-threat treatments. Although average 
emissions are greater than the NE in the endogenous voluntary-threat treatments 
withϕ = 1/3 and ϕ =1, they are lower than the emissions in the exogenous voluntary-
threat treatments withx= 66 and x= 50 respectively. It should be noted that outcomes 
for treatments 4 and 8, where communication is allowed, are not included in the model 
results, as there is not sufficient variation among participants (i.e., in Part B 
participants chose the SPNE of 12 in essentially every round). 
Among the groups that do not achieve the ambient standard voluntarily, there 
is a clear positive relationship between participant-level emissions in the tax stage of 
the exogenous voluntary-threat treatments and the tax threshold. When  x= 50 and x= 
0, emissions decisions are significantly less than the NE of 12 in both early and late 
rounds. The emissions decisions under the tax stage of the exogenous voluntary-threat 
policy where communication is not allowed reflect closely the results that observed in 
the pure ambient tax policy. Observed emissions are not significantly different 
between the exogenous voluntary-threat and pure ambient tax policies with thresholds 
of 66 and 50 respectively.   
  In the tax stage game of the endogenous voluntary-threat, the same 
correspondence between the severity of the threatened tax and the degree of 
overabatement does not exist. Only in the early rounds of the endogenous voluntary-
threat withϕ =3 are emissions significantly different from the NE of 12. There are two 
plausible explanations for this result. First, since the realized tax threshold in the 
endogenous voluntary-threat tends to be closer to the ambient standard of 72 than 
under the exogenous voluntary-threat treatments, groups facing the endogenous policy 
have less incentive for tacit collusion. Second, since the threshold is determined after 
each noncompliant voluntary round, participants have to adopt a strategy for the 
particular realization of each threshold. This makes a strategy of tacit collusion more 
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challenging, since the emissions decision must be continuously readjusted. The 
endogenous voluntary-threat policy therefore results in emissions that are closer to the 
cost-minimizing NE, relative to the exogenous voluntary-threat, over the range of 
policy parameterizations that are investigated here. This result is consistent across 
both the voluntary and tax policy settings and indicates less overall variability in 
observed outcomes under the endogenous voluntary-threat policy.   
Social Efficiency Measures 
  Estimating individual emissions decisions provides insight on how the various 
policy scenarios influence decision making, but they do not provide information useful 
for comparing the policy in terms of social outcomes. For example, if a policy 
approximates the cost-minimizing emissions level for an average participant, this does 
not mean that costs have been minimized if there is a significant degree of variation 
around the mean decision. While the objective of the policies tested here is to 
minimize the abatement costs of achieving the ambient standard, cost effectiveness is 
challenging to measure empirically. For example, there is no standard way to compare 
a treatment where group emissions exceed the ambient standard in a large percentage 
of rounds, but average abatement costs are low, to a treatment where the standard is 
consistently achieved, but abatement costs are relatively high.  
Rather than generating an ad hoc measure of cost-effectiveness, the social 
outcomes of the treatments are compared based on a measure of social efficiency. The 
efficiency measure for each treatment assumes a damage function that is linear in total 
emissions with a slope of 2,500. The choice of damage function does not have a 
significant impact on the relative efficiencies between the treatments, and the linear 
damage function is assumed so as to be consistent with previous experimental 
analyses (e.g., Spraggon 2002; Poe et al. 2004; Vossler et al. 2006; Suter et al. 
forthcoming).  
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  The aggregate efficiency measure used here is derived from the measure 
introduced by Spraggon (2002). The social surplus in a given round is determined by 
summing the pre-tax earnings of each of the six firms (the social benefit) less the 
social damage, determined by the aggregate emissions in that round. The observed 
surplus in round t by group g, , is then measured against the surplus in the zero 
abatement scenario, , and the maximum surplus possible,
gt S
zero S max S  , to give a measure 
of efficiency according to the formula 
zero
zero actual
gt S S
S S
Efficiency Social
−
−
=
max
.                                                               (12) 
The social efficiency measure given in (12) is further partitioned into measures 
of emissions efficiency (EE) and allocative efficiency (AE) similar to those introduced 
in Suter et al. (forthcoming). The emissions efficiency measures the degree to which 
group emissions deviate from the social surplus maximizing level of group emissions, 
which in each treatment is 72. The allocative efficiency provides a measure of the 
variance in emissions decisions across participants. Given that all six firms are 
identical, the cost of achieving a given level of group emissions is minimized when all 
six participants choose the same level of emissions. Thus, allocative efficiency is 
higher when participants choose make similar emissions decisions. Formally, the 
emissions and allocative efficiency measures multiplicatively determine social 
efficiency according to 
zero emissions
zero actual
zero
zero emissions
gt gt gt S S
S S
S S
S S
AE EE Efficiency Social
−
−
−
−
= = * *
max
,          (
where
13) 
 is the social surplus given the level of group emissions in round t, and 
ng that
 that 
 
emissions S
assumi  each participant contributes to the group emissions level equally. It 
should be noted that since emissions decisions can only be made in discrete 
increments, there is a small level of inefficiency included in the AE measure
results whenever group emissions are not divisible by six. In Suter et al., this third
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component of observed efficiency levels is defined as structural efficiency. The 
structural efficiency is not included here as the measure is never less than 99.8%
any of the treatments, given the relatively large range of available participant emissio
decisions. 
Table 1.6  
 for 
n 
Social Efficiency Results 
g 
Social 
Efficiency 
Emissions 
Efficiency 
Allocative 
Efficiency  Treatment  Round 
Groupin
82.68 92.58 88.85  6-14 
(5.2) (3.3) (3.6) 
80.06 91.28 87.81 
1     x = 72 
2     
15-23 
(5.2) (3.3) (3.6) 
79.59 95.82 83.41  6-14 
(4.5) (1.2) (4.2) 
77.86 96.43 79.61  x = 66  Pure 
Ambient Tax 
3     
15-23 
(4.5) (1.2) (4.2) 
63.52 87.89 74.62  6-14 
(5.1) (3.1) (8.3) 
64.89 88.33 74.34  x = 50 
15-23 
(5.1) (3.1) (8.3) 
81.59 90.48 87.51  6-14 
(3.4) (3.6) (2.0) 
78.36 84.57 91.92 
4     x = 66 
5     
15-23 
(3.4) (3.6) (2.0) 
79.89 90.44 86.67  6-14 
(6.2) (4.6) (4.3) 
74.26 85.51 87.35  x = 50  Exogenous 
Threat 
6     
15-23 
(6.2) (4.6) (4.3) 
88.72 96.46 91.68  6-14 
(9.6) (6.9)  (13.6) 
75.13 87.41 92.86  x = 0 
15-23 
(9.6) (6.9)  (13.6) 
79.77 96.28 81.60  6-14 
(3.0) (1.6) (3.1) 
73.64 95.67 78.35 
7     ϕ =1/3 
8     
15-23 
(3.0) (1.6) (3.1) 
82.24 98.16 85.10  6-14 
(5.3) (1.0) (4.5) 
84.37 96.19 84.98 
ϕ = 1  Endogenous 
Threat 
9     
15-23 
(5.3) (1.0) (4.5) 
84.83 93.61 87.83  6-14 
(7.6) (6.5) (4.3) 
76.34 85.72 86.82 
ϕ = 3 
15-23 
(7.6) (6.5) (4.3) 
Note: Numbers in paren ses a dard er the re stan rors. 
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Efficiency measures for each treatment in early and late round groupings are 
compared using the mixed modeling procedure described for participant-level 
emissions, except that the level of observation is the group rather than the individual. 
The model error is again assumed to follow an AR(1) process and the correlation 
coefficient and error variance are treatment specific. The total efficiency, emissions 
efficiency and allocative efficiencies results are reported for each treatment in Table 
1.6. 
Result 4:  There are no systematic differences in aggregate social efficiency across the 
three policy mechanisms, but the endogenous threat policy tends to have higher 
emissions efficiency and lower allocative efficiency relative to the exogenous policy. 
As illustrated in Table 1.6, the aggregate measure of social efficiency does not 
vary systematically based on policy type. All of the policy treatments have social 
efficiency levels that are not significantly different from 80%, with the exception of 
the pure ambient tax policy with a threshold of 50, which has social efficiency that is 
significantly less than 80%. In general, efficiency levels tend to diminish slightly in 
later rounds of the experiment. This is not a particularly attractive result for policy, as 
it suggests that groups tend to diverge from the social optimum as their experience 
with the mechanisms increase.  
Among the voluntary-threat policies, the variability in social efficiency levels 
tends to be highest when the threat is made more severe, as evidenced by the 
differences in standard errors.  These differences in variability stems from the fact that 
the severe threats tend to increase the frequency with which groups achieve the 
ambient standard voluntarily, but for the groups that do not achieve the standard, 
social efficiency tends to be lower as emissions are significantly less than the standard. 
Another important policy result is the fact that emissions efficiency tends to be higher 
and allocative efficiency tends to be lower in the endogenous voluntary-threat, in 
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comparison to the exogenous voluntary-threat. On average, group emissions tend to be 
closer to the standard in the endogenous policy, but there is increased variance in 
participant emissions. Thus, if policy makers are primarily concerned with 
approximating ambient pollution targets, the endogenous voluntary threat policy is 
preferable to the exogenous policy. If, however, policy makers are concerned with 
equity, then the exogenous voluntary-threat is attractive, given the higher levels of 
allocative efficiency. 
One final piece of evidence in regards to the relative merits of voluntary-threat 
policies comes from observed participant earnings. Clearly, when communication is 
allowed participants earn more money per round than in treatments where 
communication is not allowed. The average earnings per round in Part B when 
communication is allowed are approximately $1.04 for the endogenous and exogenous 
policies. When communication is not allowed, earnings under the exogenous policy 
with threshold equal to 66 remain high at $0.98, since the taxes levied in the tax policy 
rounds have a relatively minor impact on overall earnings. When the threatened tax 
threshold is reduced to zero, average earnings are reduced to $0.74 per round, with 
earnings in groups that did not achieve the standard voluntarily significantly lower 
than the average. Interestingly, average earnings are higher in the endogenous policy 
withϕ =3 than whenϕ =1/3 ($0.92 and $0.88 respectively). Thus, making the 
endogenous threat more severe does not necessarily result in a reduction in earnings, 
since ambient pollution in the voluntary policy is generally at or only slightly above 
the standard in each of the four groups. Therefore, the realized threshold is relatively 
close to the standard and the taxes collected are not extreme.  
1.5  Conclusion 
  This essay provides empirical evidence, through controlled laboratory 
economics experiments, of the effectiveness of two nonpoint pollution control policies 
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that theoretically induce voluntary compliance with a water quality standard through 
the background threat of an ambient tax. The first policy stems from Segerson and Wu 
(2006), and includes a threatened tax mechanism that is exogenous, in the respect that 
tax liabilities do not depend on the extent of voluntary noncompliance. The second 
policy, introduced in this essay, diverges from Segerson and Wu’s mechanism in that 
the tax threshold in the threatened tax mechanism is conditional on decisions in the 
voluntary period. This endogenous threat mechanism theoretically eliminates 
undesirable, suboptimal SPNE that arise in the exogenous threat policy.  
Experimental evidence suggests that making threats more severe, through 
lowering the threatened exogenous tax threshold or increasing the scale parameter in 
the endogenous voluntary-threat policy, increases the probability that groups achieve 
the ambient standard voluntarily. In addition, allowing participants the ability to 
coordinate their efforts through verbal communication leads to voluntary compliance 
in nearly 100% of decision periods, with essentially no individual-level deviations 
from the NE strategy. This positive result re-enforces the basic message of Poe et al. 
(2004) and Vossler et al. (2006): communication itself can be an important policy tool 
that can be used to greatly improve the ability of ambient policies to achieve water 
quality goals. 
In groups where communication is not allowed, groups do not voluntarily 
achieve ambient pollution standards with great regularity unless the threatened tax 
policy is made severe. When the tax policy is put into place, participant emissions tend 
to deviate significantly from the cost-minimizing NE when the tax threshold is 
significantly below the ambient standard. This result is statistically identical to the 
decisions observed under the pure ambient tax policy with tax thresholds below the 
ambient standard. In addition, reductions in observed social efficiency levels between 
early and late rounds of the experiment is worrisome, as it suggests that participants 
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learn to distrust or otherwise become frustrated with their fellow group members 
rather than learn to avoid the penalty provided by the tax policy. Finally, the range of 
earnings outcomes is wider under the exogenous rather than the endogenous 
voluntary-threat policy. This result arises from the penalty structure of the endogenous 
voluntary-threat policy, where small minor group deviations from the ambient 
standard result in correspondingly minor penalties in the subsequent tax policy.   
Taken together, the experimental results suggest that the voluntary-threat 
policies are unlikely to solve ambient pollution problems unless polluter groups 
regularly engage in communication or the threatened tax policy is severe. While 
groups of agricultural producers may indeed communicate in small watersheds, 
communication sufficient to achieve ambient standards seems unlikely without 
external encouragement. In addition, the severe threats required to induce voluntary 
abatement in the absence of communication may serve to reduce the overall 
attractiveness of the voluntary-threat policies amongst agricultural producers. In 
addition, while the voluntary-threat policies offer firms the opportunity to achieve 
ambient standards without explicit regulation, other considerations may influence the 
policies’ overall attractiveness. From the agricultural firm’s perspective, the benefit of 
a policy that allows for voluntary compliance may be outweighed by the challenge of 
having to continuously alter production practices based on the type of regulatory 
mechanism that is in place. For example, if firms adopt drastically different strategies 
based on whether the voluntary or the tax policy is in place, then the management 
costs associated with changing cropping or abatement practices my reduce the 
financial benefits of the voluntary-threat policy. In addition, the attractiveness of the 
voluntary-threat mechanisms, from the policy maker’s perspective, will be determined 
by the cost savings of not having to implement a tax mechanism in cases where groups 
achieve the standard voluntarily. When the threatened tax policy is severe, all groups 
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are able to achieve the standard voluntarily for at least a portion of the experiment and 
in these cases the implementation of the tax policy is avoided.    
These conclusions regarding the relative effectiveness of voluntary-threat 
policies could be bolstered by future research on variations of the policies tested here. 
Specifically, a better understanding of the tradeoffs between changing the number of 
threatened tax policy rounds (K) and increasing the severity of the tax in each of the 
tax policy rounds could lead to some important conclusions regarding the cost-
effectiveness of each. In addition, the policy relevance of this research could be 
improved by investigating situations where participants are heterogeneous in terms of 
their baseline emissions and the structure of their abatement costs.  Finally, explicitly 
incorporating uncertainty into the voluntary-threat mechanism is an important future 
step towards improving the policy’s real-world relevance.   
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1: It has already been shown that in the K tax periods the 
strategy  is a unique NE. The proof of Proposition 1 starts by showing that, 
when                    and  , firm i’s best response is to choose . In the 
second part of the proof it is shown that, when                    anda  , it is not a best 
response for firm i to choose .   
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If firm i chooses , ambient pollution will exceed the standard and the 
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Suppose otherwise, then it must be the case that                                             . Given 
the strict convexity of the abatement cost function and the concavity of the pollution 
function,                            for all  .  Therefore when                  , it follows that 
the K-T conditions do not hold, since                                      , for .  Firm i 
minimizes costs given that the tax policy will be put in place by choosing . 
This, however, represents the situation whereby the standard is achieved. The costs of 
choosing  are therefore always greater than the cost of , thus when                 
.                and  , the unique best response for firm i is  .  
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policy. To see this, define   to be the level of voluntary abatement that solves the K-
T condition (a.1a), i.e.,                              . The cost to firm i of choosing  and facing 
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was shown earlier that the cost of  is                       . Thus the cost of 
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must hold because of the assumed curvature of the cost and pollution functions. 
Therefore  is not a best response for firm i when                      and                              
       is necessary and sufficient to induce optimal compliance as part of a SPNE 
in the voluntary stage game.  
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1 −
SPNE and, when                  , other SPNE are possible. Suppose that , such that 
at least one firm is abating less than the socially optimal amount and firm i must 
overabate in order to meet the ambient standard. Let ε > 0 denote the amount of 
overabatement needed by firm i to ensure that the standard is met, i.e.,  . 
Firm i would never choose  since this implies higher abatement costs without 
a reduction in tax burden. If firm i chooses  the tax policy will be imposed. 
The optimal choice of voluntary abatement given that the tax policy will be imposed is 
determined by the cost minimization problem     
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is achieved with equality, none of the other n-1 firms in the watershed have an 
incentive to deviate from their strategies. The marginal benefit to firm j, in terms of 
cost savings, of reducing abatement is 
v
j a C ∂ ∂  while the marginal cost of the 
increased tax payments is given by                                     . As long as                                        
then                                                      for all  . Therefore none of the n-1 firms 
will optimally deviate from their strategy and there can be a SPNE where at least one 
firm in the watershed chooses   and another firm chooses . Setting    
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       is thus necessary and sufficient for  to be a unique SPNE. 
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Experiment Instructions 
 
Introduction 
This experiment is a study of individual and group decision-making. If you follow 
these instructions carefully and make informed decisions you will earn money. The 
money you earn will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of the experiment. A research 
foundation has provided the funding for this study.  
 
You will be in a group consisting of six players. Each player assumes the role of a 
different firm.   Think of your firm and the five other firms as being located near a 
common water resource.  
 
Your firm yields earnings through its operations. Your firm’s operations also generate 
emissions, which affect the water quality of the common water resource.  The 
combined emissions from each of the six firms located near the water resource 
determine the level of Total Pollution in each round.  Pollution affects the well-being 
of water resource users. For example, high pollution levels affect the health of fish, 
causing losses to fisherman.  
 
The experiment is broken up into many decision “rounds”. There are two parts to the 
experiment. Part A of the experiment consists of the first 5 rounds, whereas Part B 
includes the remaining rounds. You will be given additional instructions after Part A is 
completed. 
 
In each round you must make an Emissions Decision.  In general, the lower your 
firm’s emissions, the lower the level of earnings for your firm.  You have been 
provided a sheet titled Emissions Decision Sheet that lists the level of Firm Earnings 
associated with various levels of emissions generated by your firm.  Firm Earnings are 
denominated in “tokens”, which will be exchanged for cash at the end of the 
experiment according to the exchange rate listed on the Emissions Decision Sheet.  In 
addition to Firm Earnings, you are also given 5,000 tokens of General Earnings in 
each round.   
 
All six firms in your group are identical in every way, meaning that all of the firms 
face the same relationship between earnings and emissions.  
 
A round of the experiment is complete when all six players have made their emissions 
decisions. The computer will then report the Total Pollution for that round.  It will 
also calculate your Round Earnings by summing up Firm Earnings + General 
Earnings.  Pollution does not affect your earnings whatsoever in Part A of the 
experiment.  Below we explain how to make decisions using your computer.  
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USING THE COMPUTER  
 
In each round, your task is to make an Emissions Decision.  The Emissions Decision 
that you type in must be a whole number that is in the range listed on your computer 
screen.  When you type in an emissions decision and hit the enter key, the 
corresponding Firm Earnings amount will appear on your screen.  You can verify 
that the firm earnings amount that appears is identical to that provided on the 
Emissions Decisions Sheet.  
 
When you are satisfied with your Emissions Decision, you must then click the 
<SUBMIT> button for that round. Once you have clicked the <SUBMIT> button, it 
is no longer possible to change your decision.  
 
After all six players have clicked the submit button, the experiment moderator will 
instruct you to click the <RECEIVE> button. After clicking the <RECEIVE> button, 
the cells indicating the Total Pollution and Round Earnings will be filled in.  The 
Round Earnings cell simply sums up your Firm Earnings plus General Earnings.  
Recall that pollution does not affect your earnings in Part A of the experiment.    
 
As the experiment progresses, the total number of tokens you have earned will be 
calculated in the Total Tokens box located in the lower right portion of the 
spreadsheet. The Total Earnings ($) box displays the amount of money you have 
earned, in U.S. dollars, after the tokens have been exchanged.  
  45 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART B 
Please click the Go on to Part B button located underneath the Total Earnings ($) cell. 
In Part B of the experiment you will continue to make an Emissions Decision.  A key 
difference, however, is that in order to protect the water resource a Voluntary Policy 
has been put in place, whereby the firms in your group have been asked to reduce 
Total Pollution to 72 units.  As long as Total Pollution for the group is reduced to the 
target of 72 or less, the Voluntary Policy will continue to apply.  If, however, the 
group fails to reduce Total Pollution to at or below 72 in a round, a regulator will put 
in place a Tax Policy.  The Tax Policy will begin in the round following the failure to 
meet the target voluntarily and will last for three rounds.  The Tax Payment that will 
be due in each round in which the Tax Policy is in place will depend on Total 
Pollution in that round.  Specifically, under the Tax Policy you, and everyone else in 
your group, must make the following Tax Payment in each round: 
 
If Total Pollution is equal to or less than 50:   Tax Payment = 0 
If Total Pollution is greater than 50:     Tax Payment = 2,500 * (Total Pollution – 50)  
That is, under the Tax Policy, each player pays 2,500 tokens for every unit of pollution 
above 50 units.  It is important to remember that Total Pollution is based on the 
emissions decisions of everyone in your group, not just your own.  The Tax 
Calculation Sheet that has been provided to you indicates the Tax Payment 
corresponding to levels of Total Pollution under the Tax Policy. 
As an example, suppose that in Round 6 Total Pollution for the group is 70.  Since this 
means the target of 72 has been met voluntarily, no tax will be imposed and the 
Voluntary Policy will remain in effect for Round 7.  However, in Round 7 suppose 
Total Pollution for the group is 80, implying that the target has not been met 
voluntarily in this round.  No Tax Payment is due for Round 7, but in Round 8 the Tax 
Policy will be imposed and will stay in effect for rounds 8, 9 and 10.  In these rounds, 
each firm will be charged a Tax Payment determined by the above formula.  For 
example, if Total Pollution for the group is 70 you will pay a tax of 2,500 * (70 – 50) 
= 50,000.  Thus, when the Tax Policy is in place each firm will make a Tax Payment 
even when the target of 72 is met.   
Once your group has been subject to the Tax Policy for 3 rounds (after Round 10 in 
the above example), the Tax Policy will be removed and in the next round (Round 11) 
the Voluntary Policy will be put back in place.  Firms will then be given another 
chance to meet the target voluntarily.  Note that, if the target is met voluntarily in all 
rounds (starting from Round 6), the Tax Policy will never be imposed. For each round, 
the top cell indicates whether the Voluntary Policy or Tax Policy is in place. After 
everyone makes his or her emissions decision, Total Pollution will be calculated as 
before.  If the Voluntary Policy is in place, then the Tax Payment for that round will 
be zero.  Otherwise, the Tax Payment will be calculated using the formula above.  The 
Tax Payment, if any, will be deducted from your earnings so that Round Earnings = 
Firm Earnings – Tax Payment + General Earnings. 
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Understanding How the Experiment Works 
Although the computer does all of the calculations, it is important to us that you 
understand how the calculations work.  Below we have provided two tables and we 
ask that you fill in the blank cells in each. Someone will look over your calculations 
shortly and provide any assistance that you may need. 
The first table provides two examples of hypothetical Total Pollution amounts for 
Rounds 6-10.  Please indicate whether the Voluntary or Tax Policy applies for the 
remaining rounds.  If the Tax Policy applies, use the Tax Calculation Sheet to 
determine the amount of the Tax Payment. 
 
  Total 
Pollution 
Tax or 
Voluntary? 
Tax 
Payment 
(if any) 
Round 6  90  Voluntary   
Round 7  67     
Round 8  80     
Round 9  107     
Example 
1 
 
Round 10 31     
 
Round 6  68  Voluntary   
Round 7  72     
Round 8  53     
Round 9  92     
Example 
2 
 
Round 10 69     
 
Example 3 
Suppose that the Tax Policy applies in Example 3.  In the table below, first make an 
Emissions Decision and then make a guess at the combined emissions from the other 
five firms.  Note that there is no right or wrong answers for these two items. Next, fill 
in the remaining empty fields of the table using the Emissions Decision Sheet and Tax 
Calculation Sheet as references.   
Emissions Decision  (you choose)   
Firm Earnings (from Emissions Decision Sheet)  
General Earnings   5,000 
Combined emissions from the other 5 firms  (you choose)   
Total Pollution   
Tax Payment  (from Tax Calculation Sheet)  
Round Earnings   
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Sample Emissions Decision Sheet 
Emissions Decision Sheet
Exchange Rate: $1 = 70,000 Tokens
Emissions Decision  Firm Earnings
22 74,896
21 74,987
20 75,000
19 74,987
18 74,896
17 74,648
16 74,167
15 73,372
14 72,188
13 70,534
12 68,333
11 65,508
10 61,979
9 57,669
8 52,500
7 46,393
6 39,271
5 31,055
4 21,667
3 11,029  
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Sample Tax Calculation Sheet for Tax Threshold = 50 
Tax Calculation Sheet
Total Pollution Tax Total Pollution Tax Total Pollution Tax
31 0 65 37,500 99 122,500
32 0 66 40,000 100 125,000
33 0 67 42,500 101 127,500
34 0 68 45,000 102 130,000
35 0 69 47,500 103 132,500
36 0 70 50,000 104 135,000
37 0 71 52,500 105 137,500
38 0 72 55,000 106 140,000
39 0 73 57,500 107 142,500
40 0 74 60,000 108 145,000
41 0 75 62,500 109 147,500
42 0 76 65,000 110 150,000
43 0 77 67,500 111 152,500
44 0 78 70,000 112 155,000
45 0 79 72,500 113 157,500
46 0 80 75,000 114 160,000
47 0 81 77,500 115 162,500
48 0 82 80,000 116 165,000
49 0 83 82,500 117 167,500
50 0 84 85,000 118 170,000
51 2,500 85 87,500 119 172,500
52 5,000 86 90,000 120 175,000
53 7,500 87 92,500 121 177,500
54 10,000 88 95,000 122 180,000
55 12,500 89 97,500 123 182,500
56 15,000 90 100,000 124 185,000
57 17,500 91 102,500 125 187,500
58 20,000 92 105,000 126 190,000
59 22,500 93 107,500 127 192,500
60 25,000 94 110,000 128 195,000
61 27,500 95 112,500 129 197,500
62 30,000 96 115,000 130 200,000
63 32,500 97 117,500 131 202,500
64 35,000 98 120,000 132 205,000  
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Sample SAS Program for Participant Decision Model 
/*Im orts d p atafile from excel database*/ 
Proc Import out=sw_full  
  DATAFILE= "U:\User5\jfs24\Segerson Wu\Import SW.xls" 
   DBMS=EXCEL REPLACE; 
     SHEET="'Import SW$'";  
     GETNAMES=YES; 
     MIXED=NO; 
     SCANTEXT=YES; 
     USEDATE=YES; 
     SCANTIME=YES; 
run; 
 
/*Cleans original dataset and adds period variable*/ 
data clean; 
  set sw_full; 
  if round < 6 then period=1; 
  if 5 < round < 15 then period=2       ;
  if 14 < round < 24 then period=3; 
  if period="" then delete; 
 voluntary=aptax; 
keep treatment group subject period voluntary emissions surplus 
round; 
run;  
 
/*Makes necessary calculations for preparing data*/ 
data easy_mix; 
  set clean; 
  if period=1 then parta=1; 
  else parta=0; 
  if group < 3 then ID=subject; 
  else ID=subject + 12; 
 ID=24*treatment+ID; 
  if treatment=8 then delete; 
  if treatment=13 then delete; 
 GroupID=(treatment-1)*4 + group; 
run; 
 
/*Mi ed mo x del*/ 
proc mixed data=easy_mix /*NOitprint*/; 
  class treatment voluntary GroupID ID period round; 
model emissions= treatment period voluntary 
treatment*period*voluntary; 
  lsmeans treatment*period*voluntary / ; 
  repeated round / subject =ID type=ar(1) group=treatment r;  
  random groupID ; 
run; 
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Design of a Wildlife Corridor for the Northern Rockies 
 
Abstract 
  In an attempt to address the negative ecological impacts of habitat fragmentation, 
wildlife corridors have been proposed as a way to connect areas of biological 
significance. In this essay, a model to maximize the amount of suitable wildlife habitat in 
a fully connected parcel network linking core habitat areas subject to a budget constraint 
is introduced. The standard economic framework of maximizing benefits subject to a 
budget constraint that is employed is a divergence from other recently proposed models 
that focus only on minimizing the cost of a single parcel-wide corridor. While the budget 
constrained optimization model that is introduced is intuitively appealing, it presents 
substantial computational challenges above determining the cost-minimizing corridor. 
The optimization model is applied to the design of a wildlife corridor for grizzly bears in 
the U.S. Northern Rockies and is shown to drastically increase the total habitat suitability 
of the corridor over parcel selection based on cost minimization alone. In addition, an 
efficiency frontier is generated that illustrates the relative tradeoffs between corridor cost 
and habitat suitability. Finally, for cases where optimization is computationally 
impractical, a heuristic is suggested that closely approximates the optimally selected 
corridor. 
  532.1  Introduction 
In many parts of the world, land development has resulted in a reduction and 
fragmentation of natural habitat, leading to increased rates of species decline and 
extinction. To combat the negative consequences of anthropogenic habitat fragmentation, 
the procurement of biologically valuable conservation land has been promoted by 
biologists as a way to ensure species viability. A large number of models for optimally 
selecting land parcels for conservation, formally referred to as the reserve site selection 
problem (RSSP), have been proposed in the conservation biology literature. These 
models select parcels to ensure that all targeted species in a given region are protected, as 
in the Set Covering Problem (SCP) (e.g., Margules, Nicholls and Pressey 1988; Underhill 
1994), or they select a constrained number of parcels that maximize species richness, as 
in the Maximal Covering Problem (MCP) (e.g., Church, Stoms and Davis 1996; Camm et 
al. 1996).  
A number of subsequent studies have added to the conservation biology literature 
by incorporating economic variables into the RSSP. These studies seek to procure 
conservation parcels, given a budget constraint, that maximize the number of species 
protected (e.g., Ando et al. 1998; Polasky et al. 2001; Costello and Polasky 2004) or 
maximize the environmental benefits of the sites selected (e.g., Ferraro 2003; Messer 
2005; Newburn, Berck and Merenlender 2006). The results of these economic-based 
studies show that incorporating spatially heterogeneous financial costs into reserve site 
selection models leads to a substantially different set of priority parcels than standard 
SCP or MCP models that ignore parcel costs. Moreover, the parcels selected based on 
budget constrained optimization obtain considerably greater environmental benefits for 
the same conservation budget than traditional site selection models (Balmford, Gaston 
and Rodrigues 2000; Naidoo et al. 2006).   
In recent years, biologists and economists have recognized that a parcel’s spatial 
location relative to other protected parcels is also an essential attribute to consider in 
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of spatial coherence in the set of parcels selected for conservation have been developed 
(Williams, ReVelle and Levin 2005 provide a thorough review).  One primary way in 
which spatial attributes have been incorporated into site selection models is through the 
optimal selection of a connected reserve network, which is referred to here as a wildlife 
corridor.
1 The focus on developing models for the design of optimal wildlife corridors 
has come as biologists have highlighted the environmental imperative of connecting core 
areas of biological significance (Noss 1987).  
Beginning with the work of Sessions (1992), several models have been developed 
that attempt to optimally select a spatially connected set of parcels (e.g., Williams 1998, 
2002; Williams and Snyder 2005; Cerdeira et al. 2005; Onal and Briers 2006; Fuller et al. 
2006).  The design of an optimal corridor is, in its essence, a standard economic problem 
where the conservation planner is attempting to select the most ecologically beneficial 
corridor given the conservation funding available. Previous models of optimal corridor 
design, however, have not considered the case of budget constrained optimization. In 
fact, with the exception of Sessions (1992) and Williams (1998), spatially heterogeneous 
parcel cost has been ignored altogether. The formulation of the corridor design problem 
that is presented in this essay is the most relevant to a conservation planner, operating 
with limited funds with which to secure conservation land. The budget constrained 
optimization model, however, introduces some additional computational challenges and 
design elements into reserve selection, over previous corridor selection models that have 
sought to minimize the number of sites selected such that a specific number of species are 
preserved (Onal and Briers 2006; Fuller 2006; and Cerdeira 2006) or minimize the 
amount of unsuitable habitat in the corridor (Williams 1998, 2002; Williams and Snyder 
2005).   
                                                 
1 Wildlife corridors are also referred to more or less interchangeably as conservation, habitat, and 
movement corridors. 
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wildlife corridor between multiple areas of biological significance is proposed. The 
model is then applied to the design of a wildlife corridor for grizzly bears connecting the 
Yellowstone, Salmon-Selway and Northern Continental Divide Ecosystems in Idaho, 
Wyoming and Montana. The results from the budget constrained optimization model are 
then used to define an efficiency frontier that highlights the tradeoffs between corridor 
cost and overall suitable habitat included in the corridor. 
In the next section, the optimization model is motivated by highlighting the 
implementation of corridor projects in various parts of the world and reviewing the 
literature on optimal corridor design. In section 2.3, specific corridor design problem 
statements are introduced and in section 2.4 the programming model is described. The 
application of a wildlife corridor for grizzly bears in the United States Northern Rocky 
Mountain region is outlined in section 2.5 and the data sources used in the analysis are 
described in 2.6. Results of the corridor optimization in the Northern Rockies are 
provided in section 2.7. In section 2.8, a heuristic is suggested that is computationally 
more practical than optimization when a large number of parcels are available for 
selection. The concluding section describes implications for policy and future directions.      
2.2  Review of Corridor Implementation and Literature 
 Properly  implemented  wildlife corridors provide numerous ecological benefits by 
returning the landscape to its natural connected state. By allowing species the ability to 
migrate between core areas of biological significance, corridors increase gene flow and 
reduce rates of inbreeding, thereby improving species fitness and survival (Schmitt and 
Seitz 2002). Corridors also allow for greater mobility (Andreassen et al. 1996), thus 
allowing the potential for species to escape predation and respond to stochastic events 
such as fire. Additionally, corridors allow species to respond more easily to long term 
climatic changes (McEuen 1993).   
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corridor projects have been proposed or are currently being implemented. The projects 
range from local scale projects, such as the Quimper Wildlife Corridor, which provides a 
3.5 mile greenbelt in Jefferson County, WA, to much wider scale projects like the 
‘Yellowstone to Yukon’ initiative, which seeks to implement a viable corridor stretching 
from Yellowstone National Park in northwestern Wyoming to the Yukon region of 
western Canada. Corridor projects are currently being planned or implemented by 
governments and private organizations across the world. In Europe, for example, 
numerous countries have initiated wildlife corridor projects, such as the National 
Ecological Network in the Netherlands. Near the India-Bangladesh border, the Siju-
Rewak Corridor currently connects elephant populations in the Siju Wildlife Sanctuary 
and Rewak Reserve Forests. Similarly, the proposed Selous-Niassa Wildlife Protection 
Corridor Project in Africa would link game reserves in Tanzania and Mozambique to 
form Africa’s largest protected area. In northern Brazil, the Amapa Biodiversity Corridor 
connects 11 million hectares of some of the most pristine remaining areas of the Amazon 
Rainforest. In eastern Australia, a proposed 2,800 km corridor would link existing 
reserves in a corridor project dubbed the ‘Alps to Artherton’. This is by no means an 
exhaustive list of corridor projects currently being implemented around the world, but it 
is meant to illustrate the policy relevance of wildlife corridor design on several 
continents.    
  Despite the increasing number of corridors being implemented around the world, 
and several studies documenting the positive ecological benefits of existing corridors 
(e.g., Tewksbury et al. 2002; Haddad et al. 2003; Dixon et al. 2006), models for the 
optimal selection of corridor parcels have received comparatively little attention. The 
problem of optimal corridor design was first posed by Sessions (1992), who models the 
selection of a hypothetical corridor as a network Steiner tree (NST) problem. The 
hypothetical formulation employed by Sessions involves a landscape composed of a set 
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defined as the opportunity cost of not harvesting the parcel’s timber, which is assumed to 
be known and the model objective is to connect the critical parcels with the least-cost set 
of available parcels. Noting that arriving at a solution may not possible in polynomial 
time for a large set of parcels, Sessions uses a shortest path heuristic to select parcels that 
minimize the cost of connecting the critical parcels.  
  Williams (1998) also models the optimal selection of a hypothetical corridor as a 
NST problem, and addresses the dual objectives of minimizing corridor cost and 
minimizing the amount of unsuitable area included in the corridor. Using linear integer 
programming, Williams generates an efficiency frontier by varying the weights placed on 
each of the two objectives.  In other words, he finds a set of points where one model 
objective (e.g., cost) cannot be made lower without increasing the other objective (e.g., 
unsuitable habitat).  The efficiency frontier that is generated allows for a comparison of 
the tradeoffs between corridor cost and habitat unsuitability.  
In subsequent work, Williams modifies his original model to consider cases where 
there are no predefined reserves and the planner is simply trying to form a connected 
reserve (Williams 2002; Williams and Snyder 2005). In Williams (2002) he considers a 
relaxation of the contiguity requirement by incorporating a separate contiguity parameter 
that can be adjusted to control the overall degree of connectivity in the parcels selected. 
In Williams and Snyder (2005), the authors take up the special case of percolating 
clusters, where the corridor is selected so as to connect one end of the landscape to the 
other (i.e., from north to south). 
  The studies by Sessions and Williams are groundbreaking in the formulations of 
the corridor problem that they introduce. Their models, however, only allow each parcel 
to be connected to two other parcels in the corridor. Considering only a one parcel-wide 
corridor, however, rules out the possibility of a corridor being “thicker” (i.e., multiple 
parcels wide) for at least some portion of the path. This would be beneficial, for example, 
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corridor that could be cost-effectively incorporated into the reserve system. In addition, 
the authors do not extend their research to the study of an applied corridor instance, 
making it difficult to determine how the models perform in practice. Finally, although the 
problem Williams poses in his 1998 article is novel in that it incorporates both the 
financial and environmental attributes of each parcel, including measures of unsuitable 
habitat in the objective function results in some perverse incentives. For example, 
suppose that two parcels have identical cost, cover the same linear distance between two 
reserves, and have the same percentage of suitable to unsuitable habitat. The only 
difference between the two parcels is that parcel A is wider, and therefore covers more 
area, than parcel B. The optimization model would tend to prefer parcel A over parcel B, 
all else being equal, since parcel B has more aggregate unsuitable area. This perverse 
incentive can be remedied by maximizing suitable area, as is done in this study, rather 
than minimizing unsuitable area.  
  Recent articles by Cerdeira et al. (2005), Önal and Briers (2006) and Fuller et al. 
(2006) introduce models of optimal corridor design and apply them to specific study 
areas. Cerdeira et al. (2005) formulate a linear integer programming approach to solve a 
fully connected set covering problem and apply their model to the case of 496 uniform 
and contiguous parcels in the county of Hertfordshire, UK. They find that a minimum of 
22 contiguous sites are needed to optimally cover the 45 species of butterflies in the study 
area. A heuristic method that they develop in the paper selects 23 sites for conservation, 
which the authors take as evidence that their heuristic performs well in comparison to 
exact methods. Önal and Briers (2006) also formulate a fully connected set covering 
problem as a linear integer program. They apply their model to 121 bird species dispersed 
over 391 parcels in Berkshire County, UK and show that the model is too complex to be 
solved.  They then outline a procedure that involves solving the problem at a more 
aggregate scale and then selecting the minimum set of small disaggregate sites within the 
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optimal solution, since the minimum disaggregate number of sites could occur outside of 
the first stage, aggregate solution. The algorithm performs more favorably, however, than 
a heuristic procedure that is an extension of the greedy algorithm, where parcels are 
selected sequentially based on their contribution to the number of remaining unpreserved 
species. Finally, Fuller et al. (2006) apply a three stage algorithm to select a connected 
conservation network in central Mexico. They begin by selecting sites for conservation 
based on the habitat requirements of 99 species. They then define a set of paths that link 
the conservation areas with parcels containing suitable habitat. Finally, in the third stage, 
the paths that have the smallest area and impact on human populations are selected to 
form the connected reserve network.  
  The model presented in the next section diverges from previous corridor design 
studies in four important ways. First, the problem is modeled as one of finding the set of 
corridor parcels that maximize habitat suitability, subject to a budget constraint. This is a 
change from previous studies that have modeled the problem as one of minimizing some 
aspect of parcel cost, either in terms of number of parcels, financial cost, or cost to 
wildlife traversing the corridor. This is the first corridor model to explicitly include a 
budget constraint; something that likely improves the relevance of the model for 
conservation planners, who generally operate in an environment with limited budgets. 
The second primary divergence from the studies reviewed above is that the model 
presented here does not limit the selected corridor to being only one parcel wide. This is 
important because it means that if the budget allotted for the corridor is higher than the 
minimum cost corridor, then the benefits of the corridor can be improved either by 
selecting a new route, or by simply making the corridor wider so that it cost-effectively 
includes adjacent parcels. This reformulation, while intuitively appealing, presents 
additional computational challenges, as illustrated by the model results. The third 
contribution of this study is that it incorporates both estimated parcel costs and habitat 
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other study to consider both parcel costs and habitat benefits relies on empirical results 
from a purely hypothetical instance. Finally, by changing the granularity of the parcels 
available for selection, a greater understanding of the relationship between computational 
complexity and the number of parcels in the landscape is gained.  
2.3  Connection Subgraph Problem 
  The corridor model that is presented here assumes a landscape that is divided up 
into a set of contiguous, non-overlapping parcels. Utilizing terminology from graph 
theory, the landscape is represented by a graph (G) made up of vertices (parcels) and 
edges (parcel adjacencies) so that G = G(V,E).  A subset of the vertices in the graph are 
predefined as terminal vertices (reserves),  . Next, it is assumed that associated 
with each vertex is nonnegative cost, c, representing the amount necessary to secure the 
vertex for inclusion in the corridor, and a nonnegative utility, u, which represents the 
environmental benefit (i.e., habitat suitability) of the vertex. Finally, it is assumed that the 
conservation planner has a finite budget constraint, B, and a desired level of aggregate 
utility, U. The Connection Subgraph Problem requires finding a subgraph H of G such 
that (1) H is fully connected (2)  , i.e., the subgraph includes all terminal 
vertices (3) , i.e., the subgraph has aggregate cost no greater then the 
available budget and (4) , i.e., the subgraph has aggregate utility of at least 
the desired level.  
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  The last two conditions can then be relaxed to obtain three separate optimization 
problems of interest to the conservation planner. 
(1) Budget Constrained Utility Optimization 
(2) Utility Constrained Cost Minimization 
(3) Unconstrained Cost Minimization 
Note that unconstrained utility optimization could also be added to the set of 
problems above, but since it is assumed that each vertex has nonnegative utility this 
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landscape is acquired.  
By comparing the connection subgraph problem to the network Steiner tree 
problem, it can be shown that the connection subgraph problem is NP-complete (Conrad 
et al. 2007). NP-completeness is a term used in computational complexity theory to 
define a problem where it is “easy” to verify that a particular solution satisfies the 
constraints
2 (i.e., the reserves are connected and the utility and budget constraint is met), 
but it is potentially not possible to prove that a particular feasible solution is an optimum. 
Proving optimality may not be possible, because the time necessary to solve the problem 
increases exponentially as the number of vertices increase. It is possible that the 
optimality of the connection subgraph problem cannot be proven in a realistic timeframe, 
if there are a large number of available parcels in the landscape. 
  The differences in terms of parcel selection and computational complexity of cost 
constrained utility optimization, as opposed to the unconstrained cost minimization, are 
illustrated in the hypothetical 3x3 parcel map presented in Figure 2.1, where parcels C 
and G are to be connected with a contiguous corridor. In this simple example, corridor 
costs are minimized with the selection of parcels B, E, and H as shown in panel I. With 
this selection, the cost is 7 units and the utility of the parcels selected is 5. Now suppose 
that the conservation planner has available a budget of 10 units. Rather than simply 
selecting the least cost path, the planner would now be interested in finding the corridor 
that yields the highest utility, with a cost of no more than 10 units. Panel II, shows that 
for a budget of 10 units, the planner maximizes utility by selecting E, F, H, and I for a 
total utility of 9. If the conservation planner’s budget is further increased to 11 units, as in 
panel III, the optimal selection of parcels is A, B, D, with a corresponding aggregate 
utility of 10. It is not surprising that considering only parcel costs in panel I results in a 
                                                 
2 Computationally speaking, the term “easy” in this case refers to a feasibility condition that can be checked 
in polynomial time. 
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and utility are considered. What is unique about the constrained corridor optimization 
problem is that a marginal change in the available budget can result in the selection of 
mutually exclusive sets of parcels, as illustrated in panels II and III.  Given the constraint 
that all of the selected parcels must be connected, the model outcomes can change 
drastically as budget levels are varied, which is different from typical reserve site 
selection models where marginal changes in budget levels generally only influence the 
selection of a small subset of the available parcels.  
 
I. Minimum Cost Corridor  II. Optimal Corridor B=10     III. Optimal Corridor B=11 
   Cost = 7, Habitat = 5                Cost = 10, Habitat = 9            Cost = 11, Habitat = 10 
52 52 52
A 4 B 2 CA 4 B 2 CA 4 B 2 C
323 323 323
D 5 E 2 F 3 D 5 E 2 F 3 D 5 E 2 F 3
13 13 13
GH 3 I 2 GH 3 I 2 GH 3 I 2
 
Figure 2.1 Hypothetical Corridor Optimization  
Note: Parcel labels are provided in the lower left, costs are in the lower right  
and utilities are in the upper left.  
Figure 1 also illustrates the computational challenges of the budget constrained 
utility maximization problem. If the objective is to find a least cost path, as has been done 
in all previous studies, only six possible paths in the 3x3 parcel grid need to be 
considered. The optimal selection will never include paths that are more than one parcel 
wide, as this can only add to the cost of the corridor. For the case of constrained utility 
maximization, however, the set of potentially optimal corridors jumps from six to thirty. 
Thus, even in this small hypothetical case, the challenge of maximizing utility given a 
budget constraint is considerably greater than simply finding the single-parcel-wide least 
cost path.  The computation complexity of the problem is analyzed more rigorously in 
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Rockies corridor are dealt with later in the essay.  
2.4  Mixed Integer Linear Programming Model 
To solve the connection subgraph problem, a Mixed Integer Linear Programming 
Model is formulated where the binary variable xi represents each vertex  and 
indicates whether i is included in the connected subgraph. The budget constrained utility 
maximization problem can be written 
V i∈
i
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∈
                                                                              (1) 
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. .                                                                           (2) 
{} V i xi ∈ ∀ ∈ 1 , 0 .                                                              (3) 
To ensure that connectivity is achieved, four additional constraints are included 
by applying a particular network flow model. In the model, each edge is represented by a 
nonnegative variable yij, which reflects the amount of flow from vertex i to vertex j. Flow 
that is identical in volume to the n vertices in the graph is “injected” from an external 
vertex x0 into one of the terminal vertices. This constraint is formalized in equation (4) 
below. Further, the constraint provided in equation (5) ensures that only flow that is 
injected into the terminal parcel is utilized by the network.  
n y x t = + 0 0                                                                                (4) 
∑ = i t 0 x y          ( 5 )  
Next, each of the vertices that are included in the subgraph retains one unit of flow. This 
implies that the flow from vertex i to vertex j must be less than the total amount of flow 
injected into the system,  
{}E j i nx y j ij ∈ ∀ < , , .                                                                 (6) 
The conservation of flow in the network requires that the sum of all flow entering a 
vertex must be identical to the amount remaining at the vertex plus the amount of flow 
that leaves the vertex. This constraint is formalized as 
                                                      (7) 
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terminal vertices is forced to retain one unit of flow, 
 .                                                                              (8)  , 1 T t xt ∈ ∀ =
  The constrained utility optimization problem above can be transformed into its 
dual, utility constrained cost minimization problem by essentially swapping (1) and (2). 
The utility constrained cost minimization problem is written as 
i
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. . ,                                                                         (10) 
with the four connectivity constraints remaining the same. The unconstrained cost 
minimization problem, the so called “least-cost path”, can be obtained by eliminating 
constraint (9). 
  The formulation presented here allows for the possibility that the corridor can be 
more than one parcel wide. This is a favorable attribute of the model, given that the 
overall utility of the parcels selected can be increased by widening the corridor or by 
incorporating paths to areas of high quality habitat. It may be, however, that the 
conservation planner wishes to eliminate the possibility of having peninsulas in the 
network, which could represent dead ends to wildlife in the corridor. While this option is 
not explored empirically in this essay, in practice peninsulas could be reduced
3 through 
the institution of an additional constraint, which requires that every vertex receiving flow 
must output flow to at least one other vertex that is different from the input vertex. 
Formally, the constraint is 
 . , , T H j i y x y ij i ji ≠ ∈ ∀ + >                        (11) 
2.5  Wildlife Corridor Application 
The U.S. Northern Rocky Mountain Region is unparalleled in the continental U.S. 
in terms of resident wildlife species. The region is home to significant populations of 
                                                 
3 It is still possible with this constraint for there to exist a multiple parcel wide peninsula, however one 
parcel wide peninsulas would be eliminated. 
  65grizzly bears, mountain lions, gray wolves, bighorn sheep, elk, moose and bison. In 
addition, the region contains three of the largest wild, undeveloped areas in the 
continental U.S; The Greater Yellowstone, Salmon-Selway
4 and Northern Continental 
Divide Ecosystems together comprise a land area of approximately 80,000 square miles, 
larger than the combined size of the states of New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire 
and Vermont. The 25% population growth rate of the mountain West, however, was the 
highest of any region of the United States in the 1990’s. Moreover, many rural counties 
in the region gained population at higher rates than the urban counties (Hansen et al. 
2002). While many people are attracted to the region because of the abundant natural 
amenities, the sprawling development that has resulted is leading to an increasingly 
fragmented landscape. As such, the three large undeveloped areas are becoming isolated 
biological islands, separated by development. 
Development and habitat fragmentation in the Northern Rockies has led to a 
situation where populations of grizzly bears, which were once abundant across the region, 
now live almost exclusively in the Yellowstone and Northern Continental Divide 
Ecosystems. While the number of grizzlies in the Yellowstone Ecosystem, estimated 
between 400-600, has been stable enough to warrant their recent removal from the 
endangered species list (US FWS 2007), grizzly populations outside of Yellowstone 
remain federally protected under the Endangered Species Act.  It is clear that for 
sustained populations of grizzlies to return to the Salmon-Selway Ecosystem, and for the 
general viability of grizzly populations across the Northern Rockies, wildlife corridors 
must be instituted that enable movement between the core ecosystems. Further, the 
grizzly bear is referred to as an “umbrella species”, meaning that its survival improves 
the persistence of a wide range of other species living in the region (Walker and 
Craighead 1997). Therefore a viable corridor connecting the Greater Yellowstone, 
                                                 
4 The Salmon-Selway Ecosystem is also referred to as the Bitterroot Ecosystem. 
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populations of grizzlies, but would also improve the overall biodiversity of the region.  
Given the large geographic size of the region and the heterogeneity in terms of 
both habitat quality and land costs, the design of a corridor connecting the core wildlife 
areas is challenging. The overall viability of a proposed corridor will undoubtedly be 
determined by the sites that are selected to connect the landscape. Given the limited 
conservation funding available, a corridor that is overly expensive will make the project a 
budgetary impossibility. Moreover, a corridor that incorporates sites with limited 
environmental quality will fail to provide the habitat necessary for wildlife populations to 
move freely between the core areas and will therefore not fulfill the conservation 
objectives. By incorporating both habitat suitability and land acquisition costs, the model 
presented in this essay allows for the best chance of corridor implementation. The data 
that are used to measure the relative benefits and costs of acquiring land to form the 
corridor are explained in the next section.  
2.6  Description of Data Sources 
  The study area for this analysis is comprised of 64 counties in Idaho and western 
Montana, located in the U.S. Northern Rockies region. At the aggregate level, the parcels 
that are considered for inclusion in the corridor are the 64 counties themselves. While 
securing an entire county to be included in the reserve may seem infeasible, the county-
level analysis provides an illustrative example of a case where the optimization problem 
is relatively simple from a computational perspective. The county level model allows us 
to identify general corridor areas that contain low cost, suitable habitat, similar to Ando et 
al. (1998). The county model also provides a means of comparing the results of an 
aggregate model with relatively few sites, to more granular models with greater numbers 
of parcels. A map of the study area is included below as Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2  U.S. Northern Rockies Study Area 
To investigate the impact of increasing the granularity of the available parcels, the 
study area is further segmented into continuous sets of square grid cells. The largest grid 
cells are 60km on each side and segment the study area into 118 parcels. The parcel size 
is then incrementally reduced to square grids with sides of 50km, 40km, 25km, 10km and 
5km. With the most granular grid size of 5km, the study area is segmented into 12,788 
cells. Given the relatively large range of an adult grizzly (the home range of an adult 
female grizzly bear is approximately 125 square km), grid sizes smaller than 5km are 
unlikely to be suitable for grizzly bear movement (Mace and Waller 1997). Increasing the 
granularity of the grid cells allows for much more precision in defining parcel habitat 
suitability and acquisition costs and it also increases the number of parcels in the 
landscape. Given the greater number of parcels available for the corridor, increasing the 
granularity also increases the complexity of the optimization problem. Thus, comparing 
results across the continuum of cell sizes allows for an investigation into the tradeoffs 
inherent in the granularity of the model that allows for increased specificity at the cost of 
greater computational complexity.
5 In addition, increasing the granularity of the parcels 
                                                 
5 In addition to square grid cells, a grid composed or hexagonal parcels is also considered. The hexagonal 
grid results in significantly lower costs than a square grid, given that a corridor moving in a diagonal 
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increasing the parcel granularity provides insight into the scales at which corridor 
optimization is possible.    
e 
                                                                                                                                                
Grizzly bear habitat suitability data, developed and provided by the Craighead 
Environmental Research Institute (CERI), is used to measure the utility of each parcel. 
These data spatially define habitat that is considered to be suitable for grizzlies. The 
suitable habitat is measured on a 30 meter grid and each grid cell is given a score from 2 
to 4, with 4 being the highest quality habitat. The habitat suitability data are then 
aggregated to the larger grid and county levels used in the analysis by summing the 
habitat scores within each parcel boundary. This method of aggregation implicitly 
assumes, for example, that a cell with a habitat suitability value of 4 is twice as beneficial 
as a habitat suitability value of 2.  
The estimate of parcel cost is calculated in three steps.  First, spatial data on land 
stewardship, available for the states of Montana and Idaho from the GAP Analysis 
project (USGS 1999), are used to classify privately and publicly owned land in the study 
area. Next the amount of private land acreage within each parcel is calculated. The 
private land acreage is then multiplied by the county specific average value of farm real 
estate per acre, available from the USDA’s Census of Agriculture (2002). For grid cells 
with land acreage in multiple counties, the county specific real estate value per acre is 
multiplied by the amount of private acreage in each county and then summed. Using the 
value of farm real estate is a proxy for the cost of all private land, as it is reflects, 
although not perfectly, the opportunity costs faced by private land owners. Ando et al. 
(1998) similarly use county level average farm real estate value in their reserve selection 
model.  
 
direction contains fewer cells than comparably sized square grid cells. These results are available in the 
appendix.  
  69In delineating the cost of each parcel, the assumption is that land already in the 
public domain is freely available for inclusion in the corridor. One could, however, 
imagine incorporating the opportunity cost of lost timber or mining contracts as proxies 
for the cost of acquiring public land as in Polasky et al. (2001) and Sessions (1992).  
Costs of incorporating public land in the corridor are not included in the present analysis 
as there is insufficient data with which to accurately predict the heterogeneity in lost 
resource profitability associated with each parcel. In addition, it is possible that some 
limited resource extraction could occur on land included in the corridor. A depiction of 
the spatial distribution of parcel costs and parcel utilities at the 10km grid level is 
included as Figure 2.3. 
 
 
Figure 2.3  Habitat Suitability and Parcel Cost for 10km Grid Parcels 
  70By calculating the cost of each parcel based on the real estate value of its 
privately owned acreage, the assumption is that the parcels included in the corridor will 
be acquired with fee-simple purchases. For large projects, such as a corridor connecting 
the three large ecosystems in the Northern Rockies, the funds necessary to purchase a 
viable corridor outright will be large. Yet the cost estimates should be put into 
perspective by comparison to the significant amount of both public and private funding 
currently being spent on land conservation. In 2006, 133 separate ballot initiatives across 
the U.S. approved $6.7 billion in public funds for the procurement of conservation land 
(LTA 2007). This funding is in addition to the efforts of private land trusts at the local, 
state and national levels, who conserved 37 million acres in 2005 (LTA 2005) and other 
federal conservation programs such as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), which 
had annual expenditures exceeding $1.8 billion in 2006 (USDA 2006).   
It should also be noted that parcels may not necessary need to be purchased 
outright in order to be included in the corridor, as easements and other voluntary 
agreements may be sufficient to maintain habitat. This voluntary type of arrangement is 
being used, for example, in the ‘Alps to Artherton’ project in Australia, where the 
Australian government is seeking agreements with private land owners to abstain from 
certain land use practices in exchange for annual payments. In the U.S., an initiative such 
as the USDA’s Forest Legacy Program (FLP) could provide the means for funding 
voluntary easements on private forest land. The FLP works in partnership with states to 
acquire conservation easements that place restrictions on the property rights of private 
landowners owning forested acreage. Annual expenditures under the FLP have exceeded 
$55 million in each of the last four years (USDA 2007). 
While securing voluntary agreements for habitat protection may be a more viable 
strategy for cost-effectively targeting parcels to include in the corridor, there is 
insufficient data on the incentives necessary to secure such voluntary arrangements. The 
  71real estate value can therefore be thought of more as an upper-bound on a parcel’s cost
6, 
noting that the potential for voluntary habitat protection could significantly reduce the 
funds necessary to acquire the corridor. Future research on the incentives necessary for 
voluntary habitat protection could provide useful information for conservation planners. 
One additional consideration in terms of the overall cost of the corridor is the 
transaction and management costs associated with securing property rights and 
maintaining the selected parcels. Researchers have identified transaction and 
management costs as being an important consideration in reserve design (e.g., Naidoo et 
al. 2006; Newburn, Berck and Merenlender 2006), yet these costs are rarely included in 
optimal conservation models. One notable exception is Groeneveld (2005) who looks at 
the theoretical implications of varying transactions costs on the number of sites included 
in a reserve. In the present analysis, the influence of transaction costs on corridor design 
for the 5km grid parcels is investigated by finding the cost minimizing corridor both with 
and without transaction costs. Transaction costs are likely to play a more significant role 
when the cell granularity is small, as the transaction cost represents a greater proportion 
of the overall cost of the parcel and the number of potential paths is large. A fixed $5,000 
transaction cost is added to each parcel that is included in the corridor, which would 
cover legal fees, signage and other fees associated with defining a parcel as part of the 
corridor. The actual transaction and maintenance cost of a particular parcel is likely to be 
variable, but $5,000 is chosen as an approximation that is in line with reported transaction 
costs for conservation lands in New York State (LTA 2004).  
Beyond defining the costs and utilities of parcel acquisition, it is also necessary to 
define the parcel adjacencies for all of the parcels in the study area. The adjacencies for 
both the aggregate-county and square grid parcels are defined based on shared 
borders/edges. For the grid parcels this implies that interior parcels are adjacent to exactly 
                                                 
6 This of course assumes that landowners are willing to sell land for inclusion in the corridor, which is 
likely not be valid in many circumstances. 
  72four other parcels. This is referred to as a “rook” pattern of adjacency, which 
differentiates itself from a “queen” adjacency pattern where adjacency is defined based 
on shared edges and corners.
7 
Finally, it should be noted that there are regions within the study area that may 
represent either natural or man-made barriers to grizzly bear movement. For example, 
grizzlies may not be able to cross the Mission Mountain Range in Northwestern Montana 
or parts of the Clark Fork of the Columbia and other large rivers that flow through the 
study area. Man-made obstructions such as Interstate 90 or highly urbanized areas near 
major cities may also be impenetrable. As such, the land use planner is advised to ground 
truth the optimization results to ensure that these barrier areas are not included in a 
proposed corridor.  
2.7  Model Results 
  This section reports the optimization results for two variations of the connection 
subgraph problem described in section 2.3 for the county-level parcels and the separate 
grid parcel granularities. First, the results from the unconstrained cost minimization 
model are reported along with an explanation of the algorithm that is employed. Second, 
the results and algorithms used for the budget constrained utility maximization model are 
described. The unconstrained minimum cost corridor problem corresponds to the 
minimum Steiner tree problem. In the case where the number of reserves is bounded, the 
minimum Steiner tree problem can be computed in polynomial time (Promel and Steger 
2002). For the case considered here with three reserves, the algorithm that is 
implemented runs in time roughly equivalent to n
3, where n is the number of parcels. The 
algorithm first computes the shortest path between each parcel and all other parcels in the 
study area, which generates what is referred to as an all-pairs shortest path (APSP) matrix 
(Corman et al. 2001). In this case, the path length is measured strictly in terms of the cost 
                                                 
7 Williams and Snyder (2005) refer to rook adjacency as the nearest-neighbor rule and queen adjacency as 
the next-nearest neighbor rule. 
  73of each parcel. Next, the algorithm determines the parcel that minimizes the distance 
between that parcel and the three reserves, which is referred to the center point. In the 
case of three reserves, it is guaranteed that there will be exactly one center point.
8 The 
minimum cost corridor is then determined based on the shortest path between the chosen 
center point and the three reserves. The minimum cost corridor results for each 
granularity are reported in Table 2.1.  
After computing the unconstrained minimum cost corridor, the budget constrained 
utility maximization corridor is determined for budgets greater than the minimum cost. 
For parcel granularities down to 50km, the optimal budget constrained corridor can be 
computed using standard, off-the-shelf CPLEX optimization software using the MIP 
formulation described in section 2.4. For parcel granularities smaller than 50km, a 
preprocessing step is executed using the all-pairs shortest path matrix generated in the 
minimum cost solution. Specifically, if the minimum cost of connecting a given parcel to 
its two closest reserves exceeds the budget, then that parcel is “pruned” from the set of 
available parcels. This preprocessing step allows for the calculation of the optimal 
corridor for the 40km parcel granularities. Unfortunately, for parcels granularities smaller 
than 40km, optimal corridors cannot be determined even with this preprocessing step. For 
the smaller parcel granularities, a heuristic method can be implemented based on the 
minimum cost corridor. This heuristic is explained in greater detail in section 2.8.  
For the county, 60km, 50km and 40km parcel granularities, the utility maximizing 
corridor for a budget that is 10% greater than the cost minimum is provided in Table 2.2.  
For the 50km and 40km grids, the effect of varying the size of the budget on the parcels 
selected is evaluated in greater detail. To this end an efficiency frontier is generated 
illustrating the tradeoffs between parcel cost and the amount of suitable habitat in the 
corridor. 
                                                 
8 When there are more than three reserves, the algorithm finds all k-2 centerpoints through a Dreyfus-
Wagner algorithm (Corman et al. 2001) 
  74Cost Minimizing Corridor 
Table 2.1  Cost Minimization Results 
Parcel 
size 
Number 
of parcels 
Parcels 
selected 
Corridor 
Cost 
(thousand) 
Total 
HSI 
(thousand) 
Acres 
Preserved 
(thousand) 
% 
Private 
Cost per 
acre ($) 
County 64  5 1,904,355  7,038  9,649  27.2%  197.4 
60km 118  11  1,657,740  7,188  8,234  27.1%  201.3 
50km 167  12  1,329,090  5,902  6,777  30.7%  196.1 
40km 239  16 891,052  5,807  5,409  13.6%  164.7 
25km 570  23 449,430  3,743  3,408  12.5%  131.9 
10km 3,296  120  99,341 3,679 4,096  1.9% 24.3 
5km 12,788 265  10,865 2,147 1,637  0.5% 6.6 
5km
† 12,788  196  11,824 1,576 1,210 0.7%  9.8 
† Includes a $5,000 transaction cost per parcel selected. 
  The number of parcels available for acquisition ranges from 64, in the case of the 
county-level grid, to 12,788, for the 5km grid. When the parcels available for acquisition 
are the counties themselves, the minimum cost corridor has a price tag of over $1.9 
billion. Not surprisingly, purchasing all of the private land in five counties is extremely 
expensive. As the sizes of the available parcels are reduced, the corresponding cost of the 
cheapest corridor diminishes considerably. At the 5km granularity, the cost of the 
corridor is slightly less than $11 million. A portion of the decrease in cost is a result of 
the fact that less overall land area is being purchased; the 5km cost minimizing corridor 
covers over 1.6 million acres, while the county-level minimum cost corridor covers 
nearly 10 million acres. The difference in cost between the county corridor and 5km 
corridor cannot be explained by differences in preserved acreage alone, however. 
Increasing the parcel granularity allows for greater specificity, so that the corridor is 
better able to select low cost areas, which are composed primarily, and in some cases 
exclusively, of zero cost national forest land. As evidence of this, the cost per acre in the 
county grid is $197, while the cost per acre of the 5km grid is only $6. Moreover, the 
optimal parcels for the larger parcel sizes (county, 60km, 50km) are comprised of 
approximately 30% private land. For the 5km parcels, the amount of private land 
included in the parcel drops to below 1%. The corridor cost could be further reduced by 
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corridor width necessary for a wide-ranging species such as the grizzly bear. It should be 
noted that higher percentages of public land also tends to increase the amount of suitable 
habitat per acre as national forest land generally has high habitat suitability.  
  Changing the parcel granularity not only influences the cost of the parcels 
selected and the complexity of the problem, but it also influences the general path that the 
corridor follows. For the county level, 60km and 50km parcel maps, the minimum cost 
corridor essentially forms the shape of an upside-down T, where the parcels selected are 
concentrated in the region in the middle of the three ecosystems. When the parcel size is 
reduced to 40km and below, the minimum cost corridor traces a path connecting the three 
reserves that resembles the shape of a C, with the Salmon-Selway Ecosystem connecting 
directly to the Northern Continental Divide Ecosystem via a parcel path in the 
northwestern portion of the study area. By increasing the parcel granularity, the model 
avoids higher priced areas in southwestern Montana and instead chooses a slightly longer 
corridor that incorporates more national forest land. Thus, influencing the parcel 
granularity not only influences the estimated cost of the cheapest corridor, but it also has 
a significant influence on the general path that the corridor follows across the landscape. 
Maps of the optimally selected minimum cost corridors for each of the parcel sizes are 
included as Figure 2.4. 
 
  76(a) County Level (b) 60km Grid
(c) 50km Grid (d) 40km Grid
(e) 25km Grid (f) 10km Grid
(g) 5km Grid (h) 5km Grid w/trans costs  
Figure 2.4  Unconstrained Cost Minimum Corridor for Each Granularity 
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The addition a $5,000 transaction cost per parcel at the 5km level reduces the 
number of parcels selected from 265 to 196. When transaction costs are considered, each 
parcel adds incrementally to the overall cost of the corridor. Thus, the minimum cost 
corridor tends to select parcels that provide more of a direct link between the reserve 
sites, rather than following a slightly longer path that includes more zero cost, national 
forest parcels. This difference is illustrated in panels (g) and (h) of Figure 2.4, which 
show the chosen 5km corridor both with and without transaction costs. The most 
noticeable difference between the two corridors is the portion of the corridor connecting 
the Salmon-Selway to the Northern Continental Divide Ecosystem. With the inclusion of 
the transaction costs, the parcels selected link directly to the northern portion of the 
Salmon-Selway, rather than the longer parcel selected without transaction costs that 
connects to the western edge of the ecosystem. With transaction costs the model also 
does not select the zero cost parcels that form a peninsula starting from the western edge 
of the Salmon-Selway. Thus, incorporating transactions costs has a significant influence 
on both the number and shape of the resulting corridor that is selected and represents an 
important consideration for land use planners. 
Cost Constrained Utility Maximizing Corridor 
  While determining the minimum cost corridor connecting core areas of biological 
significance is important for land use planners in determining the financial feasibility of a 
wildlife corridor, selecting a corridor based on cost alone is likely to yield outcomes that 
leave out relatively low cost parcels with high quality habitat. If a land use planner has a 
budget that is larger than the minimum cost corridor, then she would ideally determine 
the corridor that maximizes the amount of suitable habitat given the budget that is 
available. Thus, after determining the minimum cost corridor, the corridor that maximizes 
the amount of suitable habitat for a budget that is 10% greater than the minimum cost 
corridor is selected. Unfortunately, at parcel granularities smaller than 40km, it is not 
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other words, the program can find a feasible solution that connects the reserves and meets 
the budget constraint, but proving that a particular feasible solution is the optimal 
solution requires excessive computational time. It is therefore apparent that cost 
constrained optimization is a significantly more computationally complex problem than 
corridor cost minimization. At very high budget levels, it is possible to prove optimality 
with a greater number of parcels, but these high budget cases are not particularly realistic. 
In the most extreme case, where the planner has funds available to purchase all of the 
land in the study area, the optimal corridor would be composed of all of the parcels.  
Table 2.2  Budget Constrained Utility Maximization Results 
Parcel 
size 
Number 
of 
parcels 
Parcels 
selected 
Corridor 
Cost 
(million) 
Total HSI 
(thousand) 
Acres 
Preserved 
(thousand) 
% 
Private 
Cost per 
acre 
County 64  5  1,904  7,038  9,649  27.2%  197.3 
60km 118  20  1,821 14,240  14,209  32.1%  128.2 
50km 167  22  1,461 12,188  11,303  19.4%  129.3 
40km 239  23  999  11,832 9,932 8.4%  100.6 
25km 570  -  -  -  -  -  - 
10km 3,296  -  -  -  -  -  - 
5km 12,788  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Note: Budget is set 10% higher than the cost minimum solution. 
  A summary of the parcels selected for the utility maximizing corridors, given a 
budget that is 10% higher than the cost minimum, is provided in Table 2.2 for the county-
level, 60km, 50km and 40km grids. At the county level, increasing the budget by 10% 
does not change the parcels selected in the optimal corridor. For this coarse parcel size, 
the budget increase is not enough to motivate the selection of a different set of counties. 
At the 60km level, increasing the budget by 10% results in the optimal selection of 20 
parcels as opposed to the 11 parcels selected in the cost minimization model. When the 
grid size is further reduced to 50km, the number of selected parcels jumps from 12 to 22, 
while at the 40km level the number of selected parcels goes from 15 to 23. In each case, 
budget constrained optimization results in a significant increase in aggregate habitat 
suitability, for example at the 50km level, suitable habitat increases from 5,902,000 in the 
  79cost minimization model to 12,187,572. It should be noted that the minimum cost 50km 
grid obtains the maximum habitat suitability possible for a budget equal to the minimum 
cost. Therefore the increase in aggregate habitat suitability at the higher budget level is 
strictly a result of the increase in budget. 
 
 
(a) Min Cost      (b) Min Cost + 5%    (c) Min Cost + 10% 
 
(d) Min Cost + 15%    (e) Min Cost + 20%    (f) Min Cost + 30% 
   
(e) Min Cost + 40%    (f) Min Cost + 50% 
Figure 2.5 Cost Constrained Utility Maximization of 50km Parcels 
  80A visual depiction of the optimal corridors for the 50km parcels under varying 
budgets is presented in Figure 2.5. The shape of the 50km corridor changes considerably 
under budget constrained maximization. Rather than forming the upside-down T as in the 
cost minimization solution, the budget constrained optimization solution looks more like 
a C, with the inclusion of a number of buffer parcels around the Salmon-Selway 
Ecosystem that are both low cost and contain a high degree of suitable habitat.  
Efficiency Frontier 
The results of the cost minimizing corridor and the utility maximizing corridor 
with a 10% greater budget allude to the tradeoffs that exist between corridor cost and 
overall habitat suitability measures. The conservation planner is likely to be interested 
both in reducing the overall cost of the corridor and in incorporating as much suitable 
habitat as possible, but may not have an exact idea of the relative tradeoffs between these 
two objectives. If the planner does have a specific target for the cost of the corridor and a 
specific target for the overall amount of habitat in the corridor, then goal programming 
techniques, first introduced by Charnes, Cooper and Ferguson (1955), could be used to 
solve the optimal corridor parcels. If the planner is interested in minimizing the costs of 
the corridor and maximizing the amount of suitable habitat, but does not have specific 
targets for either, then an efficiency frontier would provide a useful basis for decision 
making. The efficiency frontier represents the locus of non-inferior parcel combinations, 
where in order to improve one of the objectives, the other objective must be made worse 
off.  In this case to increase the amount of suitable habitat in the corridor for a point on 
the efficiency frontier, the cost of the corridor must increase.  
The weighting method and the constraint method are two possible techniques for 
generating the efficiency frontier (Willis and Perlack 1980). The weighting method, used 
in the context of corridor design in Williams (1988), incorporates both cost and habitat 
objectives in the objective function and multiplies each of the objectives by a weighting 
vector that sums to one.  Thus, if all of the weight is placed on the cost objective, then the 
  81model finds the minimum cost corridor and if all of the weight is placed on the habitat 
objective then the model, for the case of maximizing suitable habitat, would select all of 
the available parcels. The efficiency locus is then derived by systematically changing the 
weights between 0 and 1. 
  The constraint method for delineating the efficiency frontier, which is pursued in 
this essay, requires first solving for the minimum cost corridor and then solving the cost 
constrained utility maximization problem for various budget levels greater than the 
minimum cost corridor.
9 While both the weighting method and the constraint method can 
be used to define the efficiency frontier, the constraint method is preferable in this case 
because it is able to determine all of the noninferior solutions. In contrast, when the 
objective space is nonconvex (e.g., when the decision variable is zero-one), the weighting 
method is not able to find all noninferior solutions (Willis and Perlack 1980). Since it is 
minimizing a linear combination of the two objectives, the weighting method finds only 
the convex hull of noninferior solutions and ignores solutions in the interior of this hull. 
This problem is referred to as the “duality gap” (Williams 1998). The constraint method 
employed here is also preferable to the weighting method because it allows planners to 
explicitly compare the habitat benefits of specific budget levels.  For example, if the 
planner has a choice between three specific budgets for a project, then he or she can solve 
the corridor optimization problem subject to each of the three budget constraints and 
compare the resulting parcel outcomes. With the weighting method, the weights would 
have to be adjusted in such a way so as to approximate each of the three budget levels 
and, because of the duality gap, an exact solution for each of the budgets may not be 
found.  A second reason for not using the weighting method in the present analysis is that 
it is not possible to weight two objectives with different signs. In this case, we are 
                                                 
9 The identical efficiency frontier could also be generated by minimizing the cost of the corridor and 
systematically changing the constraint on the overall level of suitable habitat. 
  82seeking to minimize cost and maximize habitat suitability and thus the weighting method 
would require an alternative specification. 
The efficiency frontier for the Northern Rockies corridor is illustrated by using 
the constraint method on the 50km. Beginning with the minimum cost corridor for each, 
the budget constraint is systematically increased. The numeric results of the budget 
constrained maximization are presented in Table 2.3. In addition, the graphical efficiency 
frontier is provided for the 50km grid in Figure 2.6.  
The results show that aggregate habitat suitability measures increase nonlinearly 
with increases in the conservation budget. For the case of the 50km grid, increases in the 
budget up to 10% above the minimum cost corridor increase overall habitat suitability at 
an approximate rate of 48 units for every $1 increase in the budget. At budget levels 
between 50% and 150% greater than the minimum cost corridor, however, the rate of 
increase in habitat suitability associated with increases in the budget is less than 6 units 
for every 1 dollar increase in the budget. 
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Figure 2.6  Corridor Efficiency Frontier for 50km grid  
  83Table 2.3 reveals several noteworthy trends as the conservation budget is 
increased above the minimum cost. First, similar to the overall HSI, the number of acres 
preserved increases at a decreasing rate with changes in the budget. For budget increases 
above the cost minimum between 0 and 10%, approximately 0.033 additional acres are 
preserved for each additional dollar in the case of the 50km grid. For budget increases 
between 50 and 150%, the number of additional acres preserved per dollar falls to 0.005. 
In addition, the percentage of private land that is included in the corridor follows a U 
shaped trajectory as the budget is increased. For marginal increases in the budget above 
the cost minimum, the optimal corridor incorporates higher quantities of public land. As 
parcels with high percentages of public land are exhausted at higher budget levels, the 
optimal corridor adds additional parcels with greater percentages of private land. The 
overall percentages of private land are reflected in the cost per acre, which also decreases 
for initial budgetary increases and then grows as the low cost parcels are exhausted.  
Table 2.3  Budget Constrained Utility Maximization for 50km Parcels 
Budget 
(million) 
Cost 
(million) 
Total 
HSI 
(thousand) 
Acres 
Preserved 
(thousand) 
Percent 
Private 
Cost per 
Acre 
($) 
HSI per 
Acre 
- 1,329  5,902  6,777  30.7%  196.1  0.87 
1,396 1,394 9,842  9,608 22.2%  145.1 1.02 
1,462 1,461  12,188 11,303 19.4%  129.3 1.08 
1,528 1,526  13,220 12,176 18.5%  125.3 1.09 
1,595 1,594  14,145 12,874 15.5%  123.8 1.10 
1,728 1,727  15,533 14,131 15.7%  122.2 1.10 
1,861 1,857  16,777 15,119 15.2%  122.8 1.11 
1,994 1,992  17,811 16,239 16.1%  122.7 1.10 
2,658 2,658  22,151 20,105 16.2%  132.2 1.10 
3,323 3,321  25,500 23,298 16.5%  142.5 1.09 
 
The HSI per acre preserved increases dramatically for initial budgetary increases, 
but then plateaus and finally decreases slightly for the higher budget levels. The plateau 
in the case of the 50km grid occurs at approximately 1.10 units per acre. This again 
illustrates the fact that greater granularity allows for greater targeting of low cost, high 
  84benefit parcels. Taken together, the results indicate significant marginal benefits in terms 
of greater numbers of acres preserved, higher habitat suitability per acre and lower costs 
per acre for marginal in increases in the conservation budget above the cost minimum. 
These marginal benefits are reduced at higher budget levels, as the number of low cost 
and high benefit parcels becomes scarce. 
While the marginal benefits of budget increases are high in close proximity to the 
cost minimum, the marginal cost in terms of computational complexity is great. As the 
budget is increased above the cost minimum, the time necessary to prove utility 
maximization, in this example, decreases. Thus it may be possible to prove an optimal 
solution when the allotted budget is high, but as the budget becomes increasingly 
constrained, proving optimality may not be possible.  The optimization results therefore 
illustrate the significant tradeoffs between computational complexity and the amount of 
suitable habitat in the corridor. Given that land use planners are likely to have budgetary 
constraints that restrict their spending to levels that approximate the cost-minimizing 
corridor, these tradeoffs represent a significant policy dilemma. At low budget levels the 
overall utility of the corridor can be drastically increased by selecting parcels optimally, 
yet proving optimality represents a considerable and, in the case of a large set of available 
parcels, potentially impossible challenge. 
2.8  Minimum Cost Extension Heuristic 
Proving that a particular corridor is optimal given a budget constraint is not possible 
in a reasonable amount of time for the case of parcel granularities smaller than 40km. 
Conservation planners, however, need not be completely without guidance for selecting 
corridor parcels when the number of available parcels is large. This section describes a 
heuristic that can be applied, which generates a feasible corridor that approximates, and 
in some cases is equivalent to, the optimal corridor. Results from the application of the 
heuristic to the 40km parcels are illustrated in detail to show the degree to which the 
heuristic results approximate the optimal results. 
  85The heuristic procedure is performed using the minimum cost corridor as a baseline. 
The parcels selected for the minimum cost corridor are then treated as if they themselves 
are reserves, guaranteeing an initial connected path. Next, the optimal extension of the 
minimum cost corridor is calculated using the optimization procedure described above, 
where parcels that are not feasible given the budget constraint are pruned and the 
additional parcels are optimally selected from the remaining set using CPLEX.  
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Figure 2.7  Comparison of Optimal and Minimum Cost Extension 40km Grid 
Efficiency Frontier  
  The comparative results depicted in Figure 2.7 reveal that the minimum cost 
extension heuristic closely approximates the optimal corridor for the 40km parcels. 
Indeed, for budgets up to approximately 25% more than the cost minimizing corridor, the 
minimum cost extension heuristic selects the identical set of parcels as the optimization 
algorithm. At higher budget levels the correspondence between the heuristic and the 
optimum is not exact, but the difference is relatively minor. For budget levels up to 70% 
more than the minimum cost corridor, the difference in habitat suitability between the 
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The results suggest that even in cases where optimization is not possible, the minimum 
cost extension heuristic will allow conservation planners to capture the majority of the 
habitat benefits for a given budget, especially for budget levels that are close to the cost 
minimum. Importantly, the minimum cost extension heuristic is significantly less 
computationally intensive and provides feasible solutions for granularities at least as 
small as the 5km grid, in a reasonable timeframe. The close correspondence between the 
minimum cost extension heuristic and the optimal solution is facilitated by the correlation 
between parcel utilities and costs in the Northern Rockies study area. It is an open 
empirical question whether the same relationship will hold for a general case, where 
corridor costs and utilities are not correlated. 
2.9  Conclusion 
  As human populations grow and increasing amounts of habitat are lost to 
development, maintaining habitat connectivity will play a major role in fostering 
biological diversity. The design of wildlife corridors that connect key areas of biological 
significance is in its essence a classic economic problem that involves selecting the most 
suitable corridor habitat given a particular conservation budget. The case of an optimal 
design for a wildlife corridor connecting the Northern Continental Divide, Salmon-
Selway and Yellowstone Ecosystems in the U.S. Northern Rockies is considered in this 
essay using both heterogeneous parcel costs and utilities. To gain a better understanding 
of how parcel shape and quantity influence computational complexity, as well as the 
aggregate costs and benefits of the selected parcels, optimization is conducted over a 
range of parcel granularities. The results indicate that greater parcel granularity allows for 
more specificity in targeting low cost parcels in the cost minimization problem. 
Moreover, as the granularity of the parcels change, the cost minimizing corridor is likely 
to follow considerably different paths, reflecting the tradeoff between parcel cost and 
benefit as well as the parcel’s location in the landscape. The results also provide evidence 
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computationally easier than proving that a particular set of parcels maximize the amount 
of suitable corridor habitat for a given budget level. In the study area that is evaluated in 
this essay it is not possible to prove optimality for budget levels near the cost minimum, 
when the number of parcels is greater than 240.   
For small scale problems, budget constrained maximization allows conservation 
planners to optimally utilize the funds allotted for corridor acquisition.  The efficiency 
frontier, created by applying the constraint method on the 50km parcel grid, illustrates the 
tradeoffs that exist between corridor cost and overall habitat suitability. Budgets in excess 
of the cost minimum corridor have the potential to provide considerably higher levels of 
habitat suitability, though the marginal benefit of budgetary increases is concave. This 
implies that the greatest potential for an optimally selected corridor occurs for budget 
levels that are close to the cost minimum. Unfortunately, this budget range is also the 
most challenging in terms of computational complexity. For conservation planners that 
operate with relatively small budgets, in areas with a large number of available parcels, 
optimization may not be practical. In this case, evidence is provided that suggests that a 
heuristic, which finds the optimal extension of the minimum cost corridor in a practical 
timeframe, closely approximates the optimal solution. Thus, conservation planners 
operating with budgets greater than the minimum cost corridor, in areas with large 
numbers of available parcels, can still select parcels such that aggregate habitat suitability 
closely approximates optimal levels. Future corridor research comparing the cost 
effectiveness of heuristics over a variety of parcel costs and utilities will be useful to land 
use planners as corridor projects continue to be proposed for increasingly large 
landscapes. 
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Figure A.2.1 Minimum Cost Hexagonal Grid No Transaction Costs 
  89 
Figure A.2.2 Minimum Cost Hexagonal Grid with Transaction Costs 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
Assessing Differences in Implicit Prices for Open Space Across 
Urban, Suburban and Rural Areas: A Hedonic Pricing Study of 
Upstate New York 
 
Abstract 
This essay investigates differences in implicit prices for open space across different 
densities of development through estimation of separate hedonic equations for urban, 
suburban and rural residential areas surrounding Rochester, NY. Separate measures 
for public, agricultural, private forested and developed open space are included to 
measure heterogeneity in open space values within each of the submarkets. The 
hedonic model controls for spatial error autocorrelation through a sampling technique 
that eliminates nearest neighbors and corrects for endogeneity in surrounding open 
space through instrumental variable regression. Estimation results indicate that 
implicit prices for open space differ across the study area, with public open space 
valued more highly in urban settings and private open space generally valued more in 
rural areas. In addition, the results suggest that significant disamenities are associated 
with rural residential property in close proximity to Concentrated Animal Feeding 
Operations (CAFOs) and wastewater treatment facilities. Similar disamenities exist for 
residential property in urban areas in close proximity to waste transfer facilities and 
high traffic roadways.     
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3.1  Introduction 
Open space land provides a vector of public amenities, from scenic views and 
recreational opportunities to serving as a buffer from land development. In recent 
years, significant financial resources have been devoted toward the preservation of 
threatened agricultural and forested open space land. According to the Land Trust 
Alliance’s ‘National Land Trust Census,’ conducted in 2006, over 36 million acres of 
land are currently being conserved by private land trusts at local, state and national 
levels. Moreover, in 2006 alone, $6.7 billion in public funds were approved as part of 
133 separate ballot measures across the U.S. (LTA 2006) for the public protection of 
open space land.  The economic motivation for these expenditures is bolstered by a 
growing number of hedonic studies of residential property sales, which illustrate that 
home buyers place a premium on proximity to open space land (e.g., Irwin 2002; 
Geoghegan, Lynch and Bucholtz 2003; Ready and Abdalla 2005; Anderson and West 
2006).   
Despite the extensive set of research in this area, the degree to which marginal 
implicit prices for specific types of open space evolve across the landscape has not 
been thoroughly investigated. Palmquist (1992) shows that to estimate the benefits 
(costs) that accrue from a localized externality, such as nearby open space, “it is only 
necessary to estimate the hedonic equation for a relatively homogeneous 
neighborhood.” (p. 61)  Given that the hedonic equation represents the locus of 
intersection between the supply and demand for specific attributes, estimating the 
hedonic equation across a heterogeneous study area makes benefit estimation difficult, 
as supply and demand are likely to be different in diverse locations (Michaels and 
Smith 1990). Yet in nearly all previous open space studies, a single hedonic equation 
is estimated for an entire, likely heterogeneous, urban area (e.g., Lutzenhizer and 
Netusil 2001; Irwin and Bockstael 2001; Paterson and Boyle 2002). Demonstrating 
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that implicit prices for open space differ across a given study area is therefore critical 
to understanding differences in the benefits of nearby open space. From the social 
planner’s perspective, determining the relative values for open space across a 
heterogeneous landscape may therefore be important in the optimal use of open space 
preservation funds, as there are significant differences in terms of land costs and the 
number of local residents affected by open space in urban and rural locations. 
In this essay, data from a ten county “commute-shed” surrounding Rochester, 
New York are used to estimate marginal values for open space over a gradient of 
housing densities. Open space in each of the submarkets is further disaggregated into 
publicly owned open space, private open space that is forested, agricultural open 
space, and developed open space (e.g., golf courses). Additionally, proximity to 
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs), an open space related disamenity 
(Palmquist, Roka and Vukina 1997; Ready and Abdalla 2005; Herriges, Secchi and 
Babcock 2005), and proximity to other locational disamenities, such as high traffic 
roads, waste management and wastewater treatment facilities, are included in the 
hedonic model.  
  The estimation results clearly show that nearby open space has a significantly 
positive impact on home price in all submarkets. Marginal implicit prices for different 
types of open space, however, are highly variable and differ significantly, although not 
necessarily systematically, between the three submarkets. In addition, disamenities 
resulting from proximity to CAFOs, wastewater treatment facilities, waste transfer 
stations and high traffic roads are significant, though results vary substantially by 
submarket. 
The next section describes the hedonic method for valuing housing attributes. 
Section 3.3 highlights the results of several recent studies that provide the motivation 
for this essay and explores some of the issues related to the estimation of the hedonic 
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price function brought forth in the open space valuation literature.  Section 3.4 details 
the specification of the hedonic equation, section 3.5 describes study area and section 
3.6 describes the data sources and variables used in the analysis. The estimated 
hedonic function parameters are presented in section 3.7 followed by a discussion of 
the policy implications and a review of some of the lessons learned from this analysis 
in section 3.8. The final section offers some concluding thoughts. 
3.2  Review of Hedonic Theory  
  The hedonic pricing model is premised on the Lancasterian idea that the sales 
price of an individual housing unit is a function of the characteristics specific to that 
unit.  The seminal paper by Rosen (1974) is consistently referenced in the literature as 
the first to show that the hedonic price function traces the loci of equilibria that arise 
from perfectly competitive home “suppliers” seeking to maximize their profit and 
utility maximizing consumers seeking to maximize the utility that they derive from a 
home’s characteristics. In equilibrium, the price of residential property in a particular 
market can be written as a function of attributes specific to nearby open space (O),  
locational amenities and disamenities (L), and property specific features (S), 
  .                                                                                               (1)  ( S L O P P , , = )
Residential consumer i is assumed to have utility over housing attributes as well as a 
composite commodity (X), representing all other goods. In addition, consumer i faces 
a budget constraint, given his income, . Formally, the utility function and budget 
constraint for consumer i, assuming that he purchases exactly one housing unit are  
i y
                                            (2)  () X S L O U U
i , , , =
  ( ) X S L O P y
i + = , , .                                                                                       (3) 
Taking home prices as exogenous, the first-order conditions associated with consumer 
i maximizing utility subject to his budget constraint are such that, in the example of 
neighborhood open space, 
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.                                                                                                                      (4) 
In words, the consumer will purchase a residential property such that marginal implicit 
price of open space (       ) is exactly equal to his marginal rate of substitution between 
open space land and money. Therefore in equilibrium, the marginal implicit price for 
each housing attribute provides a measure of an individual’s marginal willingness to 
pay for that attribute (Taylor 2003). 
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  Using the prices of transacted residential property and the characteristics 
associated with the property, it is possible to econometrically derive the hedonic price 
function for a given area. The econometric issues associated with estimating the 
hedonic function are described in greater detail in the next section. Once the hedonic 
price function has been estimated, the marginal implicit price for a particular attribute 
can be obtained by differentiating the hedonic equation with respect to that particular 
attribute. 
  The implicit prices obtained from the hedonic equation provide a measure of 
the average marginal willingness to pay of households in the study area for a marginal 
change in a given attribute. To derive the entire marginal willingness to pay function 
for an attribute in a single market requires a second stage estimation procedure to be 
performed, where the estimated marginal implicit prices are regressed on attribute 
quantities as well as a set of potential demand shifting demographic attributes. The 
second stage analysis is rarely executed, however, because of the econometric 
challenges associated with estimating a demand function that relies on estimated 
implicit prices. The implicit prices are estimated by the hedonic equation, which 
generally contains a similar set of variables included in the demand function. This 
leads to a classic identification problem, where it is not possible to differentiate 
between the effects of demand shifting variables and the actual slope of the demand 
function (Freeman 2003).  
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  To obtain measures of welfare benefits from discrete changes in the quantity of 
a particular attribute across a market, it is generally necessary to estimate the entire 
marginal willingness to pay function. This would allow one, for example, to integrate 
the marginal willingness to pay function over the change in the attribute. Fortunately, 
in the case of a localized externality, Palmquist (1992) shows that estimation of 
marginal implicit prices is enough to estimate the welfare benefits associated with 
marginal changes in an attribute, assuming negligible costs associated with relocation. 
As long as the externality affects a relatively small number of homes, a marginal 
change in the externality does not appreciably alter the supply of the attribute in the 
market. Thus the marginal implicit prices accurately represent the benefits (costs) 
associated with marginal changes in a localized externality such as open space. Over a 
heterogeneous study area, marginal implicit prices are likely to vary, given the 
allocation of neighborhood features such as housing density. Palmquist therefore 
recommends estimation of hedonic equations involving localized externalities across 
only homogeneous areas, to get a true measure of the benefits associated with open 
space in those areas. 
3.3  Review of Relevant Literature 
A significant and growing set of studies use hedonic methods to estimate 
values for open space land.  A recent paper by McConnell and Walls (2005) highlights 
approximately 40 hedonic studies conducted between 1967 and 2003 that include 
some measure of open space as an explanatory variable for residential property price. 
In this section, a subset of recent hedonic studies that incorporate open space measures 
are described.  Across this set of studies, there is much variation in estimated marginal 
implicit prices for open space land.  While some of the differences in estimated 
marginal implicit prices are undoubtedly due to differences in how open space 
variables are defined and measured, differences in the characteristics of the respective 
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study areas are also likely to contribute to the variability.  The following review of the 
literature concentrates primarily on recent hedonic studies that have estimated the 
implicit prices of different open space types within a specified neighborhood of each 
observed home sale. The studies by Cheshire and Sheppard (1995) and Geoghegan, 
Lynch and Bucholtz (2003) specify separate hedonic equations for housing markets 
defined based on political boundaries, while the remaining studies estimate one 
equation for the entire study area. 
Cheshire and Sheppard (1995) were among the first to evaluate hedonic values 
for differentiated open space types. The authors estimate the separate impacts of 
publicly accessible open space and private open space land on residential home prices 
in two English towns. Estimation results indicate that publicly accessible open space 
has a significantly more positive hedonic value than private open space in the town of 
Darlington, but that the opposite is true for the town of Reading. They attribute this 
difference to the relative scarcity of the open space types between the two towns, 
consistent with diminishing marginal utility for open space land. For example, 
Reading, which has a relatively high percentage of publicly accessible open space, has 
a correspondingly lower marginal value for additional public land.  
Irwin and Bockstael (2001) utilize residential property sales data in four 
Maryland counties to evaluate the implicit prices for private open space, public open 
space and land held in conservation easements. Correcting for identification issues 
associated with endogeneity and spatial autocorrelation, Irwin and Bockstael find that 
privately held open space, public open space and land with conservation easements all 
have a positive impact on home price.  The marginal implicit price for privately held 
land is estimated to be roughly twice that of public land and land under conservation 
easements. Following a similar estimation procedure for the same four counties in 
Maryland, Irwin (2002) incorporates a more heterogeneous set of open space types 
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that includes public open space, cropland, pasture, private forested open space and 
land held in conservation easements. The study finds that publicly owned open space 
and land under conservation easements have a significantly greater effect on 
residential prices than pasture and cropland. In addition, she provides evidence that 
privately-owned forest land has a significantly negative impact on residential home 
prices relative to agricultural land. In both of these studies, the open space variables 
are measured as the percentage of the particular type of open space within 400 meters 
of the residential sales point. 
A set of studies by Geoghegan, Wainger and Bockstael (1997), Geoghegan 
(2002) and Geoghegan, Lynch and Bucholtz (2003) also look at hedonic values for 
open space in Maryland. One of the primary interests of the Geoghegan, Wainger and 
Bockstael (1997) study is determining whether “…the value of open space might be 
higher in urban areas relative to rural areas, where there is a scarcity of open space.” 
(p. 261)  To investigate differences in open space value across the landscape, they 
estimate a varying parameters model, which allows model parameters to vary 
according to distance from Washington, DC.  Their results indicate that the value of 
open space within 100 meters of a house is not significantly different from zero.  The 
value of open space within 1.0 km of a house is negative in close proximity to the 
center of Washington, DC and then increases slightly as the distance from the city 
increases.  Although Geoghagan et al.’s interest in measuring how the value of 
neighborhood attributes vary with distance to the city center is novel, their results are 
difficult to interpret.  First, despite the fact that they incorporate interesting landscape 
variables into their model, such as indices measuring the diversity and fragmentation 
in nearby land covers, they include only one measure of open space.  Second, the fact 
that open space has a negative value at close proximity to the city and then increases 
as distance from the city center increases is puzzling and goes against their hypothesis. 
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The Geoghegan (2002) and Geoghegan, Lynch and Bucholtz (2003) studies 
differentiate between permanent and developable open space within close proximity to 
each home sale point. Model results in Geoghegan (2002), from one Maryland county, 
show that hedonic values for permanent open space are significantly positive, while 
the value of developable open space is not significantly different from zero. 
Geoghegan, Lynch and Bucholtz (2003) present a similar analysis, but estimate 
separate hedonic equations for three Maryland counties and address issues of spatial 
autocorrelation and endogeneity.  Permanent open space within close proximity (100 
meters) is found to have a significantly positive hedonic value in only one of the three 
counties, while developable open space had an insignificant hedonic value in all three 
counties. 
A recent study by Ready and Abdalla (2005) in Bucks County, PA 
incorporates open space variables and looks more specifically at spillovers from 
agricultural open space by measuring the influence of proximity to animal agriculture 
operations and other locational disamenities on housing prices.  The authors 
differentiate between open space in pasture or crops, public open space, private 
forested, eased land and vacant land.  They find that all open space types within 400 
meters, except for vacant land, have a significantly positive impact on housing price, 
while only public open space and eased land have a significant impact between 400 
and 1,600 meters.  The study also finds a significantly negative relation between 
proximity to livestock facilities and house price.  These findings are similar to a study 
by Herriges, Secchi and Babcock (2005), who find significant disamenities resulting 
from hog operations in Iowa. While including livestock facilities in an analysis of 
open space values may seem unjustified, in many areas agricultural open space is 
defined by the predominance of animal agriculture.  Failure to include the potential 
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disamenities resulting from livestock facilities thus has the potential to bias measures 
of agricultural open space.    
A study by Lutzenhiser and Netusil (2001) in Portland, Oregon incorporates 
measures of neighboring land in urban parks, natural area parks, cemeteries and golf 
courses. The authors find that all of the open space types, with the exception of 
cemeteries, have positive impacts on home price, with natural area parks and golf 
courses having the highest marginal value. They also show that the influence of golf 
courses on home price decreases rapidly with distance, whereas the influence of parks 
tends to decrease more gradually.  A more recent study by Netusil (2005) also utilizes 
residential home sales data from Portland and incorporates a similar set of open space 
types as well as measures of the tree canopy and environmental zoning.  In this study, 
golf courses and quantity of tree canopy are the only open space types found to have 
significantly positive marginal implicit prices, but it is unclear if this result arises from 
the inclusion of additional variables or simply because it is based on a different sample 
of housing transactions. 
Paterson and Boyle (2002) model the amount of visible open space, in addition 
to overall quantities of open space within one kilometer of each housing transaction in 
their suburban Connecticut study area. The estimation results indicate that aggregate 
amounts of forested open space and agricultural open space within one kilometer does 
not have a significant impact on home price, although visible forest land has a 
negative implicit price. While visibility is likely an important attribute of open space 
amenities, the results from this study suggest that excluding visibility considerations is 
unlikely to bias estimates of open space benefits from models that exclude visibility 
measures. 
The studies cited above measure the influence of nearby open space land by 
calculating the amount of open space within a specific radius of each residential 
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transaction, thus simultaneously capturing elements of both scale and proximity. A 
recent study by Anderson and West (2006) captures the impact of nearby open space 
slightly differently, by including independent variables that measure the distance from 
the residential property to neighborhood parks, regional parks, cemeteries, golf 
courses and open water. In addition, they interact the distance measure with the size of 
the nearest open space type. They also include interactions between distance to open 
space and housing density, distance to the CBD, income and other demographic 
measures.  The estimation results indicate that proximity to regional parks and open 
water is highly valued and that, in general, marginal implicit prices for open space are 
higher in wealthier, more densely populated areas closer to the CBD. 
The studies reviewed here account for spatial externalities resulting from a 
wide range of open space types across a diverse set of study areas. This essay builds 
on previous studies in defining the open space types that are included in the hedonic 
model. Following the majority of recent analyses, the amount of each open space type 
is measured within a specific radius of each residential transaction. In addition, 
hedonic values for the various open space types are estimated across urban, suburban 
and rural areas, instead of treating the effect of open space as fixed across the entire 
study area.  This reflects the intuition of Geoghegan, Wainger and Bockstael (1997) as 
well as Anderson and West (2006), who allow open space variables to vary with 
distance from the central business district.  It also draws on the analyses of Cheshire 
and Sheppard (1995) as well as Geoghegan, Lynch and Bockstael (2003), where 
separate equations are estimated for specific regions to evaluate differences in open 
space variables. Finally, estimating separate equations for urban, suburban and rural 
municipalities is in line with Palmquist’s (1992) recommendation that localized 
externalities are most appropriately measured within relatively homogeneous areas. 
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3.4  Model Specification 
This section describes four model specification issues that have arisen in past 
hedonic studies and how they are treated in this study. While the hedonic price 
function allows for an analytically simple way to use revealed preferences to infer 
implicit prices for the characteristics of residential property, there are numerous 
empirical estimation issues that arise. This section outlines specification issues related 
to the choice of functional form, market extent, and dealing with endogeneity and 
spatial autocorrelation.  To begin with, a functional form that relates a home’s price to 
its characteristics must be assumed.  Given that the hedonic function represents the 
relationship between home buyers and sellers, economic theory does not provide much 
guidance on the choice of functional form (Taylor 2003). Authors have often used 
goodness of fit criteria to justify their choice of a particular functional form (e.g., 
Archarya and Bennett 2001; Irwin 2002), or estimate a flexible functional form model 
such as the Box-Cox.  Cropper, Deck and McConnell (1988), however, show that the 
quadratic Box-Cox model measures implicit prices with greater error than either the 
linear or semi-log functions in the presence of omitted variables. Further, specifying a 
linear dependent variable implies that the marginal price of one attribute is 
independent of the levels of other attributes (Freeman 2003).  This seems unlikely for 
the case of open space variables, where the implicit price of public open space, for 
example, is likely dependent on the amount of other types of open space surrounding 
the home. In this study a semi-log functional form is employed in all three markets. 
Keeping the estimation equation consistent across submarkets facilitates the 
comparison of individual coefficient estimates. 
The choice of market extent is also an empirical issue that must be resolved in 
estimation of the hedonic price function. According to Freeman (1993), a housing 
market should be segmented if the structure of demand or supply is different across 
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segments and if purchasers in one segment do not participate “significantly” in other 
segments.  While these criteria appear to be rather restrictive, Bourassa et al. (2003) 
note that housing submarkets have been defined in the literature based on geographic 
and political boundaries, socio-economic and environmental characteristics, physical 
characteristics of the dwellings as well as by the opinion of real estate agents.  Indeed, 
Freeman suggests that no matter how submarkets are defined, the estimates from each 
submarket will accurately reflect the implicit prices in that submarket.   
In this study, the descriptive statistics provided in Table 3.1 illustrate that the 
structure of the residential housing supply between three residential submarkets, 
defined based on commuting patterns, is indeed different.  For example, the mean 
property size in urban areas is 0.3 acres, while in rural areas it is 0.8 acres. Further, the 
amount of aggregate open space within 400 meters varies from 65.5 acres in urban 
areas to 101.1 in rural areas.  No assumption is made regarding the structure of 
demand across segments, as there is no reason to believe that demand differs 
systematically across the study area. Whether purchasers in one segment participate 
“significantly” in other segments is also an open empirical question.  Certainly there is 
some cross-segment participation, given that there are no barriers influencing mobility 
between markets.  The reason for segmenting markets in this study is motivated by the 
importance of evaluating differences in marginal implicit prices across a 
heterogeneous area, rather than specifying unique demand systems for each 
submarket.  The desire for obtaining accurate implicit prices estimates in a 
heterogeneous market follows the motivation of Michaels and Smith (1990), who 
estimate separate hedonic equations in four submarkets in Boston, MA to measure 
differences in the influence of hazardous waste sites on property prices.  
In addition to the choice of functional form and market delineation, issues also 
arise in regards to the exogeneity of model variables.  Specifically, Irwin and 
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Bockstael (2001), Irwin (2002), Geoghegan, Lynch and Bucholtz (2003), Ready and 
Abdalla (2005) have found that the amount of open space in a particular location is a 
function of nearby residential property prices. This is a result of land development 
over time in which open space areas with favorable attributes for residential use are 
developed. The quantity of open space surrounding a residential property at time t is 
therefore a function of residential prices, which reflect the favorable locational 
attributes of the area. This endogeneity problem results in measures of nearby private 
open space that are correlated with the model error term and thus biased parameter 
estimates. 
Model misspecification can also occur as a result of model errors that are 
correlated across space.  Errors can be spatially correlated if a spatially heterogeneous 
variable that explains variation in housing prices is left out of the model. This type of 
spatial relationship is often referred to as a spatial error or spatial autoregressive 
disturbance model and typically results in unbiased, but inefficient coefficient 
estimates (Anselin 2002).  Additionally, spatial autocorrelation can be attributable to 
substantive correlation in the prices of nearby housing units. This can occur, for 
example, if individuals prefer homes that are surrounded by high priced homes simply 
because of the fact that the homes have high prices. Substantive spatial autocorrelation 
leads to biased parameter estimates (Anselin 2002).  Kimm, Phipps and Anselin 
(2003) describe ways of treating autocorrelation in a hedonic study of air pollution in 
Seoul, South Korea, through both implementation of a spatial lag model, which 
includes an independent variable that measures the weighted price of nearby homes, or 
a spatial error model, which corrects standard errors based on the weighted errors of 
nearby housing sales.  Numerous other hedonic studies have estimated spatial error 
and spatial lag models (e.g., Basu and Thibodeau 1998; Patterson and Boyle 2002; 
Brasington and Hite 2005).  
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When endogenous variables are present in the model, however, traditional 
spatial econometric approaches are not sufficient. Irwin and Bockstael (2001) show 
that in the presence of endogenous open space variables, spatial autocorrelation will 
result in biased coefficient estimates. This is attributable to the fact that the open space 
variables are correlated with the error terms, which are themselves correlated across 
space. Further, Irwin (2002) states that standard spatial models are not capable 
eliminating the spatial autocorrelation, since “it is not possible to separate the 
endogenous spatial spillover effects from the spatial error, given that they are both 
positively correlated.”(p.474). She therefore accounts for spatial error correlation by 
taking a random sample of housing transactions so that no two transactions in the 
dataset are within a certain 100 meter neighborhood of one another. In this study, a 
sampling method similar to that introduced by Irwin is used to control for spatial 
autocorrelation and is described in section 3.7. 
3.5 Study Area and Hedonic Model 
The extent of the study area is defined by the “commute-shed” of Rochester, 
NY, which is composed of 83 municipalities in which at least 5% of the workforce 
commute into the City of Rochester for employment. These 83 municipalities are 
distributed across parts of 10 counties. The commuting patterns of the workforce are 
derived from the 2000 U.S. Census for each municipality. Given that the primary 
focus of this essay is on open space amenities, including agricultural land, housing 
transactions inside the City of Rochester are excluded.   
To address differences in the implicit prices of open space and other housing 
attributes, the study area is divided into urban, suburban and rural submarkets. The 
Census defines land as being either urban or rural, but they do not have a strict 
definition for suburban areas. As such, the urban, suburban and rural submarkets are 
defined based on the percentage of the workforce that commute to Rochester for 
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employment.  The urban submarket is defined as municipalities in which at least 40% 
of the workforce commute to Rochester, while the suburban submarket includes 
municipalities in which between 25 and 40% commute to Rochester. According to 
these definitions, there are 4 urban and 15 suburban municipalities. The remaining 63 
municipalities have fewer than 25% of the workforce commuting to Rochester and are 
classified as rural. The names of the municipalities included in the urban, suburban 
and rural submarkets are provided in appendix Table A.3.1 and a map of the 
submarkets is provided in Figure A.3.2.   
Since data from downtown Rochester are excluded, the three submarkets can 
alternatively be thought of as representing inner ring suburbs, outer ring suburbs and 
the peripheral rural areas. Given that the Rochester market could potentially be 
divided into submarkets based on a number of criteria, two alternative models are 
estimated to test the robustness of the results from the primary model, defined based 
on commuting patterns. The first alternative model is estimated with submarkets 
determined by census definitions of urban areas, rural areas and urban clusters. The 
second alternative model is estimated based on political boundaries, with the 
submarkets defined based on whether the transaction occurred inside or outside of 
Monroe County; the county in which Rochester is located.  The results of these models 
are provided in the appendix and discussed in section 3.7.  
Using the natural log of the sales price of each residential transaction as the 
dependent variable, the estimated hedonic equation is given by 
  () mi ln ε S δ L λ O β α P mi m mi m mi m m mi + + + + = ,                              (5) 
where , and  are vectors of variables representing neighborhood open space, 
location and property specific characteristics respectively for housing unit i in 
submarket m and 
mi O mi L mi S
m α , and m m λ , β m δ are vectors of parameters to be estimated for each 
submarket.  Additionally, the possibility that the open space measures are 
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endogenously determined (i.e.,  ( ) 0 ≠ mi mi, O E ε ) is considered as well as the possibility 
that model errors are correlated across space (i.e.,  ( ) 0 ≠ mj mi, E ε ε for all i,j).  The 
selection and calculation of the variables in each of the attribute vectors is described in 
the next section.   
3.6  Data Description  
  The hedonic model presented above is estimated using spatially explicit data 
derived from a wide variety of sources. This section describes the data used and the 
calculation of all of the variables included in the hedonic model. Data on the sales 
price, property specific characteristics and geocoded location of each residential 
transaction are from the New York State Office of Real Property Services (NYS 
ORPS). The open space and locational variables are then linked to the transaction data 
with a geographic information system (GIS). The open space variables are derived 
from a GIS layer of the 2001 National Land Cover Dataset (NLCD). Data on the 
location of CAFOs, wastewater treatment facilities, transfer stations, and high traffic 
roads are from the NYS Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC), while 
data on the location of entrances to the NYS Thruway are made available by the NYS 
Thruway Authority. Data on neighborhood demographic characteristics come from the 
2000 U.S. Census, school quality measures come from the NYS Department of 
Education and school tax rates are from the Office of State Comptroller.  The 
derivation of each of the model variables is described in greater detail below.  
The transactions data are provided by NYS ORPS for the years 1998 through 
2006. To ensure that the dataset is comprised exclusively of arms-length transactions 
of detached residential housing, only residential property that sold for at least $10,000, 
with a lot size between 0.1 and 5.0 acres and at least 600 square feet of living area are 
included.  These criteria closely follow that used by Ready and Abdalla (2005).  The 
resulting dataset is composed of 66,609 observed arms-length transactions of detached 
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residential housing units.  The urban submarket contains 34% (22,654) of the total 
observations, while the suburban and rural submarkets comprise 39% (26,196) and 
27% (17,759) of observations in the dataset, respectively. A map depicting the spatial 
distribution of the transactions included in the dataset is included in the appendix as 
Figure A.3.1.   
Property Specific Variables 
   The set of property specific variables are taken directly from the ORPS 
transactions database. Although the primary objective of this study lies in determining 
the marginal implicit prices of neighborhood open space characteristics, it is essential 
to control for variation in property specific characteristics of the housing units.  To this 
end, six property variables are included in the hedonic equation. The overall condition 
of the home measures the quality of the residential structure and is defined based on a 
five point scale from poor to excellent. The square feet of living area and site acreage 
are included as independent variables that control for the size of the structure and 
property respectively.  The age of the home is also included as an independent 
variable, with 2006 serving as the baseline year. Finally, the number of bathrooms and 
a variable defining whether the home has central air conditioning are included to 
measure household-level amenities. Property specific variables, similar to the set 
included in this study, are essential control variables.  The year of sale, relative to the 
2006 base year, is included as an independent variable to control for house price trends 
over time.      
Neighborhood Open Space Variables     
The data on land cover in open space are derived from the 2001 NLCD, which 
was developed through the efforts of the Multi-Resolution Land Characteristics 
(MRLC) Consortium, a group comprised of various federal agencies. The NLCD 
classifies land cover for the conterminous 48 states in the U.S. using Landsat 7 
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satellite imagery.  Land use is assigned based on contiguous 30M grid cells according 
to 29 separate classifications.  The land covers corresponding to open water, 
developed open space, forest, pasture/hay and cultivated crops were then extracted for 
the entire study area. The developed open space classification is composed primarily 
of large-lot residential property, golf courses and land planted for recreation or 
aesthetic purposes. The NLCD coverage was merged with spatial data on the location 
of publicly owned land, available from the New York State Office of Cyber Security 
and Critical Infrastructure Coordination. The publicly owned land is comprised of 
both municipal parks, which tend to be smaller parcels used primarily for recreation, 
as well as state and county parks, which are generally larger than municipal parks and 
offer a greater range of recreational activities in addition to wildlife habitat. 
The neighborhood open space variables measure the quantity of land within 
close proximity to each residential sale that is in open space. The amount of proximate 
open space land is measured as the acreage in each open space type within a radius of 
1600 meters from each observed residential sale. To investigate preferences for the 
spatial distribution of open space amenities, the amount of open space located within 
400 meters of the home and between 400 and 1600 meters are estimated separately. 
The 400 meter distance essentially measures open space that is in the immediate 
vicinity of the residence that might influence the viewshed or be encountered on a 
short walk. The 400-1600 meter range measures open space that is contained within a 
short drive from the house or that might be encountered on a bike ride or longer walk.  
The intuitive expectation is that open space within 400 meters has a larger impact on 
home price than open space quantities at the larger 400 to 1600 meter scale. The open 
space scales of 400 and 1600 meters match the methodology used in Ready and 
Abdalla (2005). Irwin (2002) evaluates land use only within 400 meters, while 
Geoghegan, Lynch and Bucholtz (2003) evaluate open space within both a 100 meter 
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and 1600 meter radius. Finally, Netusil (2005) looks at open space amenities within 
200 feet of the home, between 200 feet and ¼ mile and between ¼  and ½ mile. 
To calculate the open space acreage for each transaction, the number of 30 
meter grid cells of each open space type, within 400 meters and within 1600 was 
calculated for each residential transaction using the ARCGIS software and then 
converted to acres (each 30 meter cell = 0.22 acres). The percentage of each open 
space type between 400 and 1600 meters is calculated by subtracting the acreage 
within 400 meters from the acreage within 1600 meters. The coefficients on the open 
space variables in the hedonic model can be interpreted as the predicted percent 
change in home price associated with changing one acre of land area within either 400 
meters or between 400 and 1600 meters of a home from a developed use to a 
particular type of open space (or conversely the percent loss in home price associated 
with the open space being developed).   
The acreage in open water within 400 meters and between 400 and 1600 
meters of each home are also included as independent variables. Given Rochester’s 
location next to Lake Ontario, as well as the fact that a portion of the Finger Lakes 
region lies in the study area, access to water is an important variable in describing 
residential price differentials. The open space variables that are included in the model 
have all been shown to significantly influence property prices in previous hedonic 
analyses.
1 Agricultural open space is found to positively influence property prices in 
Ready and Abdalla (2005) and negatively influence property prices in Smith, Poulos 
and Kim (2002). Private forest land is shown to have a positive influence in Tyrväinen 
and Miettinen (2000), but a negative effect in Irwin (2002). Developed open space, 
such as large lot residential and golf courses has a positive and significant influence on 
                                                 
1 This is by no means an exhaustive list, but is included to give the reader a flavor for the number of 
hedonic studies that have found significant implicit prices for open space land. 
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residential property in studies by Smith, Poulos and Kim (2002) as well as Do and 
Grudsnitski (1995).  Smaller municipal parks have a strong positive impact in Espey 
and Owusu-Edusei (2001), but a negative impact in Lutzenhiser and Netusil (2001), 
while larger parks are shown to have the highest impact relative to other open space 
types in Anderson and West (2006) and Irwin (2002).  Finally, proximity to open 
water is shown to have a strongly positive impact in Earnhart (2001) and Mahan, 
Polasky, and Adams (2000).   
Location Specific Variables 
In addition to the property specific characteristics and the relative acreage in 
various types of open space surrounding a residential unit, the price of a home is 
influenced by its specific location in the landscape.  A set of variables that capture the 
influence of nearby amenities and disamenities are therefore included in the hedonic 
equation. Although agricultural open space is hypothesized to have a positive effect on 
home price, there are some aspects of agricultural production that may generate 
negative external effects. Over half of all agricultural receipts in New York State are 
generated from dairy farming (NYS Ag and Markets 2002).  While the number of 
dairy farms across New York has been steadily decreasing, the number of animals 
housed on the average farm has increased (NASS 2002).  As the remaining dairy farm 
operations have increased in size, the potential for negative impacts on nearby 
residential property has also risen (Palmquist, Roka and Vukina 1997).   
To capture the influence of large scale animal agriculture, a proximity measure 
to all 98 farms
2 in our study area that qualify as Concentrated Animal Feeding 
Operations (CAFOs) is calculated.  The geographic location of each CAFO coincides 
with the center of the farmstead, as determined by the NYS Department of 
Environmental Conservation (DEC).  According to the DEC classification system, the 
                                                 
2 The Finger Lakes Racetrack, which is identified as a CAFO, is not included in the analysis. 
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study area contains 60 medium-size CAFOs (200-599 mature dairy cows) and 38 
large-size CAFOs (at least 600 mature dairy cows).  Dairy farms account for the 
overwhelming majority of the CAFOs in the dataset, though some sheep and chicken 
farms are included in the total.  The impact of large and medium sized CAFOs is 
measured using an index developed in Ready and Abdalla (2005) that allows for the 
measurement of the influence of multiple nearby CAFOs, weighted by their proximity.  
For each housing unit, the proximity index is measured as 
(   
1
1 1 ∑
=
− − − =
J
j
ij i K Dist C ) ,                                                          (6) 
where J is the number of each type of CAFO within K meters of housing unit i and K 
= 1,600 meters.  The 1,600 meter extent of influence is based on Ready and Abdalla’s 
finding that the influence of nearby disamenities does not extend past 1,600 meters 
and also corresponds to the 1600 meter extent of measured nearby open space.  
Summing across all of the CAFOs within 1,600 meters allows for measuring the 
influence of multiple sites, weighted by their distance from the housing unit.  In 
addition to Ready and Abdalla, separate studies by Herriges, Secchi and Babcock 
(2005) as well as Palmquist, Roka and Vukina (1997) have shown significantly 
negative spillovers associated with residential proximity to hog operations in Iowa and 
North Carolina respectively.  
Other potential disamenities included in the hedonic model are proximity to 
waste management and wastewater treatment facilities as well as proximity to high 
traffic roadways.  Data on the spatial distribution of all three of these disamenities are 
made available by the NYS DEC.  Negative implicit prices for proximity to waste 
management facilities have been found in Hite et al. (2001) and Ready and Abdalla 
(2005), among others. For the proximity to waste management facilities variable, the 
proximity index is calculated for landfills and waste transfer stations.  Although a 
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transfer station, defined as a waste management facility where solid waste is received 
for the purpose of subsequent transfer to another facility, likely has less of an impact 
on housing price than a landfill, there are too few landfills in the study area (a total of 
3) to differentiate between the two. It is hypothesized that that the types of sites, 
smells and sounds associated with both landfills and transfer stations make living 
nearby unattractive. Overall there are 45 landfill and transfer stations within the study 
area whose proximity influence nearby residential sites.  In addition, 47 wastewater 
treatment facilities that have been issued a State Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (SPDES) permit are contained within the study area. Wastewater treatment 
plant proximity is included in the study by Ready and Abdalla, but was not found to 
significantly impact property values.  
High traffic roadways may also be seen as a disamenity to individuals who live 
nearby.  Although major roadways are essential for commuting to work and to 
commercial areas, living very close to a high traffic road entails enduring the noise 
and exhaust associated with heavy vehicular traffic. An extensive review of hedonic 
studies measuring the noise and pollution impacts of high traffic roads on residential 
property can be found in Bateman et al. (2001). Previous studies have found that the 
disamenity impact of high traffic roads is typically limited to a relatively small 
geographic scale. For example, Palmquist (1992) finds that the impact of high traffic 
roads extends for approximately 1,000 feet. Therefore the upper distance bound on the 
high traffic road variable used in this analysis is 400 meters. The high traffic roadways 
included in this study were chosen based on the NYS DEC major roadways 
designation.  They include all of the interstates that pass through Rochester in addition 
to several major state routes. Smith, Poulos and Kim (2002) as well as Palmquist 
(1992) find significant negative externalities associated with living in very close 
proximity to major highways. The proximity index is again used as a measure of the 
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impact of living near high traffic roads. A map illustrating the distribution of all of the 
disamenities described above is provided in the appendix as Figure A.3.3.   
The proximity of residential property to the central business district and to 
major transportation routes should positively impact a home’s price.  The distance 
from each observed housing transaction to the center of Rochester and to the closest of 
the six NYS Thruway entrances in the study area are included as independent 
variables.  Based on results from myriad hedonic studies that include distance to 
central cities (e.g., Brasington and Hite 2006; Anderson and West 2006), and the 
original insights of von Thunen, property prices are expected to decrease with distance 
from the CBD, holding all else constant. The distance to a Thruway entrance applies 
to all of the homes in the dataset, whereas the proximity index for high traffic roads 
mentioned previously is limited to a 400 meter buffer.  While living in close proximity 
to a high traffic road is likely to be seen as a nuisance, a location that is relatively 
close to a Thruway entrance is hypothesized to have a positive influence on home 
price (e.g., Geoghegan 1997).      
The demographic characteristics of other households in the neighborhood also 
have been found to influence a home’s price (e.g., Cheshire and Sheppard 1995; Irwin 
2002).  Variables measuring median income and the percentage of the population that 
is white are included using data from the 2000 US Census at the Census tract level.  
Based on previous studies, it is expected that both median income and the percentage 
of the population in the Census tract that identify themselves as white will have 
positive influences on home price. 
The quality of local public schools has also been shown to have a positive 
impact on residential prices (e.g., Braisington 1999; Ready and Abdalla 2005; Clapp, 
Nanda, and Ross 2005).  In this study, two proxy measures of school quality are 
included, which were provided by the NYS Department of Education. The school 
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performance index is determined based on the results of statewide tests administered 
to 4
th grade students in language arts and mathematics in 2003.  A measure of the 
student to teacher ratio at the elementary school level is also included as an 
independent variable.  This variable is derived by dividing the number of enrolled 
students in each elementary school by the number of full and part time faculty. The 
school quality measures for each residential sale are assigned by merging the location 
of the housing unit with a contiguous map of elementary school boundaries, assembled 
from data obtained from individual school districts. This level of specificity represents 
a marked improvement from school quality measures defined at the district level (e.g., 
Brasington 1999; Clapp, Nanda, and Ross 2005). Brasington’s study on the influence 
of school quality on residential property prices finds that both school performance 
measures and student-teacher ratio are capitalized into home prices in the majority of 
the six Ohio housing markets that he evaluates.  It is hypothesized that both school 
quality measures have a positive influence on home price, but comparing the two 
provides important insights, in that the student to teacher ratio represents an input to 
education while test score performance measures a school quality output. While high 
quality schools are expected to have a positive influence on housing prices, the school 
budgets are financed in large part from local property taxes. Both Brasington (1999) 
and Klapp, Nanda, and Ross (2007) find that school taxes are capitalized into home 
prices. To control for heterogeneity in school taxes across the study area, a measure of 
the average school tax rate adjusted for property value and provided by the Office of 
State Comptroller, is included as an independent variable.  
Two final location variables included in the hedonic model are whether or not 
the residential parcel is located in a village and whether the residence has access to 
public sewer systems. Many studies include the distance to nearby rural towns centers 
or villages (e.g., Michael, Boyle and Bouchard 2000; Herriges, Secchi and Babcock 
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2005) as an explanatory variable, but whether or not the residence is located inside or 
outside of a village boundary is likely to have an impact on the services received (e.g, 
refuse collection, road maintenance) and taxes.  Villages often provide additional 
public services that are not available to residents living outside of their boundaries. 
These services, however, are again financed by local taxes. Moreover, a home situated 
in a rural village often has a different set of surrounding amenities than a home outside 
such boundaries. A dummy variable indicating whether the home is located in a 
village or city
3 is included as an independent variable to capture this effect. The 
availability of a connection to the public sewer system is clearly an advantage over the 
potentially costly maintenance involved with private septic systems (e.g., Ready and 
Abdalla 2005). As such, it is expected that the availability of a public sewer 
connection will increase home price, holding all other factors constant.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for all of the variables included in the hedonic equations 
for each of the three primary submarkets are included as Table 3.1. It is clear from the 
descriptive statistics that considerable differences exist between the urban, rural and 
suburban housing markets. Most notably, percentages of agricultural land and private 
open space increase significantly between urban to rural submarkets, while developed 
open space and public open space display the opposite trend. In addition, homes in the 
suburban submarket tend to be newer, larger, in better condition and more expensive 
than homes in either the rural or urban submarkets. It should be noted that differences 
in average housing characteristics alone do not necessitate estimating parameters that 
vary by submarket.  Indeed, heterogeneity across the study area is essential to 
accurately estimating the hedonic price function.  It is the systematic variation that 
                                                 
3 The cities of Batavia and Canandaigua are located within the study area.  
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exists across urban, suburban and rural areas, however, that points to the importance 
of separating the effects of the covariates based on submarket.   
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Model Variables 
Full Market Rural Suburban Urban
Variable Units Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Observations # 66,609 17,759 26,196 22,654
Sale Price Dollars 131,151 78,959 116,370 85,283 154,471 82,328 115,771 61,286
ln(Sale Price) ln(Dollars) 11.67 0.46 11.52 0.52 11.85 0.43 11.58 0.38
Neighborhood: 0 - 400 Meters (130 acres)
Agriculture Acres 25.1 31.8 49.1 35.2 26.3 29.6 5.0 11.8
D e v e l o p e d  O S A c r e s 4 2 . 92 9 . 12 3 . 11 8 . 15 5 . 13 2 . 44 4 . 22 3 . 3
P r i v a t e  F o r e s t A c r e s 1 7 . 81 8 . 12 2 . 01 9 . 62 0 . 01 7 . 91 1 . 91 5 . 5
Municipal Park Acres 1.0 4.3 0.7 2.8 1.6 5.7 0.5 3.3
State/County Park Acres 1.1 6.3 0.6 4.8 0.7 5.3 1.8 8.1
Water Acres 2.6 11.4 5.7 17.0 1.1 6.2 2.0 10.2
Neighborhood: 400 - 1600 Meters (1,900 acres)
Agriculture Acres 443.3 426.8 853.8 374.0 459.4 361.4 102.8 162.8
Developed OS Acres 474.5 308.0 202.5 128.5 594.0 336.7 549.6 233.8
Private Forest Acres 286.3 199.9 354.9 225.6 321.7 186.4 191.5 152.5
Municipal Park Acres 21.4 31.3 6.2 13.5 30.5 35.9 22.8 31.2
State/County Park Acres 36.1 97.4 14.3 64.2 21.7 81.5 69.8 123.5
Water Acres 57.8 184.0 90.0 242.9 31.1 120.5 63.4 186.7
Location Based
Medium Cafo Index 0.00002 0.00041 0.00008 0.00079 0.00000 0.00004 - -
L a r g e  C a f o I n d e x 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 1 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 2 5 ----
Wastewater Plant Index 0.00005 0.00031 0.00015 0.00053 0.00002 0.00021 0.00001 0.00006
Transfer Station Index 0.00001 0.00050 0.00010 0.00070 0.00001 0.00040 0.00001 0.00040
High Traffic Road Index 0.00052 0.00275 0.00079 0.00374 0.00031 0.00192 0.00054 0.00262
Dist. Roch. CBD Kilometers 19.31 14.24 39.40 11.79 15.31 4.36 8.19 2.54
Dist. NYS Thruway Kilometers 16.58 9.07 18.99 13.19 13.79 7.79 17.92 4.47
Median HH Income Dollars (000) 55.0 15.1 46.1 9.0 65.1 16.0 50.4 10.4
White Population % 0.93 0.06 0.95 0.05 0.93 0.05 0.92 0.06
Public Sewer Binary 0.79 0.41 0.59 0.49 0.78 0.42 0.96 0.19
Village Binary 0.14 0.34 0.35 0.48 0.10 0.31 0.003 0.06
Pupil-Teacher Ratio Ratio 13.4 1.8 12.6 1.7 13.9 1.7 13.5 1.6
School Performance Test Score 180 9 177 7 182 9 181 8
School Tax Rate Dollars 19.26 1.77 18.54 2.39 19.00 1.09 20.14 1.43
Structural Characteristics
Sale Year Year 9.11 2.56 9.14 2.60 9.09 2.55 9.12 2.55
Overall Condition Scale (1-5) 3.05 0.337 3.06 0.155 3.07 3.18 3.02 0.203
Age Years 44 32 56 44 33 26 46 22
Living Area Sq Feet 1,694 578 1,626 576 1,840 600 1,579 514
Property Size Acres 0.55 0.69 0.84 1.00 0.58 0.61 0.30 0.28
Number Bathrooms # 1.7 0.7 1.6 0.6 1.9 0.7 1.6 0.6
Central AC Binary 0.34 0.474 0.15 0.362 0.427 0.495 0.386 0.487  
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3.7  Model Estimation Results 
  This section presents the estimation results of the hedonic equation parameters, 
and the discussion proceeds according to the framework presented in Table 3.2. To 
begin, the hedonic parameters are estimated through ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression of the full 66,609 observation dataset. The full dataset is then segmented 
into rural, suburban and urban submarkets and the separate hedonic equations are 
estimated using OLS in each of the three submarkets. The results of the full dataset 
OLS model for both the aggregate market area and each of the three submarkets are 
presented in Table 3.3, followed by a discussion of the estimated parameter results.  
Table 3.2  Hedonic Estimation Framework 
  OLS 2SLS 
Full Dataset  Table 3.3  Table A.3.3 
Sampled Dataset  Table A.3.4  Table 3.4 
Next, the sampling procedure used to control for spatial autocorrelation and the 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation method used to correct for endogeneity in 
the private open space variables are explained. The estimation results from the 
sampled 2SLS model are provided in Table 3.4, followed by a discussion of the 
implications from this model. For completeness, the results of the 2SLS estimation on 
the full sample and the OLS estimation on the sampled dataset are included in the 
appendix as Tables A.3.3 and A.3.4 respectively. Comparisons across all four sets of 
estimation results provide insights into the consistency of the estimation results across 
estimation techniques.  Keeping with the objectives of this study, attention is focused 
primarily on the variables that relate to open space proximity and locational 
disamenities as well as the differences across submarkets.  
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Table 3.3  OLS Estimation Results from Full Dataset 
Aggregate (66,609) Rural (17,759) Suburban (26,196) Urban (22,654)
R
2 = 0.773 R
2 = 0.716 R
2 = 0.795 R
2 = 0.798
Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Error Coefficient Error Coefficient Error
Intercept 9.36
* 0.03 9.36
* 0.09 9.79
* 0.05 9.41
* 0.04
Neighborhood: 0 - 400 Meters
Municipal Park -0.00046
** 0.00021 -0.00022 0.00079 -0.00043
*** 0.00023 -0.00032 0.00036
State/County Park 0.00128
* 0.00017 0.00019 0.00056 0.00131
* 0.00030 0.00110
* 0.00018
Agriculture 0.00183
* 0.00007 0.00209
* 0.00016 0.00150
* 0.00011 0.00133
* 0.00018
Developed OS 0.00160
* 0.00007 0.00238
* 0.00023 0.00092
* 0.00010 0.00182
* 0.00009
Private Forest 0.00213
* 0.00009 0.00237
* 0.00023 0.00119
* 0.00014 0.00208
* 0.00013
Water 0.00938
* 0.00015 0.01085
* 0.00033 0.00604
* 0.00032 0.00706
* 0.00021
Neighborhood: 400 - 1600 Mete
Municipal Park 0.000082
** 0.000031 -0.000260 0.000179 0.000025 0.000041 0.000094
** 0.000042
State/County Park 0.000002 0.000012 0.000024 0.000044 0.000081
* 0.000020 0.000181
* 0.000015
Agriculture -0.000060
* 0.000006 -0.000130
* 0.000015 -0.000050
* 0.000012 0.000127
* 0.000017
Developed OS 0.000079
* 0.000008 0.000106
** 0.000036 0.000084
* 0.000013 0.000247
* 0.000011
Private Forest -0.000020
*** 0.000009 -0.000130
* 0.000023 -0.000030
** 0.000015 0.000057
* 0.000014
Water -0.000050
* 0.000010 -0.000040 0.000025 0.000008 0.000020 -0.000070
* 0.000013
Location Based
CAFO -11.56
* 1.92 -10.01
* 2.42 - - - -
Wastewater Tmt -12.10
* 2.87 -18.04
* 4.14 15.73
** 5.82 108.96
* 19.61
Transfer Station -4.06
** 1.67 2.34 2.87 -7.49
** 2.76 -10.05
** 3.05
High Traffic Road -1.09
* 0.32 -0.97
*** 0.56 -0.70 0.64 -2.89
* 0.46
Dist. CBD -0.0035
* 0.0001 -0.0026
* 0.0003 -0.0041
* 0.0005 -0.0171
* 0.0016
Dist. NYS Thru -0.0043
* 0.0001 -0.0063
* 0.0003 -0.0005
** 0.0002 0.0010 0.0006
Median Income 0.0026
* 0.0001 0.0029
* 0.0004 0.0021
* 0.0001 0.0032
* 0.0002
Percent White 0.328
* 0.018 0.251
* 0.045 0.218
* 0.038 0.068
** 0.023
Public Sewer 0.0098
** 0.0030 0.0206
** 0.0063 -0.0061 0.0040 0.0091 0.0070
Pupil-Teacher 0.0046
* 0.0006 0.0047
** 0.0016 0.0290
* 0.0012 -0.0111
* 0.0010
School Perf. 0.00233
* 0.00012 0.00314
* 0.00038 0.00233
* 0.00017 0.00160
* 0.00020
School Tax Rate -0.0116
* 0.0006 -0.0189
* 0.0011 -0.0316
* 0.0015 0.0100
* 0.0015
Village 0.0813
* 0.0034 0.0412
* 0.0072 0.0838
* 0.0051 -0.0453
** 0.0206
Property Characteristics
Sale Year 0.034
* 0.000 0.034
* 0.001 0.035
* 0.000 0.034
* 0.000
Overall Cond. 0.171
* 0.003 0.208
* 0.005 0.103
* 0.004 0.159
* 0.006
Age -0.0026
* 0.0000 -0.0023
* 0.0001 -0.0029
* 0.0001 -0.0026
* 0.0001
Living Area 0.00034
* 0.00000 0.00033
* 0.00000 0.00034
* 0.00000 0.00035
* 0.00000
Property Size 0.0502
* 0.0016 0.0522
* 0.0026 0.0650
* 0.0025 0.0743
* 0.0049
Number Bath 0.1077
* 0.0021 0.1073
* 0.0047 0.0933
* 0.0029 0.0962
* 0.0030
Central AC 0.0667
* 0.0020 0.0790
* 0.0065 0.0653
* 0.0028 0.0530
* 0.0025  
Note: *,**,*** Indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels respectively. 
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OLS Results from Full Dataset 
The OLS estimation results from the full dataset, presented in Table 3.3, reveal 
that proximity to open space is highly valued. With the exception of municipal parks, 
and county/state parks in rural areas, all of the open space variables within 400 meters 
have positive and significant implicit prices. Between 400 and 1600 meters all open 
space types, except for municipal parks, have a significantly smaller impact on 
residential prices than open space within 400 meters. Interpreting the coefficients on 
open space within 400-1600 meters is challenging, however, as it is not clear how to 
reconcile an open space measure that has a positive impact on home price within 400 
meters and negative impact at the 400 to 1600 meter scale. It may be that home buyers 
have different preferences for open space acreage that is accessible to their home, but 
not necessarily adjacent to their property. While open space in the 400-1600 meter 
range is included in the model as a control variable, the primary focus of the 
discussion will be on the findings from open space coefficients within 400 meters of 
the home.   
Proximity to open water is clearly the most highly valued open space in all 
three submarkets within a 400 meter radius, but the relative values of the remaining 
open space types are highly variable.  In particular state/county parks have 
significantly higher implicit prices in suburban and urban areas than in rural areas, 
possibly reflecting preferences for accessible open space in the more urbanized 
neighborhoods. Conversely, private open space appears to be more highly valued in 
rural areas relative to urban areas. The coefficients on agricultural, developed open 
space and forested open space in rural areas are not statistically different and are 
higher than private open space types in either the suburban or urban markets.  
Proximity to concentrated animal feeding operations has a significantly 
negative impact on home price. In appendix Table A.3.2, the hedonic model is 
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estimated with separate measures for medium and large CAFOs. Parameter results 
from this model suggest that medium CAFOs have a significantly negative impact on 
home price, while the proximity of large CAFOs is negative, but not significantly 
different from zero.  This result is similar to the findings in Herriges, Secchi and 
Babcock (2003), who hypothesize that larger animal agriculture facilities tend to be 
newer and better managed, potentially because they are also more heavily regulated, 
and therefore have less impact on nearby residential property. In this case, however, 
the finding that large CAFOs do not have a significant effect on home price may also 
be a result of the relatively small number of homes that are located within 1600 meters 
of a large CAFO (448; 0.6%) compared to a medium CAFO (1,188; 1.8%). In addition 
to the fact that there are fewer large than medium CAFOs, it could also be that fewer 
homes are affected by large CAFOs because they tend to account for a larger land 
area. Thus the location of the barn housing the animals is less likely to be within 1600 
meters of residential property in the case of large CAFOs. A Wald test of the equality 
of medium and large CAFO coefficients, however, reveals no statistical difference 
between the influence of medium and large CAFOs (Wald Statistic = 0.21 which is 
less than the critical chi-squared value of 3.84 for the 0.05 level of significance) and 
thus in the model results presented in the text all CAFOs are aggregated into one 
variable. 
The proximity indices representing wastewater treatment facilities, transfer 
stations and high traffic roads are significantly negative in aggregate, but reveal 
substantive differences across the three markets.  Wastewater treatment facilities have 
a significantly negative impact in rural areas, while the impact is actually found to be 
significantly positive in suburban and rural areas. This result is similar to the findings 
of Ready and Abdalla (2005) who estimate a significantly positive influence of 
wastewater treatment plants in their OLS hedonic model. In the case of the Rochester 
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area, a likely reason for the positive implicit price is the fact that wastewater treatment 
plants in the urban and suburban municipalities tend to be located along Lake Ontario, 
where waterfront homes tend to have high prices, while in rural areas they tend to be 
located along smaller, linear waterways. Proximity to transfer stations and high traffic 
roads follow the opposite trend, with the most negative localized impacts occurring in 
the more urban municipalities. 
The census derived demographic statistics are relatively consistent across 
market areas and reveal positive implicit prices for homes located in high income, 
white neighborhoods. The indicator variables for access to public sewers and location 
in a village setting are both significantly positive in rural areas, suggesting a premium 
on local services, and insignificant and negative respectively in urban areas. Given 
that the overwhelming majority of homes in urban areas (96%) have access to public 
sewer, the insignificance of this variable is not surprising. The public school related 
variables also reveal some significant differences between markets. Although 
performance measures based on test scores are significantly positive across the three 
markets, the pupil-teacher ratio ranges from significantly negative in urban areas to 
positive in rural and suburban areas. One would expect, based on intuition and the 
results of Brasington (1999), that pupil-teacher ratio would have a negative implicit 
price (i.e., having fewer students per teacher is a benefit), but this is not the case in 
rural and suburban areas. This unexpected result could be a function of the fact that 
the pupil-teacher ratio measures an input to school quality that may be adjusted based 
on performance (i.e., the number of teachers is increased in lower performing schools 
in the rural and suburban areas). The variable measuring adjusted school tax rates 
follows a similar pattern, as increases in school tax rates have a negative influence on 
home price in rural and suburban areas and a positive impact in urban areas. The 
property specific parameters are significant in the predicted direction and generally 
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stable across all markets. The exception to this is the finding that urban residents have 
higher implicit prices for lot size and interior square footage relative to rural residents. 
This result is likely driven by the constraints on property size in urban settings that are 
not are less restrictive in rural areas.  Finally, the estimation results across the three 
markets reveal that the hedonic equation does a notably better job predicting variation 
in residential property prices in urban and suburban municipalities (R-sq = 0.798 and 
0.795 respectively) compared to rural areas (R-sq = 0.716). This is not surprising 
given the fact that the rural transactions are distributed across a much larger 
geographic area and therefore rural prices are likely a function of a greater number of 
unobservable, location specific factors. 
Overall, the estimation results suggest significant variation across the three 
housing markets that validate the estimation of three separate equations. A Chow test 
reveals that, in aggregate, the coefficient estimates from the three hedonic equations 
are significantly different.
4 A Tiao-Goldberger test is also performed, which tests the 
stability of individual coefficient estimates across the three submarkets. The test 
amounts to comparing the squared deviation of each regression coefficient from the 
weighted average coefficient across the three models, relative to the sum of squared 
errors. An application of the test to the estimation of hedonic functions across 
submarkets is provided in Michaels and Smith (1990). The results of the test are 
provided in appendix Table A.3.12 and show that all but 2 of the 33 coefficients 
(municipal parks within 400 meters and the year of sale) vary significantly across the 
three submarkets. This is strong evidence that the hedonic functions are indeed 
different across the three markets. 
 
 
                                                 
4 The F-statistic is 150.7, which is significant at the 0.01 level 
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Two Stage Least Squares Estimation on Sampled Dataset 
Previous studies have found quantities of private open space to be endogenous 
to residential property prices and have found evidence of spatial autocorrelation in 
model errors (e.g., Irwin and Bockstael 2001; Irwin 2002; Geoghegan, Lynch and 
Bucholtz 2003). A joint Hausman test reveals that endogeneity in the private open 
space measures is present in the Rochester study area as well.
5  Further, econometric 
tests reveal significant spatial error autocorrelation.
6 This subsection describes how 
endogeneity and spatial autocorrelation are controlled for in the hedonic estimation. 
These explanations are followed by a presentation and discussion of the 2SLS results 
on the sampled dataset. 
To control for endogeneity, a two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation 
procedure is undertaken, with instruments provided for the private open space 
variables; developed open space, agricultural land and private forested open space. In 
separate first stage regressions, the amount of each of the three private open measures 
within 1600 meters of each home are included as the dependent variable in an OLS 
regression, with all of the instruments, described below, and all of the exogenous 
variables serving as independent variables. In the second step, the predicted open 
space values are inserted into the hedonic equation, which is estimated with a second 
OLS regression. Given that the hedonic equation includes open space measures within 
400 meters and between 400 and 1600 meters, the predicted amount of open space 
within 1600 meters from the first stage equation is multiplied by the percentage of the 
                                                 
5 The test statistics of 168.5 for the full dataset and 13.08 for the sampled dataset are greater than the 
critical value of 11.3, which represents a significance level of 0.01 of a chi-squared distribution with 3 
degrees of freedom. This test is performed in two steps. First, residuals are obtained from first stage 
regression of each of the private open space variables on the set of instruments and all of the exogenous 
variables. Second, the residuals from each of the first stage regressions are inserted into the hedonic 
equation as independent variables. The test statistic then measures if the coefficients on the residuals are 
jointly significantly different from zero. 
6 The Lagrange Multiplier statistic is 13,828 which is distributed chi-square and significant at the 0.01 
level. This statistic is obtained using Matlab’s spatial toolbox. In addition, a spatial error model was 
calculated and the spatial parameter (lambda) was positive and highly significant.  
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open space variable that lies within 400 and the percentage of open space between 400 
and 1600 meters. Thus, expanding equation (5), the hedonic equation is estimated as 
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where the upper case letters 1600 A ˆ ,  1600 D ˆ ,  1600 F ˆ ,       represent the total 
acreage within 1600 meters that is in agriculture, developed open space, forested, 
municipal park, county/state park, or open water respectively and the lower case 
letters represent the percentage of each land use type that is within 400 meters (e.g., 
a4) and the percentage between 400 and 1600 meters (e.g., a4-16).  The “hats” on the A, 
D, and F, variables indicate that the predicted values of agricultural, developed open 
space and forest land from the first stage equation are used instead of the actual 
values. The implicit assumption is that the overall amount of each private open space 
type within 1600 meters is endogenous, but that the relative amount of open space 
within 400 meters and between 400 and 1600 meters is exogenous.  
1600 M, 1600 C, 1600 W
The instruments used in the first stage regressions are chosen based on the 
hypothesis that they are correlated with the amount of open space surrounding a home, 
but do not influence the sales price of the home. Specifically, variables are included 
that influence the direct costs and opportunity costs of development. The first 
instrumental variable is whether the residential parcel is located in an agricultural 
district. In New York State, agricultural districts are implemented to “forestall the 
conversion of farmland to non-agricultural uses,” by allowing agricultural landowners 
to receive preferential tax treatment and protections against local zoning laws and 
nuisance lawsuits (NYS Ag and Markets 2007). Being in an agricultural district 
increases the opportunity costs of taking a parcel out of agricultural production and 
  129 
therefore it is expected that homes inside of agricultural districts have higher amounts 
of surrounding open space.  
The next three instruments are all derived from a GIS coverage of soil 
characteristics developed by the USDA Natural Resource Conservation Service 
(NRCS), and include measures of building suitability, septic suitability and soil 
productivity. To calculate these variables, two steps were taken. First a 1600 meter 
lattice grid was overlaid onto the soil map
7 and an area weighted average was 
calculated for each of the three suitability measures. Next, the grid averages were 
linked to the residential transactions based on the 1600 meter grid cell in which the 
transaction is located. 
The four instruments associated with soil characteristics and opportunity costs 
of conversion are augmented with two instrumental variables that measure proximity 
to transportation and other infrastructure, which tend to reduce overall construction 
costs. The variables included are the natural log of distance from Rochester and the 
natural log of distance to Thruway exists. Irwin (2002) similarly includes the log of 
distance to various metro areas as instruments and Geoghegan, Lynch and Bucholtz 
(2003) include the log of distance to the nearest transportation node.  
The F-statistics from first stage regressions, where the three endogenous 
variables are regressed on the six instruments, fall comfortably above the threshold of 
10 recommended by Staiger and Stock (1997).  The first stage regression results from 
the sampled dataset, where the three private open space types are regressed on the 
instruments and all of the exogenous variables, are also included in the appendix in 
Table A.3.11.  
                                                 
7 The Soil Survey Geographic (SSURGO) Database is used as the soil map in all counties with the 
exception of Livingston, Wayne and Yates counties, where SSURGO data are not available and the 
comparable, but slightly less refined State Soil Geographic (STATSGO) Database is used. 
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In addition to econometric issues associated with endogenous independent 
variables, spatial error autocorrelation is found to be statistically significant based on a 
Lagrange Multiplier test (p < 0.01).  To control for the autocorrelation, the data are 
sampled so that no residential location in the final dataset has a neighbor within 100 
meters. This sampled dataset is constructed by picking one sale at random from the set 
of 66,609 residential locations. Next, a second home is chosen at random from the 
remaining pool of 66,608 observations and if this home is not within 100 meters of the 
first home selected, then it is included in the final dataset. If it is within 100 meters of 
the previously chosen observation then it is thrown out. The sampling proceeds in this 
fashion until the entire dataset has been evaluated.  In the resulting “no nearest 
neighbor” dataset that is used in the final set of regressions, there are 22,721 total 
observations.  
It should be noted that the sample generated from this procedure is not unique. 
The transaction chosen first determines in part the inclusion of the next transaction 
chosen and so on. The probability that an individual residential sale is included in the 
sampled is, however, not random. For example, a sales point that does not have any 
neighbors within 100 meters in the full dataset will always be included in the reduced 
dataset. This also hints at a potential concern with standard hedonic models that 
estimate equations over heterogeneous neighborhoods. Clearly, if no sampling or 
weighting is undertaken, then model results will reflect the preferences of residential 
consumers in densely populated areas more so than rural buyers. Sampling alone does 
not solve this dilemma, but sampling in conjunction with the separate estimation of 
equations in rural, suburban and urban markets allows for a better understanding of the 
differences in implicit prices across different densities.  
To test the robustness of the hedonic parameter estimates to particular sample 
draws, the sampling technique is repeated ten times. The ten samples are then used to 
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generate the minimum and maximum coefficient estimate from each of the 2SLS 
model variables. The results of this robustness test from the aggregate market and each 
of the three submarkets and are presented in appendix Table A.3.8 and show that the 
estimated coefficients are generally robust to the particular sample draw. Among the 
coefficients that are significantly different from zero in the sampling draw featured in 
Table 3.4, both the minimum and maximum parameter estimate from the 10 draws are 
of the same sign.    
The hedonic equation coefficients estimated with OLS on the sampled dataset 
are included in the appendix as Table A.3.4. The primary effect of the sampling 
procedure is an increase in the standard errors of the estimated coefficients. Across the 
32 variables in the aggregate market model, the standard error in the sampled dataset 
is an average of 1.83 times higher than in the full dataset.  Higher standard errors are a 
natural result of reducing the number of observations in the estimated equation. 
Theoretically, decreasing the number of observations from 66,609 to 22,712 should 
result in a 1.71 22712 66609 =  increase in the standard error. The estimated 
standard errors from the sampled dataset are therefore in line with the theoretical 
expectations.  Further, only one of the coefficients that is significantly different from 
zero in the full dataset OLS model switches signs in the sampled OLS model. Given 
that 128 coefficients are estimated in total, the fact that only one of them switches sign 
and significance (open water acreage between 400 and 1600 meters) is strong 
evidence that coefficients are robust between the model estimated with the full dataset 
and the sampled dataset.   
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Table 3.4 2SLS Estimation Results from Sampled Dataset 
Aggregate (22,721) Rural (8,507) Suburban (9,050) Urban (5,164)
R
2 = 0.7509 R
2 = 0.6739 R
2 = 0.7652 R
2 = 0.7657
Variable Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Intercept 9.29
* 0.07 8.40
* 0.30 10.01
* 0.12 9.63
* 0.11
Neighborhood: 0 - 400 Meters
Municipal Park 0.00170
** 0.00078 0.00225 0.00179 0.00210
** 0.00066 0.00167 0.00102
State/County Park 0.00332
* 0.00082 0.00132 0.00135 0.00381
* 0.00078 0.00261
* 0.00059
Agriculture 0.00609
* 0.00138 0.00366
** 0.00144 0.00503
* 0.00089 0.00776
* 0.00220
Developed OS 0.00453
* 0.00116 0.00413
** 0.00204 0.00394
* 0.00085 0.00210
* 0.00056
Private Forest 0.00539
* 0.00115 0.00472
** 0.00180 0.00503
* 0.00092 0.00079 0.00054
Water 0.01127
* 0.00087 0.01229
* 0.00159 0.00781
* 0.00078 0.00838
* 0.00068
Neighborhood: 400 - 1600 Meters
Municipal Park -0.000320
** 0.000110 0.000722
*** 0.000398 0.000067 0.000132 0.000372
** 0.000128
State/County Park 0.000008 0.000044 0.000445
* 0.000107 0.000222
* 0.000055 -0.000020 0.000068
Agriculture -0.000240
** 0.000085 0.000256
** 0.000088 0.000045 0.000083 -0.000430
** 0.000191
Developed OS 0.000082 0.000060 0.001582
* 0.000363 0.000333
* 0.000076 0.000050 0.000075
Private Forest -0.000170
** 0.000062 0.000254
** 0.000104 0.000143 0.000110 0.000342
* 0.000064
Water -0.000020 0.000046 0.000375
* 0.000085 0.000292
* 0.000074 -0.000140
*** 0.000072
Location Based
CAFO -6.79
** 3.29 -14.63
* 4.43 - - - -
Wastewater Tmt 1.08 6.68 -23.28
** 7.89 43.69
** 13.92 49.44 38.33
Transfer Station -1.95 2.54 3.69 3.71 9.33 10.23 -9.06
*** 4.71
High Traffic Road -0.64 0.62 -0.59 0.94 1.87 1.37 -3.03
** 1.04
Dist. CBD -0.0041
* 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0008 -0.0057
** 0.0018 -0.0100 0.0130
Dist. NYS Thru -0.0043
* 0.0003 -0.0088
* 0.0007 -0.0034
* 0.0008 -0.0030 0.0029
Median Income 0.0013
** 0.0004 0.0026
* 0.0007 0.0008
** 0.0003 0.0042
* 0.0005
Percent White 0.244
* 0.040 -0.016 0.080 -0.137 0.100 0.155
** 0.063
Public Sewer 0.0355
* 0.0078 0.0202 0.0153 0.0115 0.0110 0.0629
** 0.0193
Pupil-Teacher 0.0113
* 0.0014 0.0026 0.0045 0.0278
* 0.0026 -0.0138
* 0.0033
School Perf. 0.00197
* 0.00025 0.00363
* 0.00078 0.00011 0.00047 0.00189
* 0.00057
School Tax Rate -0.0129
* 0.0011 -0.0105
* 0.0023 -0.0305
* 0.0034 0.0016 0.0048
Village 0.1324
* 0.0199 0.0296
*** 0.0172 0.1763
* 0.0193 -0.1203
** 0.0438
Property Characteristics
Sale Year 0.034
* 0.001 0.034
* 0.001 0.036
* 0.001 0.032
* 0.001
Overall Cond. 0.188
* 0.005 0.218
* 0.007 0.122
* 0.008 0.121
* 0.013
Age -0.0023
* 0.0001 -0.0021
* 0.0001 -0.0029
* 0.0001 -0.0027
* 0.0002
Living Area 0.00032
* 0.00000 0.00030
* 0.00001 0.00032
* 0.00001 0.00036
* 0.00001
Property Size 0.0468
* 0.0026 0.0536
* 0.0041 0.0621
* 0.0038 0.0501
* 0.0096
Number Bath 0.1085
* 0.0043 0.1030
* 0.0079 0.0911
* 0.0058 0.1030
* 0.0069
Central AC 0.0663
* 0.0045 0.0599
* 0.0144 0.0687
* 0.0056 0.0518
* 0.0060  
Note: *,**,*** Indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels respectively. 
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The coefficient estimates of the hedonic model from the 2SLS estimation and 
the sampled dataset are included as Table 3.4. Overall, the open space coefficient 
estimates are considerably higher under the sampled, 2SLS model than under the full 
OLS model. Inspection of the 2SLS model results from the full dataset reveals that the 
higher coefficient estimates are a result of correcting for endogeneity rather than 
sampling. This suggests that the OLS model generates downwardly biased open space 
estimates, which is intuitively reasonable. If a given area is endowed with locational 
amenities, for example close proximity to Rochester and Lake Ontario, then it will 
command a higher price than other areas all else being equal. Given the higher prices 
that consumers are willing to pay, this land is more likely to be developed. Thus, 
holding all else constant, high priced residential neighborhoods will have less open 
space. This relationship runs contrary to the expectation that higher amounts of open 
space are correlated with higher property values. By estimating the amount of open 
space in a given area in the first stage equation and then incorporating these 
predictions in the second stage equation, the result should be higher estimates of 
marginal implicit prices for open space.  
  The relative implicit prices for open space between the three markets remain 
generally unchanged. Public open space, especially larger state and county parks, have 
a higher value in urban and suburban areas as opposed to the rural market. 
Additionally, marginal implicit prices for all of the private open space types remain 
relatively high in the rural areas. Interestingly, between the full dataset OLS model in 
Table 3.3 and the sampled 2SLS model in Table 3.4, the relative implicit prices of 
agricultural land are reversed. In the 2SLS model, agricultural land is most highly 
valued in urban areas relative to rural areas, while the opposite is true in the OLS 
model. This suggests that endogeneity problems associated with agricultural open 
space are most acute in urban settings, where the majority of agricultural land has been 
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developed (only 4% of the land area within 400 meters of a home in the urban area is 
classified as agricultural).  
The coefficient estimates from the sampled 2SLS model indicate that in rural 
areas, proximity to CAFOs and wastewater treatment facilities has a significantly 
negative effect. In urban areas, transfer stations and high traffic roads have a 
significantly negative impact on residential property prices. These results are 
consistent with the results of the OLS model with the full dataset. Among the 
remaining location based variables, only the coefficient on the percentage of white 
residents in the census tract changes sign between the sampled 2SLS model and the 
full OLS model, though the coefficient is only significantly different from zero in the 
full OLS model. None of the property specific variables change sign between the two 
models.    
Alternatively Defined Submarkets 
  To investigate the robustness of the estimation results to alternative submarket 
specifications, ancillary hedonic functions are estimated with the submarkets defined 
based on census boundaries and based on county boundaries. For the census based 
model, separate submarkets are determined based on the Rochester urban area, urban 
clusters and rural areas inside the general study area. These submarket definitions are 
defined by the U.S. Census and differ from the urban, rural and suburban submarkets 
analyzed above. The primary difference is that the urban clusters are composed of 
high population census blocks located in rural areas, for example village and town 
centers.  
  The hedonic estimates of the open space coefficients are generally similar 
between the primary urban, suburban and rural submarkets and the alternative census 
defined submarkets. Measures of public open space are significantly positive in the 
urban submarket under both specifications. A primary difference, however, is that the 
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private open space coefficients are considerably higher in the urban cluster submarket 
as opposed to the rural submarket. Thus, the significantly positive open space 
coefficients in the rural submarket in the primary model may be driven in large part by 
the homes located in more densely populated villages and town centers. Additionally, 
the coefficients on the locational disamenities are similar across the census defined 
and primary submarkets, except for the fact that CAFOs in rural areas are not 
significantly different from zero, though still negative. 
  The county defined submarkets are segmented into Monroe County, which is 
the county that contains the City of Rochester, and homes in the study area located in 
the nine counties surrounding Rochester. The results from the county defined 
submarkets closely mirror those from the primary model. Specifically, public open 
space is significantly positive among homes in Monroe County, but not significantly 
different from zero in the surrounding counties. Further, the private open space 
measures corresponding to developed open space and private forests are similarly 
highly significant in both submarkets. The locational disamenities are also very similar 
between the county and primary submarket definitions. CAFOs and wastewater 
treatment facilities are significant disamenities in the rural counties, while high traffic 
roads are a significant inside Monroe County. 
  Overall, the majority of the hedonic coefficients are intuitively comparable 
across the three alternative sets of submarkets. Given that each set of submarkets is 
defined according to unique criteria, it is not surprising that differences exist in the 
estimated coefficients across the three sets. Where coefficients differ, the results can 
generally be explained based on the specific submarket boundary definition. Thus, the 
results suggest that the appropriate submarket definition is important in making 
inferences based on estimated implicit prices. Since submarkets can be defined in 
myriad ways, it is important for the researcher to understand that the choice of market 
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boundaries will have an impact on the estimated hedonic coefficients. Of course, given 
the fact that 32 coefficients are estimated in each equation, differences in estimated 
coefficients are not surprising. The fact that the relative implicit prices are generally 
consistent across the different submarket deliniations is important evidence, however, 
of the systematic trends that occur within the market as a whole.  
Predicted Marginal Values 
The estimated open space coefficients in Table 3.4 indicate the predicted 
percentage change in home price resulting from a marginal change in open space. This 
subsection uses the coefficient estimates from Table 3.4 and the mean values of each 
variable to estimate the marginal values of open space and locational disamenities in 
dollar terms. Using the coefficient values to predict marginal values for open space 
and other localized externalities relies on the assumption that the change in open space 
under consideration is small relative to the entire market for open space. Therefore, a 
one acre change in each open space type is used to obtain the marginal value. If the 
change in open space being considered is large relative to the market area, then the 
housing market would adjust to reflect the new distribution of open space and relative 
prices would be altered. In the analysis that follows, the marginal value of open space 
is measured as the cost of a one acre loss in a given open space type. 
The marginal values are calculated by multiplying the vector of estimated 
coefficients times the mean values of each of the model variables. The antilog of the 
sum of the products is the predicted mean home price. Next, one acre is subtracted 
from the mean acreage of a given open space type and the new predicted home price is 
obtained. The difference between the predicted home price based on the mean value of 
each variable and the predicted price with one less open space acre indicates the 
marginal value, or in this case the marginal cost, of losing an acre of open space to 
development. The estimated marginal values as well as the percentage of homes that 
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have at least one acre of a given open space within either 400 meters or between 400 
and 1600 meters are reported in Table 3.5.  The marginal cost of each of the four 
locational disamenities (CAFO, wastewater treatment facility, transfer station, high 
traffic road) are determined in a similar fashion. The cost of adding one disamenity at 
distances of 400 meters and 1000 meters are estimated separately and the results are 
reported in Table 3.5, along with the percentage of homes within a proximity of 400 
meters and 1000 meters of each disamenity.  Since the proximity index for high traffic 
roads is measured only up to a distance of 400 meters, the impact of high traffic roads 
is estimated for a distance of 200 meters only.   
  
Table 3.5 Marginal Cost of 1 Acre Open Space Loss or Addition of a Disamenity   
Aggregate Rural Suburban Urban
Total Observations 22,721 8,507 9,050 5,164
% Obs Marg. Value % Obs Marg. Value % Obs Marg. Value % Obs Marg. Value
Neighborhood: 0 - 400 Meters
Municipal Park 8.2% -201.79 6.1% - 11.8% -301.56 5.5% -
State/County Park 5.2% -394.10 3.5% - 3.9% -548.42 10.1% -295.91
Agriculture 84.6% -720.98 97.1% -364.05 89.4% -722.12 55.6% -878.19
Developed OS 99.9% -537.33 99.9% -411.48 100.0% -566.59 100.0% -238.74
Private Forest 94.0% -638.38 97.9% -469.90 96.3% -722.51 83.3% -
Neighborhood: 400 - 1600 Meters
Municipal Park 44.1% 37.81 23.6% -72.16 56.6% - 56.2% -42.26
State/County Park 22.2% - 15.1% -44.24 17.2% -32.06 42.9% -
Agriculture 98.9% 29.10 100.0% -25.51 100.0% - 95.2% 48.43
Developed OS 100.0% - 100.0% -157.52 100.0% -48.22 100.0% -
Private Forest 100.0% 19.76 100.0% -25.25 100.0% - 99.8% -38.84
Located 400 Meters
CAFO 0.5% -1,504.02 1.3% -2,697.37 - - - -
Wastewater Tmt 0.6% - 1.2% -4,259.08 0.2% 12,289.00 - -
Transfer Station 0.3% - 0.5% - 0.1% - 0.3% -1,915.27
High Traffic Road* 4.8% - 6.0% - 3.1% - 5.9% -859.98
Located 1000 Meters
CAFO 3.5% -302.34 8.2% -545.41 - - - -
Wastewater Tmt 8.9% - 17.3% -866.75 4.0% 2,378.00 3.7% -
Transfer Station 1.8% - 3.5% - 0.8% - 0.7% -385.66  
Note: Marginal values are calculated only for variables that are significantly different 
from zero in Table 3.4. 
* The impact of high traffic roads is measured at 200 meters, since the maximum 
distance of influence is 400 meters.  
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  Inspection of Table 3.5 reveals that, based on the results from the aggregate 
market, the marginal cost of converting one acre of land from open space to some 
developed use varies from $201 to $720 per residence within 400 meters. The cost of 
open space conversion is consistently higher in the suburban submarket than in the 
market as a whole. This result arises from higher home prices along with relatively 
high coefficients on the open space variables in the suburban hedonic equation.  The 
highest cost for a one acre loss of open space is $828 for agricultural land in urban 
areas. One could argue that this result arises from the relative scarcity of agricultural 
open space in urban settings, where agriculture makes up less than 4% of the land 
surrounding an average home. In rural areas, private open space within 400 meters that 
is lost to development has a marginal cost of between $364 for agricultural land to 
$470 for private forest land.  Not surprisingly, the marginal cost of open space loss is 
considerably smaller in the 400-1600 meter range, reaching a maximum of $157 for 
losses in developed open space in rural areas.  
  The marginal cost of the introduction of a locational disamenity is also highly 
variable both across markets and across disamenity types. In rural areas, having a 
CAFO located at a distance of 400 meters is predicted to depress the price of an 
average home by nearly $2,700. The effect of CAFOs in other submarkets is not 
estimated, as CAFOs are found almost exclusively in rural areas. A wastewater 
treatment facility located at a distance of 400 meters is predicted to depress home 
price by more than $4,000 in the rural submarket, while proximity to wastewater 
treatment facilities is actually positively correlated with the price of homes in 
suburban areas. This latter result, as mentioned previously, likely stems from 
wastewater treatment plants being located in desirable lakefront areas. Waste 
management facilities and high traffic roads have negative impacts on average home 
prices of $1,915 and $960 respectively in urban areas, but no significant impact in 
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rural and suburban submarkets. Locational disamenities located 1000 meters from a 
residence have a roughly five times smaller impact on home price compared to the 
same disamenity located 400 meters from the home. This result implies that the 
influence of the disamenities considered in this analysis on home price diminish at an 
increasing rate with increases in distance.   
3.8  Policy Implications and Lessons Learned  
  In this section, the policy implications of the estimated hedonic functions are 
discussed, followed by a brief summary of the lessons that have been learned in 
undertaking this analysis. The estimated hedonic equations provide predictions of how 
marginal changes in open space, location based characteristics, and property specific 
attributes influence home prices. These estimated marginal implicit prices represent a 
measure of the marginal willingness to pay of homebuyers in each market submarket 
for specific housing attributes, such as open space. Utilizing the mean values of 
housing characteristics and the estimated coefficients from the hedonic function, the 
marginal cost of open space loss per household is also calculated. This analysis could 
be taken a step further, by multiplying the marginal cost per home by the number of 
homes affected in various neighborhoods. This would then provide an estimate of the 
social costs of lost open space acreage in a particular location.  
Care must be taken, however, in interpreting all of these results. First, the 
predicted marginal costs are based on changes in marginal open space quantities. If 
large open space areas are lost to development in a region, the supply curve for open 
space in a given area would shift and a new hedonic relationship would apply.  
Second, the social cost of changes in open space ultimately depends on what the open 
space land is converted to. For example, if a farm is subdivided into five acre lots for 
an upscale residential development, the resulting impact on nearby home prices will 
undoubtedly be very different from the case where the same farm is developed into a 
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parking lot for a large retail store.  Third, the social value of open space derived from a 
hedonic model is based solely on changes in property prices.  Ceteris paribus, this 
necessarily implies that open space in more densely populated areas is of greater value 
than open space in sparsely populated areas with very little development. Just because 
a particular open space type does not influence property prices, however, does not 
mean that it has no value for society.  For example, in this study there does not appear 
to be a preference among homebuyers for residential units in close proximity to 
municipal parks. This does not mean, however, that a municipal park is not valued by 
the general public. While the noise and congestion spillovers of a municipal park may 
not be desirable for adjacent properties, others in the larger community may benefit 
greatly from the recreational opportunities made available by the park. Indeed, there 
are a wide range of open space benefits that are not capitalized into home prices, such 
as the ecological benefits of large contiguous areas of natural habitat for wildlife.  
Finally, although the hedonic analysis illustrates costs of marginal losses of open 
space land, it does not consider the costs of open space preservation. These costs are 
likely to be highly variable across the study area and would need to be considered in 
the design of an optimal open space preservation program.  
Numerous lessons have been learned over the course of conducting this study, 
which may be helpful to future researchers undertaking a similar analysis.  The first 
lesson that became readily apparent is that large amounts of spatially explicit data can 
be both a blessing and a curse. While one could include literally hundreds of variables 
related to residential location and property characteristics, it is important to focus on 
variables of particular interest to the researcher and variables that serve as essential 
controls. Adding variables can make coefficient interpretation more difficult, similar 
to the attempts in this analysis to incorporate open space variables at two different 
ranges. This analysis employs data from a large, 10 county region and incorporates 
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over 60,000 observations and close to 40 variables. Assuming that the data represent 
one distinct housing market seems overly restrictive; yet defining submarkets is also 
not completely straightforward and could be accomplished in myriad ways.  While one 
might be tempted to incorporate a large number of submarkets, there are costs to 
segmenting markets. This first cost is obvious; more submarkets mean more equations, 
which inevitably mean more coefficients to interpret or more possibilities that at least 
some of the variables will have counterintuitive coefficient estimates. The second cost 
of delineating a plethora of housing markets is that this greatly reduces intra-market 
variation and decreases the number of observations in each market, both of which lead 
to higher standard errors on model coefficients.  
Other considerations for future researchers revolve around estimation of the 
hedonic equation.  To begin, it is important to have solid theoretical arguments for 
believing that a given variable is endogeneous. The test for endogeneity of a given 
variable involves comparing the coefficients of the hedonic equation, estimated with 
OLS, to the same equation estimated with 2SLS. Therefore, one must have an 
appropriate instrument just to test for an endogenous regressor. Thus it is essential to 
have a theoretical basis for presuming that a give variable is endogenous, to avoid an 
exhaustive search for instruments. Also, when estimating the hedonic equation for 
each submarket with 2SLS, the first stage regression is run separately in each 
submarket. This flexibility should allow for more accurate predictions of open space in 
each submarket, however, it also introduces another element of variation that may lead 
to greater variability in the estimated results. For example, it may not be possible to 
tell the degree to which observed results vary as a result of differences in the first 
stage prediction equation as opposed to the second stage hedonic estimation.  
The sampling routine employed in this paper also requires some rather large 
assumptions. It is not immediately obvious what the optimal sampling distance should 
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be.  Irwin (2002) tested several sampling distances and found that while the majority 
of variables were robust to sampling at greater distances (i.e., so that no two 
observations are within 200, 400, and 600 meters respectively), some variables did in 
fact change sign. She therefore used the 100 meter subset as the basis of her discussion 
on the basis that it provided the most robust estimates. Sampling at greater distances 
necessarily results in fewer overall observations and a greater percentage of 
observations from less densely populated areas. Future researchers should understand 
these tradeoffs and investigate the empirical implications of different sampling 
schemes. 
3.9  Conclusion 
In conclusion, the estimation results presented in this paper illustrate the 
significant differences that exist in the marginal implicit prices for attributes of 
residential property across urban, suburban and rural areas near Rochester, NY.  
According to the estimated hedonic price equations, large public parks have a 
relatively high implicit price in urban and suburban areas, while private open spaces 
such as agricultural and private forested land is of consistently high value in rural 
locations.  In addition, proximity to Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations 
(CAFOs) and wastewater treatment facilities have significantly negative impacts on 
housing prices in rural areas, while in urban areas proximity to high traffic roads and 
waste transfer stations significantly diminish residential property prices. Overall, the 
results do not support the assumption that open space always has the highest impact on 
home prices in urban as opposed to rural areas. The impact of open space on 
residential property values is clearly dependent both on the location and the type of 
open space being considered. Failure to account for these differences across open 
space types and market areas may lead policy makers to infer incorrect values of 
specific types of open space, if considering only aggregate data.   
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To validate the robustness of the results, several additional steps should be 
undertaken in future work. First, allowing parameter estimates to vary across a more 
incremental gradient of population densities than what is presented here would allow 
for a comparison of the value of obtaining potentially more accurate estimates of 
implicit prices in each of the submarket delineations, against the loss in efficiency 
caused by lower variation within each submarket. Second, future research will extend 
this analysis to included housing markets in Binghamton and Albany, NY, which will 
allow for comparisons of implicit prices both within and between housing markets in 
Upstate New York. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A.3.1  Names of Municipalities Included in Dataset 
Market
Number of 
Transactions Municipality Names
Urban 22,654 Brighton Gates Greece Irondequoit
Chili Clarkson East Roc. Hamlin Henrietta
Suburban 26,196 Mendon Ogden Parma Penfield Perinton
Pittsford Riga Rush Webster Wheatland
Albion Avon Barre Batavia Bergen
Bethany Bristol Byron Caledonia Canadice
Canandaigua Carlton Clarendon Conesus Dansville
East Bloomfield Elba Farmington Gaines Genesee Falls
Geneseo Gorham Grove Groveland Hopewell
Huron Kendall Le Roy Leicester Lima
Rural 17,759 Livonia Macedon Manchester Marion Middlesex
Mount Morris Murray Naples North Dansville Nunda
Oakfield Ontario Ossian Palmyra Pavilion
Perry Portage Richmond Sodus South Bristol
Sparta Springwater Stafford Sweden Victor
Walworth Wayland West Bloomfield West Sparta Williamson
Yates York  
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Table A.3.2 OLS Estimation Results with Medium and Large CAFOs  
Aggregate (66,609)
R
2 = 0.773
Variable Coefficient Error
Intercept 9.36
* 0.03
Neighborhood: 0 - 400 Meters
Municipal Park -0.00046
** 0.00021
State/County Park 0.00128
* 0.00017
Agriculture 0.00183
* 0.00007
Developed OS 0.00160
* 0.00007
Private Forest 0.00213
* 0.00009
Water 0.00938
* 0.00015
Neighborhood: 400 - 1600 Meters
Municipal Park 0.000082
** 0.000031
State/County Park 0.000002 0.000012
Agriculture -0.000060
* 0.000006
Developed OS 0.000079
* 0.000008
Private Forest -0.000020
*** 0.000009
Water -0.000050
* 0.000010
Location Based
Medium CAFO -12.01
* 2.15
Large CAFO -8.62 6.78
Wastewater Tmt -12.12
* 2.87
Transfer Station -4.06
** 1.67
High Traffic Road -1.09
* 0.32
Dist. CBD -0.0035
* 0.0001
Dist. NYS Thru -0.0043
* 0.0001
Median Income 0.0026
* 0.0001
Percent White 0.327
* 0.018
Public Sewer 0.0098
** 0.0030
Pupil-Teacher 0.0046
* 0.0006
School Perf. 0.00233
* 0.00012
School Tax Rate -0.0116
* 0.0006
Village 0.0813
* 0.0034
Property Characteristics
Sale Year 0.034
* 0.000
Overall Cond. 0.171
* 0.003
Age -0.0026
* 0.0000
Living Area 0.00034
* 0.00000
Property Size 0.0502
* 0.0016
Number Bath 0.1077
* 0.0021
Central AC 0.0667
* 0.0020
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A.3.3  2SLS Estimation Results from Full Dataset 
Aggregate (66,609) Rural (17,759) Suburban (26,196) Urban (22,654)
R
2 = 0.756 R
2 = 0.687 R
2 = 0.777 R
2 = 0.746
Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Error Coefficient Error Coefficient Error
Intercept 9.23
* 0.03 8.69
* 0.16 10.21
* 0.06 9.55
* 0.06
Neighborhood: 0 - 400 Meters
Municipal Park 0.00112
* 0.00033 0.00296
** 0.00110 0.00160
* 0.00032 0.00240
* 0.00053
State/County Park 0.00301
* 0.00034 0.00252
** 0.00092 0.00414
* 0.00041 0.00256
* 0.00030
Agriculture 0.00605
* 0.00065 0.00500
* 0.00089 0.00495
* 0.00042 0.01206
* 0.00156
Developed OS 0.00467
* 0.00045 0.00577
* 0.00120 0.00419
* 0.00039 0.00227
* 0.00025
Private Forest 0.00500
* 0.00043 0.00650
* 0.00109 0.00482
* 0.00042 0.00049
*** 0.00028
Water 0.01098
* 0.00033 0.01415
* 0.00097 0.00749
* 0.00039 0.00872
* 0.00037
Neighborhood: 400 - 1600 Meters
Municipal Park -0.000320
* 0.000049 0.000236 0.000266 0.000069 0.000082 0.000412
* 0.000056
State/County Park -0.000020 0.000022 0.000054 0.000073 0.000144
* 0.000032 0.000013 0.000027
Agriculture -0.000320
* 0.000043 -0.000090 0.000061 -0.000040 0.000050 -0.000470
* 0.000095
Developed OS 0.000021 0.000029 0.000978
* 0.000151 0.000205
* 0.000047 0.000077
** 0.000029
Private Forest -0.000220
* 0.000025 -0.000190
** 0.000068 0.000029 0.000073 0.000353
* 0.000038
Water -0.000120
* 0.000020 0.000006 0.000055 0.000187
* 0.000045 -0.000150
* 0.000028
Location Based
CAFO -6.89
** 2.14 -10.58
* 2.84 - - - -
Wastewater Tmt 7.36
*** 3.77 -22.20
* 4.89 39.83
* 6.85 130.13
* 22.64
Transfer Station -1.71 1.75 9.26
** 3.46 -3.61 2.92 -12.85
* 3.39
High Traffic Road -0.82
** 0.33 -0.21 0.62 1.19
*** 0.70 -2.38
* 0.53
Dist. CBD -0.0025
* 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0005 -0.0048
* 0.0012 -0.0226
* 0.0059
Dist. NYS Thruway -0.0039
* 0.0002 -0.0078
* 0.0004 -0.0018
* 0.0005 -0.0028
** 0.0014
Median Income 0.0015
* 0.0002 0.0030
* 0.0005 0.0010
* 0.0002 0.0042
* 0.0002
Percent White 0.278
* 0.020 0.117
** 0.055 -0.244
* 0.056 0.190
* 0.029
Public Sewer 0.0161
** 0.0051 0.0030 0.0090 -0.0026 0.0064 0.0804
* 0.0113
Pupil-Teacher Ratio 0.0075
* 0.0007 -0.0061
*** 0.0035 0.0318
* 0.0014 -0.0111
* 0.0015
School Performance 0.00260
* 0.00013 0.00469
* 0.00057 0.00054
** 0.00024 0.00122
* 0.00025
School Tax Rate -0.0103
* 0.0006 -0.0133
* 0.0017 -0.0349
* 0.0018 0.0024 0.0028
Village 0.1189
* 0.0076 0.0298
** 0.0097 0.1644
* 0.0090 -0.0632
** 0.0230
Property Characteristics
Sale Year 0.034
* 0.000 0.035
* 0.001 0.035
* 0.001 0.033
* 0.001
Overall Condition 0.181
* 0.003 0.208
* 0.005 0.111
* 0.005 0.161
* 0.007
Age -0.0025
* 0.0000 -0.0021
* 0.0001 -0.0030
* 0.0001 -0.0023
* 0.0001
Living Area 0.00033
* 0.00000 0.00032
* 0.00001 0.00034
* 0.00000 0.00036
* 0.00000
Property Size 0.0458
* 0.0022 0.0563
* 0.0029 0.0641
* 0.0027 0.0463
* 0.0072
Number Bathrooms 0.0993
* 0.0024 0.0971
* 0.0056 0.0851
* 0.0031 0.0953
* 0.0034
Central AC 0.0615
* 0.0022 0.0604
* 0.0081 0.0624
* 0.0029 0.0544
* 0.0028  
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A.3.4  OLS Estimation Results from Sampled Dataset 
Aggregate (22,721) Rural (8,507) Suburban (9,050) Urban (5,164)
R
2 = 0.766 R
2 = 0.7088 R
2 = 0.7888 R
2 = 0.7923
Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Error Coefficient Error Coefficient Error
Intercept 9.43
* 0.05 9.30
* 0.13 9.64
* 0.09 9.53
* 0.08
Neighborhood: 0 - 400 Meters
Municipal Park -0.00040 0.00040 -0.00041 0.00134 -0.00042 0.00043 -0.00025 0.00076
State/County Park 0.00097
** 0.00031 -0.00033 0.00079 0.00049 0.00047 0.00154
* 0.00036
Agriculture 0.00153
* 0.00014 0.00144
* 0.00025 0.00109
* 0.00020 0.00146
* 0.00034
Developed OS 0.00104
* 0.00014 0.00139
* 0.00039 0.00033
*** 0.00020 0.00181
* 0.00020
Private Forest 0.00165
* 0.00017 0.00132
* 0.00034 0.00084
* 0.00025 0.00208
* 0.00027
Water 0.00875
* 0.00028 0.00952
* 0.00049 0.00544
* 0.00054 0.00734
* 0.00044
Neighborhood: 400 - 1600 Meters
Municipal Park -0.000030 0.000064 -0.000380 0.000271 -0.000090 0.000076 -0.000050 0.000097
State/County Park 0.000050
** 0.000023 0.000113
*** 0.000062 0.000115
* 0.000034 0.000167
* 0.000031
Agriculture -0.000010 0.000012 -0.000050
** 0.000025 -0.000030 0.000022 0.000108
** 0.000035
Developed OS 0.000128
* 0.000016 0.000272
* 0.000058 0.000108
* 0.000024 0.000291
* 0.000026
Private Forest 0.000016 0.000016 -0.000030 0.000034 -0.000020 0.000028 0.000081
** 0.000030
Water 0.000055
** 0.000020 0.000088
** 0.000038 0.000056 0.000036 -0.000008 0.000030
Location Based
CAFO -11.17
* 3.32 -9.50
** 3.94 - - - -
Wastewater Tmt -10.85
** 5.19 -17.97
** 6.79 17.92 11.66 38.74 34.17
Transfer Station -2.87 2.43 -0.27 3.24 -8.11 9.45 -6.69 4.39
High Traffic Road -1.48
** 0.55 -1.42
*** 0.81 -0.74 1.23 -3.48
* 0.91
Dist. CBD -0.0042
* 0.0002 -0.0026
* 0.0005 -0.0033
* 0.0008 -0.0200
* 0.0031
Dist. NYS Thru -0.0045
* 0.0002 -0.0062
* 0.0004 -0.0010
** 0.0004 0.0025
** 0.0012
Median Income 0.0027
* 0.0002 0.0041
* 0.0006 0.0023
* 0.0002 0.0033
* 0.0004
Percent White 0.318
* 0.033 0.138
** 0.065 0.310
* 0.070 0.037 0.051
Public Sewer 0.0198
* 0.0051 0.0294
** 0.0097 0.0034 0.0069 0.0040 0.0121
Pupil-Teacher 0.0082
* 0.0011 0.0056
** 0.0023 0.0252
* 0.0023 -0.0089
* 0.0021
School Perf. 0.00177
* 0.00022 0.00289
* 0.00052 0.00245
* 0.00033 0.00206
* 0.00043
School Tax Rate -0.0138
* 0.0010 -0.0148
* 0.0016 -0.0282
* 0.0027 0.0040 0.0031
Village 0.0702
* 0.0064 0.0145 0.0121 0.0711
* 0.0101 -0.0974
** 0.0406
Property Characteristics
Sale Year 0.034
* 0.001 0.034
* 0.001 0.036
* 0.001 0.033
* 0.001
Overall Cond. 0.182
* 0.005 0.222
* 0.007 0.113
* 0.007 0.122
* 0.012
Age -0.0025
* 0.0001 -0.0022
* 0.0001 -0.0029
* 0.0001 -0.0028
* 0.0001
Living Area 0.00033
* 0.00000 0.00031
* 0.00001 0.00033
* 0.00001 0.00035
* 0.00001
Property Size 0.0492
* 0.0021 0.0501
* 0.0031 0.0605
* 0.0034 0.0656
* 0.0072
Number Bath 0.1158
* 0.0037 0.1099
* 0.0068 0.1008
* 0.0053 0.1029
* 0.0063
Central AC 0.0709
* 0.0041 0.0847
* 0.0102 0.0730
* 0.0053 0.0486
* 0.0056  
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Table A.3.5  Census Defined Market Areas: OLS Results on Sampled Data 
Rural (8,444) Urban Cluster (2,062) Urban Area (12,213)
R
2 = 0.7323 R
2 = 0.7094 R
2 = 0.7998
Variable Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Intercept 9.26
* 0.13 9.16
* 0.34 9.44
* 0.06
Neighborhood: 0 - 400 Meters
Municipal Park -0.00062 0.00135 0.00053 0.00157 0.00002 0.00038
State/County Park -0.00006 0.00064 -0.00044 0.00177 0.00103
** 0.00034
Agriculture 0.00093
** 0.00028 0.00292
* 0.00047 0.00167
* 0.00018
Developed OS 0.00050 0.00047 0.00376
* 0.00063 0.00107
* 0.00014
Private Forest 0.00124
* 0.00038 0.00313
* 0.00067 0.00170
* 0.00019
Water 0.00911
* 0.00055 0.01226
* 0.00096 0.00602
* 0.00036
Neighborhood: 400 - 1600 Meters
Municipal Park -0.000220 0.000208 -0.001820
** 0.000633 0.000156
** 0.000058
State/County Park 0.000222
* 0.000051 -0.000450
* 0.000129 0.000054
** 0.000025
Agriculture 0.000079
** 0.000030 -0.000340
* 0.000051 -0.000004 0.000016
Developed OS 0.000228
* 0.000057 -0.000110 0.000110 0.000160
* 0.000016
Private Forest 0.000075
** 0.000037 -0.000360
* 0.000078 0.000083
* 0.000020
Water 0.000140
* 0.000042 -0.000110 0.000092 -0.000004 0.000023
Location Based
CAFO -1.60 4.75 -3.95 7.62 -44.95 71.45
Wastewater Tmt -8.48 9.13 -30.22
** 11.67 -15.87 10.54
Transfer Station 0.30 3.56 8.12 9.71 -3.29 6.19
High Traffic Road -1.26 1.01 0.84 1.34 -1.60
** 0.76
Dist. CBD -0.0043
* 0.0004 -0.0063
* 0.0012 -0.0037
* 0.0006
Dist. NYS Thru -0.0050
* 0.0004 -0.0027
** 0.0009 -0.0015
* 0.0003
Median Income 0.0032
* 0.0004 0.0037
* 0.0010 0.0024
* 0.0002
Percent White 0.272
* 0.068 0.395
* 0.118 0.226
* 0.042
Public Sewer 0.0378
* 0.0099 -0.0031 0.0233 -0.0042 0.0063
Pupil-Teacher 0.0144
* 0.0023 0.0107
** 0.0047 0.0006 0.0014
School Perf. 0.00149
** 0.00051 0.00369
** 0.00147 0.00228
* 0.00024
School Tax Rate -0.0124
* 0.0017 -0.0122
** 0.0044 -0.0009 0.0017
Village 0.0356
** 0.0152 0.0766
* 0.0229 0.0593
* 0.0089
Property Characteristics
Sale Year 0.032
* 0.001 0.032
* 0.002 0.036
* 0.001
Overall Cond. 0.213
* 0.007 0.228
* 0.016 0.104
* 0.007
Age -0.0023
* 0.0001 -0.0026
* 0.0002 -0.0028
* 0.0001
Living Area 0.00032
* 0.00001 0.00031
* 0.00001 0.00034
* 0.00000
Property Size 0.0503
* 0.0029 0.0559
* 0.0120 0.0622
* 0.0044
Number Bath 0.1060
* 0.0068 0.1287
* 0.0140 0.1062
* 0.0044
Central AC 0.0930
* 0.0098 0.0898
* 0.0199 0.0635
* 0.0041  
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A.3.6 Census Defined Market Areas: 2SLS results on sampled data 
Rural (8,444) Urban Cluster (2,062) Urban Area (12,213)
R
2 = 0.7148 R
2 = 0.6286 R
2 = 0.7905
Variable Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Intercept 8.54
* 0.32 7.26
* 0.79 9.53
* 0.06
Neighborhood: 0 - 400 Meters
Municipal Park -0.00019 0.00158 0.00053 0.00216 0.00156
** 0.00057
State/County Park 0.00040 0.00098 0.00182 0.00254 0.00210
* 0.00049
Agriculture 0.00143 0.00103 0.00822
* 0.00196 0.00544
* 0.00107
Developed OS 0.00071 0.00156 0.01096
* 0.00254 0.00287
* 0.00053
Private Forest 0.00255
*** 0.00134 0.00971
* 0.00219 0.00290
* 0.00050
Water 0.01040
* 0.00128 0.01722
* 0.00187 0.00676
* 0.00047
Neighborhood: 400 - 1600 Meters
Municipal Park 0.000124 0.000238 -0.003080
** 0.001270 -0.000030 0.000082
State/County Park 0.000725
* 0.000178 -0.000700
* 0.000205 -0.000050 0.000035
Agriculture 0.000558
* 0.000157 -0.000920
* 0.000185 -0.000360
* 0.000072
Developed OS 0.001080
** 0.000337 -0.000080 0.000378 -0.000010 0.000040
Private Forest 0.000664
* 0.000185 -0.000310 0.000225 -0.000050 0.000053
Water 0.000558
* 0.000143 -0.000410
** 0.000188 -0.000110
* 0.000030
Location Based
CAFO -1.92 4.95 7.09 11.37 1.68 73.97
Wastewater Tmt -3.58 10.14 -23.33
*** 13.93 -23.93
** 11.86
Transfer Station 3.27 3.81 36.58
** 16.26 -4.59 6.38
High Traffic Road -0.41 1.09 1.53 1.54 -1.51
*** 0.79
Dist. CBD -0.0040
* 0.0004 -0.0046
** 0.0023 0.0010 0.0014
Dist. NYS Thru -0.0077
* 0.0009 -0.0023 0.0020 -0.0013
** 0.0005
Median Income 0.0016
** 0.0007 0.0078
* 0.0021 0.0028
* 0.0002
Percent White 0.119 0.084 0.293
*** 0.166 0.152
** 0.050
Public Sewer 0.0528
* 0.0128 -0.0883
** 0.0407 -0.0057 0.0097
Pupil-Teacher 0.0163
* 0.0025 0.0089 0.0058 -0.0033
** 0.0017
School Perf. 0.00135
** 0.00054 0.01288
* 0.00254 0.00230
* 0.00025
School Tax Rate -0.0095
* 0.0020 -0.0090 0.0120 0.0005 0.0018
Village 0.1001
* 0.0303 0.1765
* 0.0419 0.0874
* 0.0127
Property Characteristics
Sale Year 0.033
* 0.001 0.029
* 0.003 0.036
* 0.001
Overall Cond. 0.202
* 0.008 0.238
* 0.018 0.108
* 0.007
Age -0.0022
* 0.0001 -0.0020
* 0.0003 -0.0027
* 0.0001
Living Area 0.00032
* 0.00001 0.00032
* 0.00002 0.00034
* 0.00000
Property Size 0.0473
* 0.0034 0.0485
* 0.0141 0.0566
* 0.0056
Number Bath 0.1051
* 0.0072 0.1163
* 0.0163 0.1043
* 0.0046
Central AC 0.0877
* 0.0108 0.0736
** 0.0248 0.0623
* 0.0042  
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A.3.7  County Defined Market Areas: OLS Results from Sampled Dataset 
Outside Monroe (8,294) Monroe County (14,425)
R
2 = 0.7097 R
2 = 0.7867
Variable Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Intercept 9.33
* 0.13 9.41
* 0.06
Neighborhood: 0 - 400 Meters
Municipal Park -0.00062 0.00135 -0.00002 0.00038
State/County Park -0.00058 0.00080 0.00130
* 0.00031
Agriculture 0.00149
* 0.00026 0.00143
* 0.00016
Developed OS 0.00164
* 0.00041 0.00106
* 0.00014
Private Forest 0.00145
* 0.00035 0.00185
* 0.00018
Water 0.01014
* 0.00050 0.00610
* 0.00036
Neighborhood: 400 - 1600 Meters
Municipal Park -0.000520
*** 0.000275 0.000152
** 0.000060
State/County Park 0.000087 0.000065 0.000077
* 0.000023
Agriculture -0.000080
** 0.000026 0.000022 0.000016
Developed OS 0.000208
* 0.000060 0.000171
* 0.000016
Private Forest -0.000080
** 0.000035 0.000055
** 0.000019
Water 0.000025 0.000039 0.000017 0.000023
Location Based
CAFO -5.13 4.03 -30.94 32.93
Wastewater Tmt -24.93
* 7.22 14.97 10.85
Transfer Station 8.65 7.46 -1.31 2.55
High Traffic Road -0.09 0.86 -1.68
** 0.75
Dist. CBD -0.0033
* 0.0005 -0.0058
* 0.0006
Dist. NYS Thru -0.0056
* 0.0004 -0.0013
* 0.0003
Median Income 0.0042
* 0.0006 0.0027
* 0.0002
Percent White 0.186
** 0.066 0.242
* 0.042
Public Sewer 0.0229
** 0.0099 -0.0084 0.0059
Pupil-Teacher 0.0063
** 0.0024 0.0021 0.0015
School Perf. 0.00261
* 0.00053 0.00222
* 0.00024
School Tax Rate -0.0138
* 0.0016 -0.0023 0.0017
Village 0.0235
*** 0.0125 0.0779
* 0.0088
Property Characteristics
Sale Year 0.034
* 0.001 0.035
* 0.001
Overall Cond. 0.221
* 0.007 0.115
* 0.006
Age -0.0022
* 0.0001 -0.0028
* 0.0001
Living Area 0.00031
* 0.00001 0.00034
* 0.00000
Property Size 0.0510
* 0.0032 0.0596
* 0.0030
Number Bath 0.1099
* 0.0069 0.1062
* 0.0042
Central AC 0.0932
* 0.0106 0.0673
* 0.0041  
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 A.3.8  County Defined Market Areas: 2SLS Results from Sampled Dataset 
Outside Monroe (8,294) Monroe County (14,425)
R
2 = 0.6837 R
2 = 0.7786
Variable Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Intercept 8.53
* 0.26 9.47
* 0.06
Neighborhood: 0 - 400 Meters
Municipal Park 0.00158 0.00168 0.00129
** 0.00053
State/County Park 0.00061 0.00122 0.00259
* 0.00049
Agriculture 0.00284
** 0.00114 0.00480
* 0.00086
Developed OS 0.00322
*** 0.00166 0.00311
* 0.00054
Private Forest 0.00394
** 0.00146 0.00365
* 0.00056
Water 0.01205
* 0.00129 0.00724
* 0.00052
Neighborhood: 400 - 1600 Meters
Municipal Park 0.000445 0.000389 -0.000060 0.000088
State/County Park 0.000394
* 0.000106 -0.000020 0.000035
Agriculture 0.000238
** 0.000086 -0.000280
* 0.000061
Developed OS 0.001431
* 0.000317 0.000029 0.000041
Private Forest 0.000206
** 0.000101 -0.000090
*** 0.000052
Water 0.000318
* 0.000085 -0.000080
** 0.000031
Location Based
CAFO -11.08
** 4.46 -28.05 33.88
Wastewater Tmt -32.09
* 8.06 25.48
** 11.92
Transfer Station 17.43
** 8.82 -1.89 2.61
High Traffic Road 0.34 0.93 -1.69
** 0.77
Dist. CBD -0.0014
** 0.0007 -0.0023
*** 0.0012
Dist. NYS Thru -0.0079
* 0.0007 -0.0011
** 0.0004
Median Income 0.0027
* 0.0007 0.0028
* 0.0002
Percent White 0.045 0.079 0.156
** 0.049
Public Sewer 0.0151 0.0135 -0.0110 0.0102
Pupil-Teacher 0.0033 0.0037 -0.0007 0.0016
School Perf. 0.00337
* 0.00070 0.00226
* 0.00025
School Tax Rate -0.0097
* 0.0022 -0.0009 0.0019
Village 0.0277 0.0176 0.1178
* 0.0136
Property Characteristics
Sale Year 0.034
* 0.001 0.035
* 0.001
Overall Cond. 0.220
* 0.007 0.120
* 0.007
Age -0.0021
* 0.0001 -0.0027
* 0.0001
Living Area 0.00031
* 0.00001 0.00033
* 0.00000
Property Size 0.0540
* 0.0039 0.0594
* 0.0035
Number Bath 0.1043
* 0.0076 0.1037
* 0.0044
Central AC 0.0694
* 0.0139 0.0662
* 0.0041  
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Table A.3.9 Coefficient range from 10 sample draws: aggregate and rural 
Aggregate Rural
Variable Coefficient S.E. Min Max Coefficient S.E. Min Max
Intercept 9.29
* 0.07 9.15 9.34 8.40
* 0.30 8.01 8.43
Neighborhood: 0 - 400 Meters
Municipal Park 0.00170
** 0.00078 0.00110 0.00238 0.00225 0.00179 0.00177 0.00474
State/County Park 0.00332
* 0.00082 0.00261 0.00414 0.00132 0.00135 0.00083 0.00213
Agriculture 0.00609
* 0.00138 0.00480 0.00766 0.00366
** 0.00144 0.00267 0.00496
Developed OS 0.00453
* 0.00116 0.00341 0.00578 0.00413
** 0.00204 0.00271 0.00555
Private Forest 0.00539
* 0.00115 0.00427 0.00698 0.00472
** 0.00180 0.00356 0.00635
Water 0.01127
* 0.00087 0.01090 0.01290 0.01229
* 0.00159 0.01147 0.01399
Neighborhood: 400 - 1600 Meters
Municipal Park -0.000320
** 0.000110 -0.000320 -0.000120 0.000722
*** 0.000398 0.000580 0.001290
State/County Park 0.000008 0.000044 -0.000040 0.000017 0.000445
* 0.000107 0.000399 0.000590
Agriculture -0.000240
** 0.000085 -0.000330 -0.000190 0.000256
** 0.000088 0.000244 0.000358
Developed OS 0.000082 0.000060 0.000028 0.000100 0.001582
* 0.000363 0.001502 0.002000
Private Forest -0.000170
** 0.000062 -0.000250 -0.000120 0.000254
** 0.000104 0.000211 0.000353
Water -0.000020 0.000046 -0.000090 -0.000020 0.000375
* 0.000085 0.000327 0.000454
Location Based
CAFO -6.79
** 3.29 -6.86 -1.70 -14.63
* 4.43 -16.31 -10.21
Wastewater Tmt 1.08 6.68 -8.25 2.06 -23.28
** 7.89 -32.62 -23.22
Transfer Station -1.95 2.54 -3.26 1.34 3.69 3.71 4.26 6.41
High Traffic Road -0.64 0.62 -1.00 0.18 -0.59 0.94 -0.72 0.53
Dist. CBD -0.0041
* 0.0002 -0.0044 -0.0041 -0.0005 0.0008 -0.0008 0.0004
Dist. NYS Thru -0.0043
* 0.0003 -0.0044 -0.0042 -0.0088
* 0.0007 -0.0096 -0.0085
Median Income 0.0013
** 0.0004 0.0009 0.0020 0.0026
* 0.0007 0.0020 0.0031
Percent White 0.244
* 0.040 0.266 0.315 -0.016 0.080 -0.016 0.071
Public Sewer 0.0355
* 0.0078 0.0320 0.0440 0.0202 0.0153 0.0058 0.0278
Pupil-Teacher 0.0113
* 0.0014 0.0096 0.0112 0.0026 0.0045 -0.0014 0.0023
School Perf. 0.00197
* 0.00025 0.00169 0.00221 0.00363
* 0.00078 0.00359 0.00413
School Tax Rate -0.0129
* 0.0011 -0.0133 -0.0120 -0.0105
* 0.0023 -0.0108 -0.0077
Village 0.1324
* 0.0199 0.1147 0.1524 0.0296
*** 0.0172 0.0129 0.0420
Property Characteristics
Sale Year 0.034
* 0.001 0.033 0.035 0.034
* 0.001 0.033 0.035
Overall Cond. 0.188
* 0.005 0.183 0.190 0.218
* 0.007 0.212 0.222
Age -0.0023
* 0.0001 -0.0023 -0.0023 -0.0021
* 0.0001 -0.0022 -0.0020
Living Area 0.00032
* 0.00000 0.00031 0.00032 0.00030
* 0.00001 0.00029 0.00031
Property Size 0.0468
* 0.0026 0.0444 0.0484 0.0536
* 0.0041 0.0530 0.0573
Number Bath 0.1085
* 0.0043 0.1041 0.1170 0.1030
* 0.0079 0.1012 0.1117
Central AC 0.0663
* 0.0045 0.0642 0.0716 0.0599
* 0.0144 0.0360 0.0691 
 
 
 
  153 
Table A.3.10 Coefficient range from 10 sample draws: suburban and urban 
Suburban Urban
Variable Coefficient S.E. Min Max Coefficient S.E. Min Max
Intercept 10.01
* 0.12 9.87 10.08 9.63
* 0.11 9.44 9.61
Neighborhood: 0 - 400 Meters
Municipal Park 0.00210
** 0.00066 0.00159 0.00236 0.00167 0.00102 0.00138 0.00391
State/County Park 0.00381
* 0.00078 0.00354 0.00448 0.00261
* 0.00059 0.00202 0.00361
Agriculture 0.00503
* 0.00089 0.00416 0.00524 0.00776
* 0.00220 0.00679 0.01326
Developed OS 0.00394
* 0.00085 0.00326 0.00435 0.00210
* 0.00056 0.00222 0.00351
Private Forest 0.00503
* 0.00092 0.00442 0.00564 0.00079 0.00054 0.00063 0.00205
Water 0.00781
* 0.00078 0.00748 0.00916 0.00838
* 0.00068 0.00834 0.01015
Neighborhood: 400 - 1600 Meters
Municipal Park 0.000067 0.000132 0.000022 0.000157 0.000372
** 0.000128 0.000333 0.000610
State/County Park 0.000222
* 0.000055 0.000166 0.000202 -0.000020 0.000068 -0.000110 0.000005
Agriculture 0.000045 0.000083 0.000037 0.000110 -0.000430
** 0.000191 -0.000810 -0.000420
Developed OS 0.000333
* 0.000076 0.000292 0.000359 0.000050 0.000075 -0.000060 0.000096
Private Forest 0.000143 0.000110 0.000075 0.000214 0.000342
* 0.000064 0.000275 0.000429
Water 0.000292
* 0.000074 0.000213 0.000296 -0.000140
*** 0.000072 -0.000220 -0.000060
Location Based
CAFO - - - -
Wastewater Tmt 43.69
** 13.92 31.37 64.57 49.44 38.33 48.39 88.20
Transfer Station 9.33 10.23 -6.85 23.27 -9.06
*** 4.71 -19.60 -9.31
High Traffic Road 1.87 1.37 -0.51 1.75 -3.03
** 1.04 -3.80 -2.72
Dist. CBD -0.0057
** 0.0018 -0.0077 -0.0053 -0.0100 0.0130 -0.0367 -0.0036
Dist. NYS Thru -0.0034
* 0.0008 -0.0033 -0.0024 -0.0030 0.0029 -0.0058 0.0023
Median Income 0.0008
** 0.0003 0.0007 0.0012 0.0042
* 0.0005 0.0033 0.0045
Percent White -0.137 0.100 -0.111 0.022 0.155
** 0.063 0.095 0.217
Public Sewer 0.0115 0.0110 0.0039 0.0162 0.0629
** 0.0193 0.0370 0.1039
Pupil-Teacher 0.0278
* 0.0026 0.0245 0.0299 -0.0138
* 0.0033 -0.0159 -0.0084
School Perf. 0.00011 0.00047 -0.00028 0.00048 0.00189
* 0.00057 0.00181 0.00259
School Tax Rate -0.0305
* 0.0034 -0.0345 -0.0265 0.0016 0.0048 -0.0086 0.0049
Village 0.1763
* 0.0193 0.1560 0.1759 -0.1203
** 0.0438 -0.1175 -0.0476
Property Characteristics
Sale Year 0.036
* 0.001 0.035 0.037 0.032
* 0.001 0.032 0.035
Overall Cond. 0.122
* 0.008 0.109 0.120 0.121
* 0.013 0.126 0.152
Age -0.0029
* 0.0001 -0.0029 -0.0028 -0.0027
* 0.0002 -0.0028 -0.0025
Living Area 0.00032
* 0.00001 0.00032 0.00033 0.00036
* 0.00001 0.00033 0.00036
Property Size 0.0621
* 0.0038 0.0580 0.0635 0.0501
* 0.0096 0.0336 0.0542
Number Bath 0.0911
* 0.0058 0.0887 0.0964 0.1030
* 0.0069 0.1005 0.1183
Central AC 0.0687
* 0.0056 0.0691 0.0770 0.0518
* 0.0060 0.0499 0.0594 
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Table A.3.11 First stage regression results 
Agricultural Land Developed Open Space Forested Open Space
R
2 = 0.714 R
2 = 0.594 R
2 = 0.460
F-Stat of Instruments=1939 F-Stat of Instruments= 442.9 F-Stat of Instruments=861.7
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Intercept -7289.53
* 143.64 1530.39
* 116.59 -1087.90
* 95.17
In Ag District 208.67
* 6.54 -93.93
* 5.31 -62.93
* 4.33
Building Suitability 134.90
* 5.36 -94.85
* 4.35 -78.33
* 3.55
Septic Suitability -56.43
* 7.70 58.84
* 6.25 8.25 5.10
Soil Productivity 8.14
* 0.23 1.93
* 0.19 -7.89
* 0.15
ln_dist_roch 726.52
* 11.45 -323.80
* 9.30 380.55
* 7.59
ln_thru_dist 37.97
* 6.77 87.67
* 5.50 -60.73
* 4.49
Municipal Park_4 -2.29
* 0.43 0.86
** 0.35 -0.56
** 0.28
State/County Park_4 -0.06 0.32 0.58
** 0.26 -0.55
** 0.21
Water_4 -0.18 0.29 0.44
*** 0.24 -0.73
* 0.19
Municipal Park_4_16 -2.39
* 0.07 1.83
* 0.05 -0.79
* 0.04
State/County Park_4_16 -0.17
* 0.02 -0.42
* 0.02 -0.13
* 0.02
Water_4_16 -0.52
* 0.02 -0.19
* 0.02 -0.18
* 0.01
Pct. Ag_4_16 -79.86
* 16.62 142.48
* 13.49 85.94
* 11.01
Pct. Dev_o_4_16 -589.99
* 48.78 565.73
* 39.59 -323.15
* 32.32
Pct. Lg. for_4_16 -59.78 42.16 392.29
* 34.22 -375.39
* 27.93
CAFO 17770.00
* 3571.85 -3146.53 2899.32 -677.98 2366.54
Wastewater Tmt 85713.00
* 5558.66 -54933.00
* 4512.03 -3478.34 3682.90
Transfer Station 10527.00
* 2602.18 -10469.00
* 2112.23 -1010.17 1724.08
High Traffic Road -1301.64
** 588.41 7.68 477.62 -191.80 389.85
Dist. CBD -15.84
* 0.51 8.36
* 0.42 -14.29
* 0.34
Dist. NYS Thru -5.60
* 0.53 -7.03
* 0.43 13.83
* 0.35
Median Income -0.67
* 0.16 4.65
* 0.13 2.38
* 0.11
Percent White 227.67
* 37.67 117.20
* 30.58 -211.72
* 24.96
Public Sewer -224.10
* 5.13 162.53
* 4.17 -38.28
* 3.40
Pupil-Teacher -17.90
* 1.19 -4.70
* 0.97 -5.95
* 0.79
School Perf. 3.66
* 0.24 0.31 0.20 -0.47
** 0.16
School Tax Rate 17.73
* 1.09 -12.32
* 0.89 -6.69
* 0.72
Village -90.09
* 6.90 7.44 5.60 -79.45
* 4.57
Sale Year 2.58
* 0.69 -3.76
* 0.56 1.29
** 0.46
Overall Cond. 25.52
* 4.87 -37.11
* 3.96 15.09
* 3.23
Age -0.39
* 0.06 0.28
* 0.05 -0.09
** 0.04
Living Area 0.01
** 0.00 0.01
* 0.00 -0.02
* 0.00
Property Size 4.27
*** 2.26 -23.09
* 1.84 25.36
* 1.50
Number Bath -10.26
** 3.97 22.46
* 3.22 0.43 2.63
Central AC -10.97
** 4.40 20.94
* 3.57 -2.03 2.91  
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A.3.12. Tiao-Goldberger F-Statistics 
Variable
Full Dataset      
OLS
Sampled Dataset  
2SLS
Intercept 18.23
* 28.46
*
Neighborhood: 0 - 400 Meters
  
Municipal Park 0.06
  0.09
 
State/County Park 2.37
** 3.91
*
Agriculture 8.76
* 39.06
*
Developed OS 146.15
* 53.50
*
Private Forest 23.64
* 70.64
*
Water 88.04
* 19.70
*
Neighborhood: 400 - 1600 Meters
  
Municipal Park 2.93
** 2.15
**
State/County Park 12.43
* 14.44
*
Agriculture 64.79
* 15.37
*
Developed OS 78.77
* 26.07
*
Private Forest 33.56
* 1.58
 
Water 4.17
* 24.63
*
Location Based
  
CAFO - -
Wastewater Tmt 23.67
* 9.75
*
Transfer Station 5.37
* 2.08
**
High Traffic Road 4.44
* 3.21
**
Dist. CBD 38.32
* 5.01
*
Dist. NYS Thru 175.85
* 17.79
*
Median Income 12.05
* 15.72
*
Percent White 9.56
* 3.04
**
Public Sewer 8.23
* 2.39
**
Pupil-Teacher 253.87
* 51.88
*
School Perf. 8.29
* 12.62
*
School Tax Rate 161.20
* 17.78
*
Village 23.99
* 33.23
*
Property Characteristics
  
Sale Year 1.15
  2.77
**
Overall Cond. 152.61
* 46.70
*
Age 31.03
* 17.90
*
Living Area 10.40
* 11.16
*
Property Size 11.43
* 1.45
 
Number Bath 4.40
* 1.07
 
Central AC 10.49
* 1.49
 
 
Note: *,**,*** Indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels respectively. 
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Figure A.3.1.  Spatial Distribution of Residential Transactions 
 
Figure A.3.2. Urban, Suburban and Rural Municipalities in the Study Area  
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Figure A.3.3.  Spatial Distribution of Potential Disamenities 
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